Issue No. 782

A Way Out Of Crisis 

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's plans to impose a patently unworkable one-person, one-vote (OPOV) model are pushing Somalia to the brink. The country is deeply fractured, with Jubaland and Puntland disengaged from Mogadishu and a host of others resistant to Villa Somalia's Islamist centralising agenda. The national opposition is vowing to resist a perceived choreographed plan by the Somali president to either rig dubious OPOV polls or seek a term extension. Meanwhile, rumours are rife in Mogadishu that clans are stocking up on arms and militias are mobilising. There are fears the growing political strain could trigger the fragmentation of the military and security services. 

The current crisis is eerily reminiscent of past events in Somalia. In 2021, a move by
then-incumbent president, Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo, to manipulate the electoral process and impose a two-year term extension almost re-ignited large-scale violence in the country. Thousands of heavily armed clan forces loyal to the opposition took over large parts of Mogadishu and nearly overran Villa Somalia. The tense standoff ended only when pressure from then-PM Mohammed Hussein Roble and the international community forced Farmaajo to back down and agree to a new consensual electoral arrangement. Yet today, the crisis is perhaps even more significant in light of the sweeping rewrite of Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Consitution in early 2024. Unlike the current situation, however, incumbent PM Hamza Abdi Barre does not hold sway with the opposition nor is perceived as a neutral figure, but rather as a hardline enforcer of the most controversial elements of Villa Somalia's agenda. And with a politically de-fanged UN and a divided international community, the prospects for compelling Hassan Sheikh's administration to climb down are far more complex.

Still, the international community remains generally sceptical or ambivalent about Hassan Sheikh's current electoral plans. No major Western donor has so far publicly pledged assistance, though a coherent and unified international response remains absent. Most prefer to maintain mild rhetorical backing for the OPOV plans, with support for direct elections a normative principle for most liberal Western states. In turn, it is difficult for many Western diplomats to openly oppose Villa Somalia's rhetoric about transitioning Somalia away from the 4.5 clan power-sharing system. This position is working to Villa Somalia's advantage, with the electoral body stepping up engagement with donors and wielding photo ops to give the impression of growing international support.

Hassan Sheikh's game plan is hard to read. Publicly, he remains bullish and vows to conduct OPOV in 2025 – even though timelines are being pushed farther down the year and the modalities are unworkable. The National Electoral Commission Chairman Abdikarim Ahmed Hassan has stated that 800 polling stations have been identified but is reticent in explaining how these stations were picked and where exactly they are located. The lack of detail and the ambiguous reporting by the Commission is deliberate. Villa Somalia wants to continue feeding the illusion of a coherent, democratic plan that is only opposed by a domestic autocratic-minded elite. But it has no implementable or workable blueprint, with every step triggering a fresh wave of criticism and resistance from a broad coalition of opposition figures.

There are grounds to assume Hassan Sheikh's real goal is not to deliver OPOV but to foment a significant enough crisis that will eventually force Somali stakeholders to negotiate. The Somali president is a veteran of term extension politics, having facilitated several for his regional counterparts in his second term, and knows how to play his cards. The president may be hoping that in the inevitable looming crunch and subsequent bargaining typical of Somali politics, he can extract one key concession-- a term extension. Villa Somalia is believed to be gunning, ideally, for a two-year extension but may also welcome a deal to give Hassan Sheikh another year at the helm until at least May 2027. 

Somalia's electoral system is clearly broken. The country cannot continue on the same path every electoral cycle – of contested processes, rigging attempts, and escalated crises that end with a 'return to the tent.' To avoid the complete and dangerous breakdown of the fragile political settlement and place the country on a healthier democratic trajectory, stakeholders ought to consider the following changes.

First, it is clear that Hassan Sheikh has lost credibility to manage Somalia's electoral process. Villa Somalia should be pressured to abandon its unworkable OPOV agenda and return the presidency to its intended constitutional position. Rushed through parliament in a process marred by allegations of bribery and without a quorum, the revisions to Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution should also be discarded. In turn, a transitional arrangement should be pursued, though this negotiated settlement could take several forms. 

Second, the co-opted National Consultative Council (NCC) should return to its intended design as a vehicle to initiate meaningful and credible progress on the federal model. Darood-majority Jubaland and Puntland must return to the NCC as it is transformed into an 'NCC+' that includes all major opposition parties. Such an NCC could build an agreement on a one-year transitional administration that can craft and implement a consensual electoral model.

Third, the NCC+ would have to negotiate a new prime minister. Incumbent PM Hamza Barre lacks the autonomy, political influence, and credibility to engineer a 'smooth landing' like PM Roble did in 2021. A neutral, credible, and nonpartisan prime minister with no vested interest in elections must be chosen in his place. The Cabinet and new prime minister could continue running the country, as the Provisional Constitution intended, during the transitional period.

Free and fair OPOV elections are not attainable in Somalia at this stage for a litany of reasons. But if Villa Somalia can be compelled to retreat from the edge, a realistic 'hybrid' or 'enhanced' electoral model that incorporates aspects of the traditional 4.5 quota system with forms of direct plebiscite may be feasible. The transitional period should be flexible and consensus-driven, but it appears increasingly the only way forward to prevent another collapse of Somalia's political settlement.

The Somali Wire Team