Djibouti at the Helm of the African Union
On Saturday, after several rounds of secret voting in Addis Ababa, Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mohamoud Ali Youssouf was elected to serve as the next African Union (AU) Commission Chair. He defeated former Kenyan PM Raila Odinga, who dropped out in the 6th round after successive neck-and-neck ballots, with the long-serving Kenyan opposition leader ahead in the first two rounds. Following the elimination of the Madagascan candidate, however, Youssouf inched ahead, and it soon became apparent that Raila would be unable to obtain the 2/3s required of the 49 AU member states.
Youssouf comes to the helm of the AU Commission at a troubled time for the continent and the Horn. Every region is experiencing some form of conflict or another, from the roiling civil war and famine in Sudan to the transnational Sahelian jihadist groups in Mali and Burkina Faso to the escalating violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The outgoing Chair and former Chadian politician Moussa Faki has overseen the atrophying relevance of the AU, as well as a move away from its founding peace and security principles. Though he has developed relationships with the UN and other multilateral organisations, Faki has been repeatedly criticised for applying these tenets haphazardly and comprehensively failed to outline a vision for peace talks in Sudan. Many of the key organs within the AU have wilted during his leadership.
In large part, the vote for Youssouf was one against Raila and Kenya because of the events unfolding in the DRC. The escalating conflict in the resource-rich east of the country has seen the alleged Rwandan-backed M23 rebels seize Goma in January and now Bukavu, the second-largest city in the region. It has precipitated a severe deterioration in bilateral ties between Rwanda and South Africa, which have been at odds on a host of issues for several years. The killing of South African military personnel by M23 forces in Goma and the escalating war of words between Kigali and Pretoria, aligned with the Félix Tshisekedi government in Kinshasa, has now triggered an immense crisis in bilateral relations. The rhetorical onslaught on South Africa by the returned Trump administration has further muddied the waters.
Rwanda was the first East African state to unequivocally and openly voice support for Raila Odinga. President Paul Kagame took on the mantle of 'regional champion' for the campaign, as South Africa, for its part, largely dithered or remained non-committal. It came as little surprise when Pretoria moved against Raila over the weekend, based on the assumption that Kenya is aligned with Rwanda and that Raila may serve Kigali's interest.
South Africa's stance was confirmed a week before the vote when the regional East African Community bloc called a joint summit with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Tanzania chaired by Kenya. The meeting did not go well. It proved acrimonious, with the outgoing AU Chair, Faki, ejected from the meeting at the behest of the South Africans. Pretoria soon doubled down on its DRC policy and mobilised its African and international allies against Rwanda and, by extension, Raila at the AU vote in Addis. SA's leverage and clout in the SADC sub-region proved decisive, with Pretoria also likely to have influenced North Africa to support Youssouf at the ballot. Speaking at the end of the vote at the AU Hall in Addis Ababa, a beaming Cyril Ramaphosa said, "We are pleased with the outcome."
Leaving aside his defeat of Raila and ahead to his coming four-year term, it will be notable how Youssouf will have to negotiate the still-growing influence of Middle Eastern and Gulf powers on the continent. Since Faki came to the seat in 2017, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia's economic and political investments have broadened and deepened, particularly in the Horn. These highly wealthy actors' general preference for quiet bilateral dealings with non-state actors over multilateral forums and sovereign states has repeatedly undermined the workings and influence of the AU. Doha is even widely believed to have funded Youssouf's run for the seat.
With the Djiboutian candidate now in position and the deputy chair, Selma Haddadi, hailing from Algeria, the Arab voice has been strengthened at the African multilateral. But the election of Haddadi also signals a loss for Israel, with the Algerian position historically a pro-Palestinian one. Israel's attempts to sway African countries to its side now look even more remote, including due to Youssouf's victory. In 2024, the Djiboutian foreign minister controversially praised the Houthi attacks on Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea as "resisting foreign intervention."
The Somali Wire Team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
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