The Isbaaro Economy of Somalia's Roads
'Isbaaro' (checkpoints) are a ubiquitous part of life for many Somalis. Decades after the 'isbaaro wars' of the 1990s, dozens are still dotted across Main Supply Routes (MSR) in central-southern Somalia, placed on the entrances of towns or serve as ad hoc, impermanent structures on more minor roads. Reflective of the contested patchwork of forces and administrations that comprise Somalia, while successive federal governments have pledged to tackle the entrenched issue, the checkpoints remain.
Clan-based checkpoints have a long history in the country, with pre-colonial 19th century Somalia witnessing the "earliest form[s] of transit dues," according to British explorer and writer Richard Burton in 1894. 'Abanship'-- a form of clan-based patronage to facilitate safe passage through territory-- spread during the expansion of the caravan trade, based on the principle that herders traversing another clan's territory would negotiate access to pasture and water en route. But it was the rule of Siad Barre that saw the conscious deployment of formal checkpoints, first used to fund the 1977-78 Ogaden War. Though a feature of the military regime, it was particularly towards its ignominious collapse in 1991 and in the succeeding years that the numbers and violence associated with checkpoints exploded. Post-1991, dozens of well-armed militias establishing checkpoints sprung up across central-southern Somalia, raising funds to purchase loyalty and firearms. During this period, more dominant clans and their warring militias further sought to capture other key revenue sources, such as ports.
Today, though much of the internecine clan fighting has ceased or been incorporated into the Al-Shabaab conflict-- the socio-economic patterns remain. Most checkpoints are still in contested areas of control, where multiple competing district, regional, and federal presences overlap and extract funds. And though many of the clan militia checkpoints were nominally removed from under the command of a particular warlord, they still exist in one form or another. They may be operated by Al-Shabaab in Jubaland, by militia associated with a district administration in South West State or by the Somali National Army (SNA) in Mogadishu. All these are still inevitably associated with a particular clan or sub-clan, and often an individual in turn.
The variety of checkpoints is immense. There are the better-known ones such as 'Ex-Control' on Mogadishu's outskirts that still taxes all goods entering the capital from Afoogye. Al-Shabaab targeted the checkpoint in a December 2019 suicide bombing that left 85 people dead and over a hundred more injured. Less-established checkpoints, though, may not even have a physical barrier but are just a few militia fighters loitering on a small road that will tax anyone passing them. These may only exist for a week or two.
Other checkpoints continue to be flashpoints for sub-national political settlements. For instance, control over the profitable checkpoint on the edge of Beledweyne, historically operated by the Hawaadle for the governor of Hiiraan, has brought about conflict with the current Abgaal-led Hirshabelle regional administration in Jowhar, which wants a slice of the funds. In 2022, Al-Shabaab's attempt to establish a nearby rival checkpoint helped trigger the Ma'awiisley uprising in Galmudug that displaced the jihadist group from much of central Somalia. Some of the disparate Ma'awiisley, too, were later criticised for the proliferation of checkpoints in newly liberated territories, though this was in large part a consequence of the lack of federal support for the militias.
Meanwhile, the legacies of the 'isbaaro wars' and resource capture are still keenly felt in inter-clan grievances, such as between the Hawaadle and more marginalised clans in Hirshabelle, including the Jajele and the Gaalje'el. Unsurprisingly, those from more influential clans are able to traverse checkpoints with fewer problems and costs than lower-caste clans. In Lower Shabelle, for instance, the brokers that navigate checkpoints for traders are overwhelmingly Hawiye/Abgaal or Hawiye/Habar Gedir, as it is these sub-clans that dominate the region's trade. In turn, those from lower-caste and more disenfranchised clans in the area routinely face higher prices. For small-scale farmers and herders, navigating these myriad patchworks of checkpoints is a costly business.
The prevalence of checkpoints in Somalia also mirrors the continued struggles of government administrations to expand their tax bases. With the federal and regional governments incapable of administering swathes of the country and unable to extract meaningful taxes, moving goods are levied instead-- including in ports. The typical placement of checkpoints on entrances/ exits of major towns often reflects the extent of the administration's territorial control. However, checkpoints serve another purpose- tying together militias and their leaders to Somalia's tortured state-building project by associating them with a particular district or administration to prevent them from raising funds at will.
