Issue No. 801

Al-Shabaab's Offensive Steps Up Further

Al-Shabaab's offensive momentum continues across central Somalia. Yesterday morning, as President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud travelled to Mogadishu's airport to depart for Adan Yabaal in Middle Shabelle, a major improvised explosive device (IED) was remotely detonated near his presidential convoy. Thankfully, the president was unharmed, but the explosion pulled down buildings at the Ceel-gaabta junction and wrecked a bulletproof SUV in the convoy. Several people were consequently killed in the blast, including two journalists, Mohamed Abukar Dabashe and Sultan Ayub Wardhere, while a number of presidential red berets were also injured. The condemnation of the attack in Mogadishu was swift, with the UK calling it a "cowardly act."

Photos of the massive roadside explosion have been widely shared across social media, with enormous quantities of concrete rubble strewn across the intersection. Beyond the immediate damage, what it patently displayed, once again, was the extent to which Al-Shabaab has penetrated Mogadishu through its much-feared secret service known as the Amniyaat. A major IED like the one detonated yesterday would most likely have been assembled by operatives within its specialist bomb-making wing known as the Mutafaajiriin, who typically construct Al-Shabaab's larger explosive devices in the city centre piecemeal to avoid detection. The enormous attack on a presidential convoy en route to the airport on a main road further signalled another monumental lapse in Mogadishu security for the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), whose director has been decamped in Beledweyne for much of the year. It raises several questions for NISA and Villa Somalia, not least why the president dismissed the recent warnings of the US Embassy about an impending attack in the capital as "propaganda." 

Though yesterday's attempted assassination of the president naturally garnered the most attention, there were several other attacks conducted by Al-Shabaab in Middle Shabelle—ramping up again the operational tempo of the jihadist group. Particularly notable was the reported overrunning of a Somali National Army (SNA) military base held by Turkish-trained Gorgor forces in Warta Dibi Samatar by Al-Shabaab, with the militants claiming to have seized a significant quantity of munitions and inflicted several casualties. It appears increasingly likely that the jihadists will attempt to take Aadale in southern Middle Shabelle in the coming days as they consolidate their hold across more of the country's interior.

Al-Shabaab's simultaneous pivot to Lower Shabelle had been predicted for some time, with its encroachment on Mogadishu and the severing of parts of the region from the capital making strategic sense. It may, in part, also be motivated by the increased drone and air strikes conducted by the US, Ethiopia, and Turkey on behalf of the Somali government. More drones are expected to be deployed to the battlefield in the coming days, including two Bayraktar Akinci drones purchased on behalf of Mogadishu by Qatar, each estimated to cost USD 8 million, which landed in the capital yesterday. These drones are superior to the well-known and popular Bayraktar TB2 models, with the Akinci delivering longer endurance and advanced surveillance systems.

However, the increasing deployment of airpower against Al-Shabaab has limits, and these drones will be almost entirely ineffective if the jihadists move the battlefield into Mogadishu itself. The federal government will likely struggle to justify requesting a collective self-defence strike from AFRICOM in Mogadishu, where Al-Shabaab can easily slip through the populace undetected and carry out ambushes or plant IEDs. With the increase in drone strikes and the jihadists' offensive in Lower Shabelle and Banaadir, we can likely anticipate an increase in ambushes and the rapid mobilisation of fighters before dispersal.

Moreover, drones are also limited in their defensive capabilities if not attached to a particular locale, having to patrol significant territory for long periods. With Al-Shabaab having massed thousands of fighters across the Shabelles, the militants are now able to mobilise quickly and strike in several possible locations. While drones can prevent Al-Shabaab from clustering in particular areas and can inflict high casualties when the jihadists try to seize individual villages, they don't slow the broader operational groundswell and tempo.

Al-Shabaab most likely did not anticipate positioning itself to capture Mogadishu at this stage in its offensive planning, but if there is a collapse of government security forces, the jihadists may have to move faster than planned. The deployment of the Custodial Corps to the battlefield in the Shabelles should be of particular concern, as these forces are likely to fold on the battlefield due to their inexperience and reported low morale. If these are the 'bottom of the barrel' and the federal government is unable—or unwilling—to deploy other more experienced forces to the battlefield, this should be of immense concern.

So what are the options to stem the seemingly inexorable advance of Al-Shabaab? The president will have to attempt to hurriedly build a coalition that can at least slow Al-Shabaab's offensive. To do so, he will have to make serious political concessions regarding his entirely improbable one-person, one-vote (OPOV) plan, as well as his constitutional agenda that has brought the country's political settlement to its knees. While Villa Somalia desperately needs to mend fences, it is negotiating from a position of weakness, and whether it is willing or ready to make the necessary concessions remains to be seen. Even today, the OPOV process appears to still exist in the minds of some senior officials, with PM Barre still hosting a meeting this week to report on its 'progress.' But as the security situation deteriorates and the government continues to unravel, it will become ever clearer that its implementation is now even less viable in central Somalia. The indications from the recent reshuffle are hardly positive, which rewarded Damul Jadiid members, the small Muslim Brotherhood clique to which Hassan Sheikh belongs, the president's family members, and regime loyalists. The reshuffle of the country's longest-serving and particularly inept Defence Minister, Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur 'Jama,' was long overdue, having overseen the dangerous politicisation of the SNA and been repeatedly accused of particularly egregious corruption. His replacement, however, Jibril Abdirashid Hajion, has no defence experience and is reported to be unwell. The reshuffle and moving of Jama-- a close Turkish ally-- hardly smacks of a government ready to grasp the nettle of serious military reform and relinquish its grip on the SNA to those with experience. 

Instead, the federal government must turn to those like former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, who can call upon significant clan militia within the Abgaal. Whether the much-maligned national opposition and Federal Member States (FMSs) that Villa Somalia has sought to cajole and undermine for months, including violently, are prepared to offer the necessary military support and oxygen to Mogadishu is not yet certain. Certainly, a transitional political mechanism to negotiate the coming months is still the preferred option for many, with a hybrid electoral option that ensures elections are held in May 2026 to be negotiated between an expanded National Consultative Council. But first, finding the necessary political coalition to forge a stop-gap solution quickly is the immediate priority, with building on the security response from there. There is little time to waste.

The Somali Wire Team