Suppressing Opposition, One Hotel at a Time
The federal government has taken another leaf out of the Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo playbook– attempting to break up MP and opposition meetings in Mogadishu. In January, a missive was sent out to several hotels to inform them that any such meetings are banned without prior federal approval. And on Monday, federal MP Dahir Amin Jesow accused Villa Somalia of directing soldiers to break up a hotel gathering of 5 opposition parties in Mogadishu. As Villa Somalia lauds the opening of the registering of political associations and the promise of 'one-person, one-vote' (OPOV) elections, it is simultaneously working to choke the country's fragile civic and democratic space. The need for a transitional political arrangement only continues to grow.
Ahead of the supposed OPOV polls, with protests and meetings being shut down, public officials and lawmakers intimidated, and journalists arrested, one might ask what election monitors would report if they were deployed to Mogadishu today. It could hardly be positive. A democratic, credible election is greater than the sum of its parts, far more than just the ticking of a ballot in one of the only 800 polling centres identified by the controversial federal electoral commission. Freedom of speech, alignment with the Constitution as well as credible electoral laws, and buy-in from the majority of the population are all critical. These issues are only heightened in Somalia, lacking a history of strong democratic polls and the implicit threat of violence underpinning its political settlement. Yet a de-fanged UN is missing in action, while the divided international community has been unable to formulate a coherent response to the chasm between Villa Somalia's rhetoric and actions.
The breaking up of an opposition meeting by armed troops in Mogadishu had been coming for some time. The federal government has deployed increasingly aggressive and militarised tactics outside of the capital against its perceived political opposition, including in Gedo and supporting the SSC-Khaatumo militia in Somaliland's Sool region. Federal parliamentarians, too, have been repeatedly caught in the crosshairs, with dozens being denied permission to fly to Jubaland amid the Kismaayo-Mogadishu fallout since October 2024. And just this week, the governor of the Jasiira district in Lower Shabelle alleged that he was assaulted by three officers who accused him of organising forces affiliated with the former opposition movement known as 'Badbaado Qaran' (National Salvation Forces).
In the capital, Hawiye opposition politicians led by former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, former PM Hassan Ali Khaire, and Wadajir party leader Abdirahman Abdishakur are attempting to push back against the government. This opposition group once counted incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in their number as they resisted Farmaajo's similar upending of Somalia's political settlement. But jitters have also been rising over federal plans to disarm the forces in and around the capital associated with the opposition. As ever, the question in Somalia is, 'Who is disarming who?' While it may appear that federal troops are seeking to take back weapons from rogue clan militias, Sheikh Sherif and others seemingly suspect that Villa Somalia wants to limit the chances of another 'Badbaado Qaran' emerging and its opposition convening.
In a televised address yesterday, Sheikh Sherif again laid into the federal government, attacking the breaking up of the opposition meeting, attended by MPs from his Himilo Qaran Party. Calling the militarisation of political disputes "barbaric," the former president called it a "blatant violation of political rights and democratic values." Sheikh Sherif is not just a prominent Hawiye opposition leader but also one of the likely leaders of the political parties supposed to emerge from the political association elections. Again, any independent election monitor would surely raise concerns about the cavernous trust deficit.
Meanwhile, just yesterday in Hargeisa, hundreds of now-opposition Kulmiye supporters cheerfully gathered in the streets and by the presidential palace to welcome home former President Muse Bihi Abdi from the Emirates yesterday. In perhaps no other country in the Horn today could opposition members gather in front of the presidential compound with guards and security forces idly watching them pass by. Having carried off the successful, peaceful presidential OPOV elections last November won by Abdirahman 'Irro,' the democratic and civic gulf between Somalia and Somaliland has never been more apparent. The simple act of the Kulmiye demonstration belies a much deeper democratic maturity in the polity that continues to be largely ignored by the international community.
Returning to Somalia, the apparent accusation by the security forces that the Jasiira governor was an organiser of 'Badbaado Qaran' perhaps inadvertently points to the direction the country is heading. Badbaado Qaran refers to a former opposition group formed in March 2021 of predominantly Hawiye militias during the Farmaajo presidency. At that time, it was formed to prevent his attempts to delay and rig the polls, successfully deploying to the streets of Mogadishu and nearly overrunning Villa Somalia. Among the former leaders of Badaado Qaran are, ironically, allies of Hassan Sheikh, such as former Banaadir Police Commissioner Sadiq John and Mohamed Abuukar Jafar, the former commissioner of Mogadishu's Dayniile district. Both are now sitting MPs.
If election monitoring were to begin now, it might be too early to cry foul, but under the leadership of this federal government, a 'free and fair' election remains a very distant prospect. For months, there have been growing reports of the gradual mobilisation of opposition and pro-government militias in and around Mogadishu ahead of possible violence in the capital. Whether this culminates into a movement like Badaado Qaran remains to be seen, and there are fewer obvious ringleaders who might pick up the mantle. But with the federal government increasingly violently targeting its political opposition, the cyclical 'crisis point' in Somalia's politics continues to edge closer. To stave off such a crisis and open violence in the streets of Mogadishu, a negotiated, consensus-led political transitional arrangement must be pursued-- and urgently.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
In the 17th century, the Ottoman polymath Kâtip Çelebi penned 'The Gift to the Great on Naval Campaigns', a great tome that analysed the history of Ottoman naval warfare at a moment when Constantinople sought to reclaim maritime supremacy over European powers.
Villa Somalia has prevailed in Baidoa. After weeks of ratcheting tensions, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen proved a paper tiger this morning, unable to resist the massed forces backed by Mogadishu. After several hours of fighting, Somali National Army (SNA) forces and allied Rahanweyne militias now control most of Baidoa and, thus, the future of South West. In turn, Laftagareen is believed to have retreated to the protection of the Ethiopian military at Baidoa's airport, with the bilateral forces having avoided the conflict today.
Last October, Al-Shabaab Inqimasin (suicide assault infantry) overran a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) base in Mogadishu, freeing several high-ranking jihadist detainees and destroying substantial quantities of intel. A highly choreographed attack, the Inqimasin had disguised their vehicle in official NISA daub, weaving easily through the heavily guarded checkpoints dotting the capital to reach the Godka Jilicow compound before blowing open the gates with a suicide car bomb. In the months since, Al-Shabaab's prodigious media arm-- Al-Kataib Media Foundation-- has drip-fed images and videos drawn from the Godka Jilicow attack, revelling in their infiltration of Mogadishu as well as the dark history of the prison itself. And in a chilling propaganda video broadcast at Eid al-Fitr last week, it was revealed that among the Inqimasin's number was none other than the son of Al-Shabaab's spokesperson Ali Mohamed Rage, better known as Ali Dheere.
The Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA) did not emerge from a shir (conference) in October 1995 to defend a government, nor to overthrow it. Rather, the militia —whose name was even explicit in its defence of a unified Digil-Mirifle identity —arose from the ruin of Bay and Bakool in the years prior, and decades of structural inequalities.
The battle for South West—and Somalia's political future—continues apace. With the brittle alliance between South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud having broken down spectacularly, the federal government is pouring in arms and forces to oust the Digil-Mirifle leader. Staring down the barrel of the formal opposition holding three Federal Member States and, with it, greater territory, population, and clan, Villa Somalia is looking to exploit intra-Digil-Mirifle grievances—and convince Addis—to keep its monopolistic electoral agenda alive. But this morning, Laftagareen announced a 9-member electoral committee to hastily steer his re-election, bringing the formal bifurcation of the Somali state ever closer.
The worm, it seems, has finally turned. After years serving as a prop for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's monocratic aspirations, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, the leader of South West State, has clapped back against Villa Somalia, accusing the federal government of – among other things - dividing the country, monopolising public resources, colluding with Al-Shabaab, and leading Somalia back into state failure.
Last April, General Sheegow Ahmed Ali-- once the highest-ranking military officer hailing from the Somali Bantu-- died in ignominy in a Mogadishu hospital. A senior commander who had previously spearheaded operations in south-central Somalia, Sheegow had been summarily sentenced to 10 years in prison in 2023 for operating a militia in the capital. His death-- mourned widely and protested in Mogadishu and Beledweyne-- returned the spotlight to the pernicious issues of discrimination in the Somali National Army (SNA).
The Horn of Africa's political fate has always been wired to external commercial interests, with its expansive eastern edge on the Red Sea serving as an aorta of trade for millennia. A Greek merchant's manual from the 1st century AD describes the port of Obone in modern-day Puntland as a hub of ivory, tortoiseshell, enslaved people and cinnamon destined for Egypt. Today, as so often quoted, between 12-15% of the world's seaborne trade passes along the arterial waterway, with the Suez Canal bridging Europe and Asia. But well before the globalised world or the vying Gulf and Middle Powers over the Red Sea's littoral administrations, the logic of 'gunboat diplomacy' underpinned the passage over these seas.
At the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s, the bloated, corrupt, and clan-riven national army was nevertheless in possession of vast quantities of light weapons. Much of it sourced during Somalia's ill-fated alliance with the USSR and later Western and Arab patrons, government armouries were soon plundered by warring militias across Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Baidoa, and every garrison town as the country descended into chaos, providing the ammunition for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people.