Suppressing Opposition, One Hotel at a Time
The federal government has taken another leaf out of the Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo playbook– attempting to break up MP and opposition meetings in Mogadishu. In January, a missive was sent out to several hotels to inform them that any such meetings are banned without prior federal approval. And on Monday, federal MP Dahir Amin Jesow accused Villa Somalia of directing soldiers to break up a hotel gathering of 5 opposition parties in Mogadishu. As Villa Somalia lauds the opening of the registering of political associations and the promise of 'one-person, one-vote' (OPOV) elections, it is simultaneously working to choke the country's fragile civic and democratic space. The need for a transitional political arrangement only continues to grow.
Ahead of the supposed OPOV polls, with protests and meetings being shut down, public officials and lawmakers intimidated, and journalists arrested, one might ask what election monitors would report if they were deployed to Mogadishu today. It could hardly be positive. A democratic, credible election is greater than the sum of its parts, far more than just the ticking of a ballot in one of the only 800 polling centres identified by the controversial federal electoral commission. Freedom of speech, alignment with the Constitution as well as credible electoral laws, and buy-in from the majority of the population are all critical. These issues are only heightened in Somalia, lacking a history of strong democratic polls and the implicit threat of violence underpinning its political settlement. Yet a de-fanged UN is missing in action, while the divided international community has been unable to formulate a coherent response to the chasm between Villa Somalia's rhetoric and actions.
The breaking up of an opposition meeting by armed troops in Mogadishu had been coming for some time. The federal government has deployed increasingly aggressive and militarised tactics outside of the capital against its perceived political opposition, including in Gedo and supporting the SSC-Khaatumo militia in Somaliland's Sool region. Federal parliamentarians, too, have been repeatedly caught in the crosshairs, with dozens being denied permission to fly to Jubaland amid the Kismaayo-Mogadishu fallout since October 2024. And just this week, the governor of the Jasiira district in Lower Shabelle alleged that he was assaulted by three officers who accused him of organising forces affiliated with the former opposition movement known as 'Badbaado Qaran' (National Salvation Forces).
In the capital, Hawiye opposition politicians led by former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, former PM Hassan Ali Khaire, and Wadajir party leader Abdirahman Abdishakur are attempting to push back against the government. This opposition group once counted incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in their number as they resisted Farmaajo's similar upending of Somalia's political settlement. But jitters have also been rising over federal plans to disarm the forces in and around the capital associated with the opposition. As ever, the question in Somalia is, 'Who is disarming who?' While it may appear that federal troops are seeking to take back weapons from rogue clan militias, Sheikh Sherif and others seemingly suspect that Villa Somalia wants to limit the chances of another 'Badbaado Qaran' emerging and its opposition convening.
In a televised address yesterday, Sheikh Sherif again laid into the federal government, attacking the breaking up of the opposition meeting, attended by MPs from his Himilo Qaran Party. Calling the militarisation of political disputes "barbaric," the former president called it a "blatant violation of political rights and democratic values." Sheikh Sherif is not just a prominent Hawiye opposition leader but also one of the likely leaders of the political parties supposed to emerge from the political association elections. Again, any independent election monitor would surely raise concerns about the cavernous trust deficit.
Meanwhile, just yesterday in Hargeisa, hundreds of now-opposition Kulmiye supporters cheerfully gathered in the streets and by the presidential palace to welcome home former President Muse Bihi Abdi from the Emirates yesterday. In perhaps no other country in the Horn today could opposition members gather in front of the presidential compound with guards and security forces idly watching them pass by. Having carried off the successful, peaceful presidential OPOV elections last November won by Abdirahman 'Irro,' the democratic and civic gulf between Somalia and Somaliland has never been more apparent. The simple act of the Kulmiye demonstration belies a much deeper democratic maturity in the polity that continues to be largely ignored by the international community.
Returning to Somalia, the apparent accusation by the security forces that the Jasiira governor was an organiser of 'Badbaado Qaran' perhaps inadvertently points to the direction the country is heading. Badbaado Qaran refers to a former opposition group formed in March 2021 of predominantly Hawiye militias during the Farmaajo presidency. At that time, it was formed to prevent his attempts to delay and rig the polls, successfully deploying to the streets of Mogadishu and nearly overrunning Villa Somalia. Among the former leaders of Badaado Qaran are, ironically, allies of Hassan Sheikh, such as former Banaadir Police Commissioner Sadiq John and Mohamed Abuukar Jafar, the former commissioner of Mogadishu's Dayniile district. Both are now sitting MPs.
If election monitoring were to begin now, it might be too early to cry foul, but under the leadership of this federal government, a 'free and fair' election remains a very distant prospect. For months, there have been growing reports of the gradual mobilisation of opposition and pro-government militias in and around Mogadishu ahead of possible violence in the capital. Whether this culminates into a movement like Badaado Qaran remains to be seen, and there are fewer obvious ringleaders who might pick up the mantle. But with the federal government increasingly violently targeting its political opposition, the cyclical 'crisis point' in Somalia's politics continues to edge closer. To stave off such a crisis and open violence in the streets of Mogadishu, a negotiated, consensus-led political transitional arrangement must be pursued-- and urgently.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate