Issue No. 780

Not So AUSSOM

The troubles of the latest African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia rumble on. Nearly a month since its supposed launch, the funding black hole remains, numbers and composition of the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) are undecided, and the domestic political wrangling continues. Though the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) nominally began on 1 January 2025, even the UN Security Council Resolution 2767, adopted at the end of December, has allowed 6 months for the "realignment of troops and the transfer of locations." In other words, though the signage may have been changed, AUSSOM remains a shamble, and the security auspices bleak.

The federal government is still attempting to play an awkward balancing act of its own making between Addis and Cairo. Having conspired with Egypt– with the bizarre acquiescence of the African Union– in August 2024 to theoretically deploy as many as 10,000 troops to Somalia, Mogadishu has been unable to pull back from the scissor trap. In turn, the closer Mogadishu moves towards normalising relations with Ethiopia– a necessity for the security of southern Somalia– the more likely it is to frustrate Egypt, as well as Eritrea. So, having travelled to Addis amid much fanfare and clasping hands with PM Abiy Ahmed, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud then departed for Cairo a few days later. The Somali president and his Egyptian counterpart agreed to elevate bilateral relations to a 'strategic partnership,' with cooperation in education, justice, economy, security, politics, and more to be developed. 

A second tripartite summit, and undeniably anti-Ethiopia alliance, between Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea was also pledged for early February. Most significant was the confirmation that Egyptian forces would be deployed to Somalia, both bilaterally and as part of AUSSOM. The number of 10,000 was always fanciful, though, mainly due to Cairo's strategic interests in Libya, Sudan, and the Sinai Peninsula, and is more likely to number just a few hundred. With the Ethiopians likely to remain-- though the halting negotiations are still ongoing-- the possibility of the Egyptian military being deployed to remote areas along the Ethiopian border has diminished, thankfully. But the heightened Cairo-Addis tensions of 2024 are far from over, and it appears that Mogadishu, too, has not given up attempting to antagonise Ethiopia.

Meanwhile, the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) has stepped up with the total withdrawal of the Burundian military from the mission– which pulled out after a lack of consensus with Mogadishu on troop numbers. Burundi had proposed that it could contribute 3,000 soldiers to AUSSOM, but the federal government slashed that to just 1,000, which Burundi subsequently rejected for being inadequate to secure its forces. It is also rather telling about the dire state of the security situation in Somalia if 1,000 experienced soldiers-- a battalion's worth-- is not perceived to be enough to defend itself against the resurgent Al-Shabaab.

Mogadishu appears to be playing a duplicitous game with TCC contributions, referring to them bizarrely as "slots." Villa Somalia had claimed to Addis in early January that it did not know the exact number of troops that Ethiopia could continue deploying to Somalia because these "slots" had been filled by other nations – seemingly attempting to force a reduction in Ethiopian numbers. However, as soon as the Burundians withdrew, Kampala and Cairo appeared to have been offered to assume the numbers for the 1,000 soldiers. It calls into question whether the ongoing negotiations with the Ethiopians are in good faith and suggests that Villa Somalia may continue to drag along the process to somehow compel the Ethiopians to withdraw from Gedo, in particular. 

Addis's support for Kismaayo and the Ahmed Madoobe administration has remained firm following the Ras Kamboni debacle in December 2024, where Somali National Army (SNA) troops were deployed in a cackhanded attempt to unsettle the long-serving Jubaland president. Since then, with Jubaland-Mogadishu relations still badly deteriorated and Kismaayo severing ties with the federal government, the battle for control in the southernmost Federal Member State has transferred to Gedo. Mogadishu would prefer a peacekeeping force, such as the Ugandans, to be deployed to Gedo, which will be less likely to obstruct its destabilising political machinations and attempts to wrest districts from the Jubaland administration.

Meanwhile, the gaping funding hole remains, with the African Union and the TCCs now reportedly going into debt for the sustained deployment that will have to theoretically be paid back at some unknown later point. The refusal of the US to allow assessed contributions through the hybrid funding model under Resolution 2719 means that funding for AUSSOM will have to come largely via voluntary contributions -- and few countries appear to be forthcoming. How this will be resolved is unclear, but the federal government is planning a donor conference in an attempt to fill the ballooning budget. 

The return of Donald Trump to the White House and the immediate pause in foreign aid could not perhaps come at a worse time for Somalia, with Washington even less likely to stump up hundreds of millions of USD to fund the multi-year AUSSOM operation. And while financing for Danab may continue, even prior to Trump's re-election, there was pressure within the State Department to transition the special forces to be Somali-led and funded. It is likely just a matter of time before US forces are pulled back to Djibouti and Manda Bay in a revived Operation Octave Quartz that withdrew them in 2020.

Yet more evidence about the scale of Somalia's security challenges has emerged in recent weeks. It appears that most, if not all, of the 100 personnel in the British military contingent in Baidoa have withdrawn, and Operation TANGHAM-- where SNA soldiers from South West State were equipped and trained-- has been closed down. The rationale paints both a grim security and political dynamic. Little military progress had been made in training the SNA from Sector 60, and it was subsequently proposed that non-Sector 60 troops from elsewhere in Somalia be trained in Baidoa. However, this proposal came during a nadir in relations between Abdiaziz Laftagareen in Baidoa and Villa Somalia in 2024, with the South West president perceiving any attempt to deploy non-Rahanweyne troops to the city as a possible Trojan Horse for Villa Somalia. While the withdrawal of the British is unlikely to make a significant military impact, the mere fact that joint training still cannot occur outside of Mogadishu because of the lack of trust in the federal model and the poor security arrangements does not inspire hope for the supposed transferring of security responsibilities. 

The continued lack of clarity-- be it incompetence or intrigue-- over AUSSOM points to a federal government that still prefers political machinations to sober security-centred planning. The amped-up promises of imminent national victories against Al-Shabaab may have diminished somewhat, but with the resumption of clearing operations in Hiiraan in territory already previously liberated, the chest-thumping rhetoric has returned at the edges. Meanwhile, the continued lack of material support from the federal government to Puntland in the ongoing fight against Daesh is just more evidence of friction over the federal model and a lack of commitment of Villa Somalia in the fight against violent extremist organisations. But as the SNA continues to disintegrate, rather than to build, and with critical elements of AUSSOM and its funding still a muddle, 2025 appears set for another, even tougher year for those living in the shadow of Al-Shabaab.

The Somali Wire Team