Issue No. 784

The battle for Jubaland erupts in Gedo

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's attempts to mimic his predecessor, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, continue to fragment the country. In late 2019 and early 2020, the disruptive president and his spy chief, Fahad Yasin, deployed hundreds of federal troops and National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) operatives to the Gedo region of Jubaland, having been unable to dislodge regional President Ahmed Madoobe from Kimsaayo after his re-election in August 2019. Alongside security forces, cash was poured in to leverage the Mareehaan-dominated districts of Luuq, Dollow, Beled Hawo, Garbaharey and Bardheere away from Madoobe's Ogaadeen-majority administration. Sporadic deadly violence erupted between federal and regional troops as Al-Shabaab expanded and consolidated its presence in Gedo, which has not diminished since.

Similarly, having failed to unseat Madoobe following the Ras Kamboni debacle in late 2024, Villa Somalia's attention has turned to Gedo. In essence, the current occupants of Villa Somalia have attempted the same playbook as Farmaajo but with fewer troops and fewer funds. Moreover, they do not have the benefit of Farmaajo being from the Mareehaan and have only alienated large parts of the sub-clan by sidelining them in the federal power-sharing formula. Since the battle for Jubaland transferred to Gedo, the federal government has also hardly helped its case by deploying the unpopular Minister of Internal Security Abdullahi 'Fartaag' to unsettle the region, alongside former Gedo Governor Abdullahi Abdi Shimbir.

For weeks, Fartaag and Shimbir have been crisscrossing Gedo, drumming up support for the federal government by prising, intimidating, and bribing the necessary officials and security personnel. In Bardheere, for instance, Fartaag pledged to rebuild two of the region's main three bridges over the Juba River that the El Nino rains destroyed in late 2023. However, their heavy-handed tactics in Ras Kamboni and elsewhere, as well as wielding Fartaag as the face of federal attempts to sway the Mareehaan, have been received poorly, creating an environment in which Madoobe has garnered his largest support amongst the sub-clan since 2013. 

Moreover, Mogadishu this time around also does not have Ethiopia onside in Gedo amid their continued fallout, unlike Farmaajo, who lent on the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) for support as he sought to undermine Madoobe. During that period, ENDF commandos were dispatched to Kismaayo in a foolhardy attempt to arrest Madoobe but were resisted by the Kenyan African Union peacekeeping troops, almost triggering open violence. In this light, unlike 2019, it is little surprise why Villa Somalia has quietly sought to expel Ethiopian troops from Gedo during the fraught Mogadishu-Addis negotiations regarding the Ethiopian deployments under the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). 

If Villa Somalia gets its way, a more amenable force would be deployed to Gedo, likely the Ugandan military, to acquiesce to its destabilising attempts to pull the region into its orbit. Addis has resisted this so far and continued to support Madoobe– as have the Kenyans– despite the frustrations of the federal government. Last month, Nairobi dispatching a private plane to Kismaayo, in breach of the federal aviation ban, to bring their long-standing ally to the Kenyan capital triggered a fresh round of histrionics by the nationalist hardliners in the federal government. The much-weakened Darood PM Hamza Abdi Barre has particularly favoured diplomatic retaliation, even while the impeachment plot against him gathers steam. A former ally of Madoobe who served as chair of the Jubaland Electoral Commission from 2019 to 2020, Barre's star has waned in recent months, having been unable to prevent the Jubaland president from splitting from the National Consultative Council (NCC) and orchestrating his re-election in spite of Mogadishu's protests.

The fighting at Ras Kamboni in December should have been another inflexion point for the federal government. Multiple lines have been crossed since the federal government began unilaterally rewriting Somalia's electoral and constitutional processes, but deploying federal troops against one of the few constants of modern Somali politics was beyond the pale. However, since then, it has only doubled down, branding Madoobe a criminal and colluder with Al-Shabaab, a patently absurd claim considering his history fighting the jihadist group. And not content with having politically weaponised Gorgor soldiers at Ras Kamboni– much like Farmaajo did in Mogadishu in 2021– there have been other violent incidents. On 23 December, federal troops from Beled Hawo attacked Jubaland forces in Dollow, attempting to arrest regional officials who had landed in the city. It was only after the intervention of Ethiopian troops stationed there under the African Union auspices that the fighting calmed.

The latest clashes between Somali National Army (SNA) and Jubaland forces took place in Bardheere on Wednesday, the second-largest town in Jubaland and the location of an African Union peacekeeping base occupied by the ENDF. The day prior, Jubaland Daraawiish had taken control of the Bardheere following the withdrawal of the SNA. On Wednesday, however, under apparent orders from Mogadishu, SNA soldiers attacked the Bardheere district headquarters, with three soldiers and a civilian killed in the ensuing violence, as well as over a dozen injured. Among them was Mohamed Ilyas Agane, who was unconstitutionally imposed as district head of social affairs by the federal government. 

Mogadishu and the Madoobe administration have since released contrasting statements about the fighting. For now, it appears that federal troops control parts of Bardheere but that Jubaland is massing forces in a possible attempt to retake it in the coming days. The Ministry of Internal Security statement condemned the "suspect" Madoobe and asserted that his aligned "agitators" had been thwarted. An SNA commander, Aden Sheikh Ali, further threatened retribution for anyone aligned with Madoobe. The rival Jubaland statement yesterday warned that the federal government was ready to spill blood in Beled Hawo and Garbaharey for political gain as well.

Regardless of the contradictory federal and regional statements, more fighting in Gedo between national and regional forces only opens the door for Al-Shabaab. The federal government cannot seriously claim that countering violent extremism is a genuine priority when it has worked to undermine Puntland and Jubaland's security, and entirely abandoned fighting Al-Shabaab in favour of directing the SNA against politicians opposing Hassan Sheikh's electoral ambitions.

Others have suggested that Villa Somalia plans to use Bardheere town as one of its locations for highly contentious one-person, one-vote (OPOV) elections– whenever they may be or what abrogated form they take. The federal government perhaps considers that it requires control of the town to assert it is obtaining some nominal Darood/Mareehaan representation and holding elections in every Federal Member State, though the participation of any areas in Puntland remains doubtful. But once again, directing the attacking of fellow government soldiers under the guise of 'democratic elections' shows the depths the Hassan Sheikh administration is plumbing. 

The deadly events at Bardheere and the destabilisation of Gedo are precisely why Villa Somalia cannot be entrusted with the supervision of the necessary political transition. Under the guise of realising democracy, President Hassan Sheikh is continuing to skew the playing field through money and force, and rather than countering the resurgent Al-Shabaab, he is instead focused on dismantling and attacking the federal system. Villa Somalia is clearly trying to monopolise the future political process at the federal and regional levels through several ploys, no matter the consequences. In turn, a transition has become vital for de-politicising the fight against violent extremism so the armed forces and their partners aren't dragged into waging conflict over Hassan Sheikh's personal electoral ambitions. A broad consensus-led political transition is now the only route out of the growing crises facing Somalia.

The Somali Wire Team