Issue No. 797

Somalia's Enduring Humanitarian Crisis

Once again, Somalia is quietly heading towards a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe. Intersecting threats of rising conflict and worsening drought are estimated to push an additional one million people into 'crisis' levels of food insecurity between April and June 2025. The prospect of 4.4 million people at IPC Level 3 hunger could arguably not come at a worse moment, with the international aid and development architecture paralysed by the savaging of USAID. In 2022, Somalia narrowly avoided famine due to coordinated humanitarian efforts, but it is unlikely to receive such assistance this time around.

As with previous emergencies, the brunt of this enduring humanitarian crisis will be most keenly felt amongst those living in southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab controls the bulk of the south, including much of Bay and Bakool in South West State and the Juba Valley in Jubaland. For most Western humanitarian organisations, this renders these areas essentially impenetrable, unwilling to work under the conditions imposed by Al-Shabaab. One of the few humanitarian organisations operating in Al-Shabaab-held territory is Qatar Charity-- Doha's soft power arm that functions in several jihadist contexts across the world. Last month, senior federal officials criticised humanitarian organisations operating under Al-Shabaab in frustration with the extremists acting as a quasi-government in southern Somalia. However, Qatar Charity was not mentioned by name; unsurprising considering the close relationship between Doha and Mogadishu. At points, the jihadist group has been known to weaponise and withhold humanitarian aid, publicly burning food relief amid the punishing 2022 drought to target particular communities. More recent reports, however, have indicated that Al-Shabaab intends to invite Western aid organisations to operate within its territory to display its humanitarian credentials.

The alarming surge of almost a million people into 'crisis' hunger levels is being driven in large part by inadequate rains. The last Deyr rainy season between October and December 2024 was particularly concerning, which fell well short of the crucial season's historical average. In turn, the Daawo River that runs through the Gedo region and supplies Dollow, Luuq, and Beled Hawo has already dried up, with its depletion in February coming far earlier than normal. Moreover, the imminent Gu season between April and June is also forecasted to be drier than usual, and more crop failure for agro-pastoralists is now widely anticipated. But there is little 'usual' left when it comes to Somalia's seasons, with the climate crisis driving ever-more extreme weather and drought-flooding cycles.

Just last year, erratic rainfall and flooding in 2024 caused two consecutive failed crop harvests, driving yields 45% below average and raising food inflation nationwide. The 2022 drought was famously punishing for the nation's pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities, but the past 18 months in Somalia, impacted by the La Niña and El Niño weather phenomena, have displaced tens of thousands more. Today, there are an estimated 3.5 million displaced people in Somalia, placing immense demands on dwindling international financing.

Armed conflict, too, is certain to compound the grim humanitarian outlook of the coming months. Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle-- where the resurgent militants have seized and consolidated their hold in recent weeks-- are two of the most fertile areas of the country, as well as Middle Juba. Thousands have already been displaced by the ongoing Al-Shabaab offensive in Middle Shabelle, with the jihadist group ordering those around Ali Foldheere to leave the area. It is beyond apparent that the federal government remains incapable of projecting any significant humanitarian or stabilisation presence and is now fighting a panicked rear-guard action against Al-Shabaab. The prospects for a bountiful harvest were already bleak even before the recent attacks.

What makes this latest humanitarian crisis different to other ones, however, is the suspension and anticipated evisceration of USAID. The 90-day suspension of nearly all humanitarian and developmental programming by the Trump administration has upended the status quo in Somalia. For years, Somalia has been highly dependent on USAID's emergency funding to prevent much of the country from slipping into famine, and the aid organisation was anticipated to spend USD 125 million in 2025 in the country. The abrupt loss of funding has already disrupted essential services, including healthcare, water access, education, food security, and security programs. These programmes, however, were concentrated in government-held areas, often focusing on particular issues in displacement camps that could be accessed. Communities under the veil of Al-Shabaab have not been directly supported by European or American assistance, so the suspension in southern Somalia will be less keenly felt.

Critically, these are not services that Somalia's federal government either has the capacity or the interest to absorb. Mogadishu has repeatedly politicised international assistance for its own interest, denying Puntland equitable access to funding and programming following Garowe's withdrawal of recognition of the federal government. Closer to the capital, many of the displaced in Mogadishu, largely from lower-caste clans, have been uprooted by Villa Somalia's public land clearances for the financial benefit of its allies. But most importantly, the federal government controls or negotiates access to a diminishing portion of the country. Humanitarian or development programming is a distant concern to an administration that is far more focused on forcing through its vexed one-person, one-vote (OPOV) agenda.

Still, the federal government's absence from Puntland and Jubaland, as well as much of the country's interior, has not prevented it from requesting vast sums from international donors. But this year, more than ever, money is limited, with the UN's Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for 2025 request for USD 1.42 billion nearly entirely unfunded. Just 12.4% so far has been raised, and the federal government lacks the financial capacity or the inclination to divest its limited resources to support those outside of its narrow base. The World Food Programme (WFP) also recently announced that it requires nearly USD 300 million to address Somalia's urgent humanitarian needs over the next 6 months but is also facing difficulties raising these funds. 

It is not that Somalia has been historically devoid of international funding, but rather the opposite when compared to its neighbours in the Horn of Africa and particularly Somaliland. Successive administrations have reaped billions from the international community over the years while the country remains mired in perennial humanitarian emergencies. Somalia's enduring issues of corruption and negotiating access to the millions of impoverished are well known, but less considered is the immense profits reaped by a slice of the Mogadishu elite in charge of negotiating access and overseeing foreign aid programmes. How the capital's entire ecosystem of aid and development will adjust to the USAID cuts is going to have a number of spill-over consequences.

Al-Shabaab's current advance across Middle Shabelle has raised fears of a jihadist takeover of the capital. While the extremists are not yet ready to seize Mogadishu, if Al-Shabaab can install itself later this year, what might this mean for development and aid programming? It was already unlikely the US was going to maintain a high level of investment even without the suspension, considering that many within the Republican party consider Somalia a 'sunk-cost' fallacy. European partners, however, could face an unwelcome choice at a moment of rising demand and limited funding-- work with those like Qatar Charity and agree to Al-Shabaab's conditions or withdraw entirely. With millions facing extreme hunger in the coming months, neither is appealing.

The Somali Wire Team