Simultaneously, Al-Shabaab's governance can be felt through its network of checkpoints, predominantly in Jubaland. Though most of the checkpoints in central-southern Somalia are operated by government-associated forces, the jihadist group nevertheless operates a significant number in areas under its control. Al-Shabaab has a far more standardised version than their competing, ad hoc counterparts under the auspices of government-affiliated forces. In fact, though farmers and truckers may pay more to bring their produce short distances in Al-Shabaab-held territory, they spend more over long distances through government-associated land due to the multiple checkpoints. However, the extremist group does not typically tax small-scale farmers as they do not produce enough to pass the financial level required to extract 'zakat.' The jihadists also routinely attack government checkpoints, such as Ex-Control, as a way to undermine the symbols of the administration.
Though the wanton violence associated with checkpoints in the 1990s and early 2000s has eased, they remain a key contributor to Somalia's deep economic imbalances. To tackle the engrained nature of checkpoints in Somalia, a holistic approach is needed. Rather than understanding them solely from a security or counter-terror perspective, engaging with them from a political and socio-economic lens is the only route to breaking down the structural impediments.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
In social psychology, the term "desperation conundrum" refers to a psychological paradox wherein an acute, extreme, or severe need for an objective inadvertently impedes its attainment. This occurs because an intense sense of urgency frequently drives choices and behaviours that alienate the very outcome that is so desperately sought.
Somalia’s contemporary political trajectory is profoundly defined by the month of October. Within the Somali collective consciousness, October is not merely another page on the calendar; it is the recurring crucible of political upheaval, tragedy and systemic transformation.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has since 10 October been deploying National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces, specifically the little-known Public Protection Forces (Ilaalada Shacabka / People’s Protection Forces), in Wadajir. This mobilisation is concentrated close to the home of ex-President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – a development widely criticised by many Somalis as provocative. Some interpret the build-up as a prelude, possibly, to some form of armed action against the former president and leader of the opposition Somali Future Council, amid uncorroborated media reports that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has used Abgaal clan elders to relay an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of Sharif and other opposition figures.
It’s been a bruising week for the Somali Federal Government (FGS), headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional term of office expired in May this year. Yesterday, forces aligned with the administration of Jubaland peacefully took control of the strategic border town of Beled Haawo in Somalia’s Gedo region – a lucrative customs post for trade and transit with Kenya. Roughly 1,000 Daraawiish paramilitaries loyal to Abdirashid Hassan Janan – a fickle politician who is notorious for changing sides in a volatile region – reportedly deployed across key sites in the town following negotiations with the previous local administration.
Plans are intensifying within Hiiraan to establish an autonomous "Hiiraan State." This development reflects deep-seated regional and clan cleavages reasserting themselves in local politics, set against the backdrop of a stalled federal process, a breakdown in talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and the opposition Somalia Future Council (SFC), and an unravelling Somali federation.
Nearly a month has passed since a powerful blast destroyed the home of General Mahad, widely known as Taliye Shub, in Doolow, a political dissident who opposed the government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
While Mogadishu’s elite were ensconced in the Hangar complex last week praising Turkey, berating its critics, and proclaiming a ‘New Somalia’, the country's periphery told a vastly different story - one where "old Somalia," with its deep-seated clan feuds and the brutal calculus of blood and retaliation, remained stubbornly intact.
On 5 September, Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro arrived in the United States for an informal working visit designed to launch a new diplomatic push to cement Hargeisa's rising geopolitical profile. Monitored closely both regionally and internationally, the high-stakes trip carries immense domestic expectations. It represents an ambitious diplomatic outreach by Hargeisa to Washington, capitalising on the momentum generated by Israel's formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025. However, translating this sudden diplomatic visibility into tangible strategic prospects remains a formidable challenge.
Turkey yesterday crossed a perilous threshold in Somalia when it used its military air assets not for counterterrorism purposes but as a partisan tool in local Somali political warfare.