Operation Hilaac Advances in Puntland
Puntland's 'Operation Hilaac' (Lightning) continues to progress against the Islamic State-Somalia (ISS)-- and with a new partner. On 1 February, the Trump administration ordered its first drone strikes on an ISS position in the Al-Miskaad mountains near Dhasan village, one of the jihadist's key command-and-control bases. It was the fourth set of strikes of the offensive overall, with the UAE having also conducted three others against the extremist group. According to US President Donald Trump on social media, the strikes targeted a senior ISS operational leader, though his identity remains unconfirmed.
The US strikes arguably could not have come at a better time, following President Said Abdullahi Deni's recent announcement of the commencement of Phase 2 operations. Puntland forces are now pushing into the Toga Jecel Valley and are anticipated to begin targeting ISS near Dhasan, Shebaab, and Dhadar villages in the coming days. Yesterday, significant and prolonged clashes occurred near the settlement of Dharin in the valley, resulting in dozens of ISS casualties as the Puntland troops successfully cleared the fortified area. Having secured the bottoms of the valleys by the Al-Miskaad mountains in recent weeks, Puntland forces have since steadily advanced up dry riverbeds from the Timirshe to Qandala road. The remaining area is mountainous, comprised of rugged terrain of dry, deep valleys with dense vegetation. There are also complex cave systems that ISS controls, and an uphill battle for these areas against a significant number of jihadists could prove costly in casualties.
Still, the weeks since the start of the operation have been largely successful, with several ISS bases taken, including a significant one at Turmasaale in late January. This is partly due to the sustained outreach from the Deni government to engage with historically peripheral and marginalised communities that ISS has depended upon, including the Ali Salebaan sub-clan, ahead of the first phase of operations. Meanwhile, another senior ISS commander was also taken out of the equation on Monday with the defection of Abdirahman Shirwac Aw-Saciid, an individual implicated in numerous killings as well as the extremist's extortion racket in Bosasso. The apparent death of a senior ISS operational leader and an increase in US strikes targeting ISS leadership could yet precipitate further defections, something that Puntland needs to be ready to exploit.
The US support has already lifted morale among the Puntland troops as they begin the heavier lifting of the campaign. If ISS anticipates more strikes from the US, as well as the UAE, it may prefer to withdraw deeper into the cave complexes and allow the Puntland forces to take the territory relatively easily. However, the clashes yesterday at Dharin suggest that the jihadists are prepared to fight tooth and nail for some strategic areas. Still, though the assembled Puntland forces are pushing up into the mountains, the complex and porous terrain continues to lend itself to a game of cat-and-mouse. Militants have mostly retreated, laying landmines and deploying suicide drones to impede the Puntland troop's advance. To date, this has meant the assembled forces have met a critical mass of ISS fighters just once and so have struggled to inflict notable casualties on the jihadists.
They also may not be able to if significant numbers are able to evade Puntland's loose cordon thrown around the ISS positions in the Al Miskaad mountains. If ISS leadership can make it east of the Main Supply Route (MSR) that runs into their territory, then they will be able to avoid the primary operations towards Dhadar and Dhasan. ISS leadership has already dispatched some of their families to Yemen, from where they are still importing weapons and explosives. Still, it is probable that more significant fighting will take place in the coming days between the coalition of several hundred ISS fighters and Puntland troops.
Meanwhile, the offensive against ISS is also intensifying some inter-communal rifts within Bosasso. The city has a significant Ethiopian contingent, with many migrants travelling through Puntland en route to more lucrative job opportunities in the Gulf. ISS has heavily recruited from the illegal migrants, offering better pay and, in turn, several senior commanders within Daesh are Ethiopian. Since the launch of the operations, hundreds of Ethiopians– predominantly Oromo– have been deported or arrested by the Puntland administration in several cities in the northern Federal Member State. There remain significant tensions between the Ethiopian and Somali communities in Bosasso, as well as elsewhere in Puntland. And while the regional government denied the reports that three Ethiopians had been killed in two apparent xenophobic attacks, a video of young Somalis hurling stones at an Ethiopian man has been widely circulated.
The operations have further underscored the increasingly sophisticated role of weaponised technology amongst jihadist groups in Somalia. In late December, a suicide vehicle-borne explosive device was deployed by ISS for the first time at the Dharjale military base, killing well over a dozen Puntland troops. Several suicide drones have been shot down by Puntland forces since early January, revealing a higher degree of sophistication than first anticipated. And over the weekend in Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab operatives flew reconnaissance drones over the presidential palace. Though not armed, it was a clear shot across the bow and marked the first time the rival jihadist group deployed drones in this heavily fortified area of the capital. Inspired by Hamas's 7 October 2023 attacks in Israel, Al-Shabaab has established a specific department to emulate their fellow jihadists and develop new weaponry systems. Led by US citizen Jehad Serwan Mostafa and Abdullahi Osman Mohamed, also known as 'Engineer Ismail,' growing their suicide drone capacity has been front and centre of these endeavours.
Following the US strikes, Puntland's regional government released a statement praising the UAE and the US for their support, as well as Ethiopia and Kenya. Absent was the federal government– though it nevertheless attempted to insert itself into the situation and claim credit by thanking the US strike in a statement. Mogadishu is clearly worried about what the new Trump administration might portend– both due to the sympathies of senior Republican officials to Somaliland and their concurrent frustrations with Villa Somalia. Considering the blatant lack of federal support provided to Puntland fighting a violent extremist organisation-- supposedly one of the priorities of the federal government-- it is extraordinary to take any recognition for any successes against ISS.
Returning to the operations, if Puntland is able to dislodge and degrade ISS from their positions in the mountains, securing the territory will nevertheless be complex. As seen in central-southern Somalia, without investment and continued deployment of forces– Al-Shabaab/ Daesh can gradually creep back, exploiting clan divisions and a distracted government. Thus, it is critical that forward-deployed troops in these areas are sustained, even as political attention moves on. Declaring victory too early would be a mistake, and while the support from Ali Salebaan and others remains strong, it is also predicated on promises of development assistance and security integration of some of their forces. But in the immediate weeks ahead, the return of US air support is an immensely positive development, while reports yesterday also suggested a number of Emirati strikes on ISS positions. Washington should be encouraged to double down and provide further strikes in coordination with the UAE and Puntland, as well as support operational planning. It is in the interests of all for ISS-- and its Al-Karrar Office-- to be struck a decisive blow.
The Somali Wire Team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
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On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
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