Issue No. 798

Al-Shabaab Advances and Villa Somalia's Dhusamareb Strategy

The first phase of Al-Shabaab's offensive surge culminated yesterday morning in a devastating complex attack on a hotel in Beledweyne. At least 10 people were killed after the jihadists detonated a car bomb before storming the Qaahira Hotel, targeting a meeting of Gaalje'el elders who were mobilising clan militias in western Hiiraan against Al-Shabaab. The intention was clear—to violently disrupt the assembling of ma'awiisley against Al-Shabaab in Hiiraan and to intimidate clans contemplating resistance.

The Beledweyne attack follows Al-Shabaab's sweeping progress across Middle Shabelle, with the militants seizing numerous villages and towns in recent weeks. Al-Shabaab has massed thousands of fighters from across Somalia to advance and consolidate its grip on Middle Shabelle, with units travelling from as far as El Wak in Kenya to participate in the offensive. In turn, the threat to Jowhar and other major towns within Hirshabelle has significantly grown. The timing of this Ramadan surge is no coincidence. Throughout 2024, Al-Shabaab deliberately reduced its attacks, avoiding any justification for the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to either delay its drawdown or increase troop numbers. Instead, Al-Shabaab quietly strengthened its position, continued recruiting fighters, and secured new armaments.

Now, with AU peacekeeping forces reduced and the Somali National Army (SNA) remaining in disarray, Al-Shabaab is free to dictate the battlefield. It is once again demonstrating its strength, proving that it can seize territory at will and that the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) is no viable replacement for ATMIS. AUSSOM is in serious disarray, with its troop numbers not enough to resist the advancing militants, and, particularly concerningly, funding for the mission remains absent, with the entire peacekeeping operation likely unsustainable beyond June. The possibility of the total collapse of AUSSOM should not be dismissed. And though US airstrikes have increased, Al-Shabaab's sheer numbers and effective strategy mean these strikes have had little discernable impact so far.

The federal government's response to Al-Shabaab has been—at best—chaotic and contradictory, still driven by its unilateral, destabilising electoral agenda. Last Friday, rather than acknowledging the scale of the threat, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's weekly sermon insisted that one-person, one-vote (OPOV) was not only feasible but necessary. Though unnamed, he further condemned the recent US warning of a probable Al-Shabaab attack in Mogadishu as "foreign propaganda" and a "pro-terrorist narrative." Most extraordinary, however, was the offering of amnesty to advancing Al-Shabaab fighters. He stated, "You will not be humiliated, you will not be jailed… those who defected live with dignity." Considering that Al-Shabaab raided Bal'ad—just 18 miles from Mogadishu—two weeks ago, the notion that the jihadists are preparing to surrender is nonsensical. Meanwhile, allied religious sheikhs have also been mobilised to condemn the terrorist group, and the Minister of Religion, Mukhtar Robow, sought to dismiss comparisons between Mogadishu, Kabul and Damascus.

Leaving aside the misguided rhetoric, however, is the promise of renewed military operations against Al-Shabaab from Dhusamareb in Galmudug. Having travelled to the UAE to seek military and financial assistance, the president is soon expected to don his combat fatigues again and travel to the regional capital. But, put simply, the decision to launch operations from Dhusamareb lacks any military rationale and is instead politically motivated by the electoral interests of an embattled president.

The deployment of SNA troops to Dhusamareb—an area of limited strategic value and far from the jihadist stronghold in Juba—is driven by Villa Somalia's attempts to retain control over key towns where polling stations could be theoretically established. The possibility of Al-Shabaab seizing areas in Galmudug and Hirshabelle threatens to further undermine the compromised OPOV plan, with Puntland and Jubaland having already withdrawn from the process. There are only a dozen or so towns across central Somalia where the federal government can theoretically hold elections, such as Jowhar and Beledweyne. But with South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen reportedly preparing to secure his own re-election and break from the OPOV plan, Villa Somalia cannot afford to lose more ground. Redeploying SNA forces to Dhusamareb and maintaining its hold there will allow the federal government its OPOV agenda to stagger along—at least until it inevitably collides with the growing national opposition. As part of this broader strategy, the federal government has attempted to maintain a foothold in Gedo and secure Laftagareen's continued backing through financial incentives, asserting—unconvincingly—that both Darood and Digil-Mirifle are represented in the process.

Moreover, the president's move to Dhusamareb should also be understood within the context of divisions within the Hawiye, and particularly his own Abgaal sub-clan. Villa Somalia is attempting to preempt the resurgence of Badbaado Qaran 2.0 (National Salvation)—the Hawiye militias that previously took to the streets of Mogadishu and forced former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo to abandon his term-extension plans. In recent weeks, Abgaal forces loyal to opposition leader and ex-President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed have once again mobilised in anticipation of potential violence in the capital if Villa Somalia persists with its OPOV elections.

Despite Al-Shabaab threatening Abgaal territory, Mogadishu has largely refused to arm Sheikh Sherif's sub-clan, the Abgaal/Harti, fearing that these influential militias could later turn against the government. Instead, weapons have been distributed to militias from the president's own sub-clan, Abgaal/Wa'eysle, to fight Al-Shabaab. And by heading to Dhusamareb to rally support among the Habar Gidir militias—another key faction of the original Badbaado Qaran movement— the president appears to be attempting to divide the Hawiye opposition before it can unite against his unworkable OPOV plan. The deployment to Dhusamareb is more than just poor military policy and attempting to show the Trump administration that Mogadishu still has some counter-terror credentials. Instead, Villa Somalia is scrambling—seeking support from once-maligned partners like the UAE and Ethiopia-- rather than looking for allies domestically.

If Mogadishu was serious about striking Al-Shabaab, it would target the group's strongholds in Juba and its de facto headquarters in Jilib rather than from Dhusamareb. However, this remains unlikely, as such an operation would require empowering other political opponents, namely the Jubaland administration under Ahmed Madoobe. What remains less certain, however, is Al-Shabaab's ultimate objective with this current offensive—and its timeline for achieving it. Some clear motivations for targeting Middle Shabelle include advancing ahead of the anticipated Egyptian military deployment under AUSSOM, cutting off Mogadishu from key supply routes, and further weakening Hassan Sheikh's position within the Abgaal. For now, though, Al-Shabaab appears content to allow Villa Somalia's Dhusamareb offensive to play out, but in the coming weeks, the real test will be in Lower Shabelle and Banaadir. If Al-Shabaab pivots to targeting these areas, the end of the federal government could be far sooner than many anticipate.

The Somali Wire Team