Mogadishu Agrees on Ethiopian Troops Remaining
Over the weekend, Somalia's federal government and Ethiopia finally agreed to the composition and deployment of Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) in Somalia, both bilaterally and under the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) auspices. In a signing ceremony in Mogadishu on Saturday, Ethiopia's spy chief, Redwan Hussein, and ENDF Chief of Staff Berhanu Jula signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with their Somali counterparts, which is expected to regulate the operational mandate of Ethiopian forces moving forward.
Though tensions remain, the agreement is another step towards normalising Ethiopia-Somalia relations, building upon the Turkish-driven Ankara Declaration in December 2024. In mid-January, Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud travelled to Addis amid much pomp to meet with Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed to discuss the Ethiopian military and political presence in Somalia. Still, Saturday's deal took several weeks of fraught negotiations and other high-level bilateral visits, but Somalia's federal government have now agreed that the same number of Ethiopian troops will remain in Gedo in Jubaland, Bay and Bakool in South West, and Hiiraan in Hirshabelle. These areas fall under the ENDF's security umbrella, and the deal critically allows for a degree of security and military continuity in south-central Somalia. Considering no other Somali or regional force could feasibly secure the lengthy and hostile terrain of the Somalia-Ethiopia border from the entrenched presence of Al-Shabaab, maintaining the ENDF numbers is a significant victory for the communities living near the extremist's shadow.
Mogadishu's acceptance of Ethiopian troops remaining in these areas also represents a retreat for the federal government, having spent much of 2024 lambasting Addis and comparing the Ethiopian military presence to an invasion. In the end, Somalia's dissatisfied federal government had little choice when presented with the alternative offered by Addis-- a full withdrawal of ENDF troops and the subsequent fall of swathes of territory to Al-Shabaab. Mogadishu was also facing significant pressure from its last remaining elected non-Hawiye ally, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen, for a sizeable ENDF presence to remain in south-central Somalia.
That the ENDF will stay in Gedo with the federal government's acquiescence is particularly notable, with Mogadishu having lobbied hard for their withdrawal as it continues to seek to undermine Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe and prise the Mareehaan-majority region from his administration. Ethiopia has been a stalwart ally of Madoobe amid the rapid and violent deterioration of the Jubaland-Mogadishu relationship in recent months, supplying the long-serving regional leader with weapons and political support. Addis has now proposed negotiations between the Darood-majority administrations of Jubaland and Puntland as well as the federal government, a possible welcome return to a previously held position as a more neutral interlocutor.
In turn, one of the reasons the negotiations have dragged on-- despite AUSSOM having nominally begun on 1 January 2025-- was Mogadishu's insistence that Addis sever its close political relationships with the various Federal Member State (FMS) administrations. Addis has partially agreed to this and pledged to avoid interfering in Somalia's domestic politics but firmly refused to sever its security relationship with its Somali allies. How this evolves will have to be seen, and separating the political from the military is nigh impossible in such a fraught context as Somalia. The politicisation of the Somali National Army (SNA) remains ever-present, and the current federal administration has increasingly deployed national forces against its political opponents rather than Al-Shabaab.
Though the deal is a positive step, the security outlook for Somalia remains bleak, with the continued potency of Al-Shabaab emphasised in a series of attacks just last week. Early last Thursday, heavily armed Al-Shabaab fighters seized villages and towns across 5 districts of Middle Shabelle in a clear display of force. The militants targeted El Ali Ahmed, Daru Ne'ema, Ali Fooldheere, El Baraf, and Al-Kowtar, engaging in intense clashes with clan militias. Dozens were slain in the ensuing violence, with the jihadist group asserting that 93 people had been killed in the simultaneous assaults. In typical Al-Shabaab style, they subsequently retreated from several of the areas, having taken photos of their raised flag in the town centres and slain government forces.
Puntland is another story, though, where significant progress continues to be made against Islamic State-Somalia (ISS) without substantial domestic or international support. Major territorial gains have been made by the assembled forces, retaking significant land held by Daesh in the Al-Miskaad mountains and advancing up the dry riverbeds of the Togga-Jeceel valley. Substantial casualties have also been inflicted upon the jihadists there, which hosts the globally influential Al-Karrar Office led by Abdulqadir Mumin. The federal government has finally and grudgingly pledged support for Puntland, but what form this could take has not been revealed. Puntland will need, however, far more significant development and security assistance in the longer term to secure these recaptured areas to prevent Daesh from returning. The political stability and security successes of Puntland in recent months stand in firm contrast to recent events in south-central Somalia.
It is nearly two months into the supposed start of AUSSOM, yet numerous questions concerning the AU peacekeeping mission hang over it. With the number of Ethiopian troops confirmed but not public, urgent work is required to finalise the composition and location of the multilateral forces across the country. Funding for the coming months, let alone years, also remains absent, with the returned Trump administration in the US firmly rejecting any proposition that it stumps the significant cash required. Moreover, this deal does not promise a fresh injection of troops but simply ensures that a declining security context does not accelerate even faster. Months have been wasted, and a window of opportunity against Al-Shabaab has been squandered by the political wrangling brought about by the federal government's outsized response to the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding.
Whether Mogadishu accepts Addis's latest offer of mediation with Puntland and Jubaland remains to be seen but appears unlikely considering President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's argument for full-throttled pursuit of his electoral and constitutional agenda at the reopening of the federal parliament on Saturday. Meanwhile, the Ethiopia deal is a win for Addis, as it is able to continue deploying its forces to Somalia without Mogadishu savaging it in various forums. It does not mean, however, that Somalia's federal government has had a Damascene conversation over Somalia's national security, with its insistence during negotiations that only it deals with Addis reflective of the centralising inclination that has driven the destabilisation of the country.
The Somali Wire Team
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