The Isbaaro Economy of Somalia's Roads
'Isbaaro' (checkpoints) are a ubiquitous part of life for many Somalis. Decades after the 'isbaaro wars' of the 1990s, dozens are still dotted across Main Supply Routes (MSR) in central-southern Somalia, placed on the entrances of towns or serve as ad hoc, impermanent structures on more minor roads. Reflective of the contested patchwork of forces and administrations that comprise Somalia, while successive federal governments have pledged to tackle the entrenched issue, the checkpoints remain.
Clan-based checkpoints have a long history in the country, with pre-colonial 19th century Somalia witnessing the "earliest form[s] of transit dues," according to British explorer and writer Richard Burton in 1894. 'Abanship'-- a form of clan-based patronage to facilitate safe passage through territory-- spread during the expansion of the caravan trade, based on the principle that herders traversing another clan's territory would negotiate access to pasture and water en route. But it was the rule of Siad Barre that saw the conscious deployment of formal checkpoints, first used to fund the 1977-78 Ogaden War. Though a feature of the military regime, it was particularly towards its ignominious collapse in 1991 and in the succeeding years that the numbers and violence associated with checkpoints exploded. Post-1991, dozens of well-armed militias establishing checkpoints sprung up across central-southern Somalia, raising funds to purchase loyalty and firearms. During this period, more dominant clans and their warring militias further sought to capture other key revenue sources, such as ports.
Today, though much of the internecine clan fighting has ceased or been incorporated into the Al-Shabaab conflict-- the socio-economic patterns remain. Most checkpoints are still in contested areas of control, where multiple competing district, regional, and federal presences overlap and extract funds. And though many of the clan militia checkpoints were nominally removed from under the command of a particular warlord, they still exist in one form or another. They may be operated by Al-Shabaab in Jubaland, by militia associated with a district administration in South West State or by the Somali National Army (SNA) in Mogadishu. All these are still inevitably associated with a particular clan or sub-clan, and often an individual in turn.
The variety of checkpoints is immense. There are the better-known ones such as 'Ex-Control' on Mogadishu's outskirts that still taxes all goods entering the capital from Afoogye. Al-Shabaab targeted the checkpoint in a December 2019 suicide bombing that left 85 people dead and over a hundred more injured. Less-established checkpoints, though, may not even have a physical barrier but are just a few militia fighters loitering on a small road that will tax anyone passing them. These may only exist for a week or two.
Other checkpoints continue to be flashpoints for sub-national political settlements. For instance, control over the profitable checkpoint on the edge of Beledweyne, historically operated by the Hawaadle for the governor of Hiiraan, has brought about conflict with the current Abgaal-led Hirshabelle regional administration in Jowhar, which wants a slice of the funds. In 2022, Al-Shabaab's attempt to establish a nearby rival checkpoint helped trigger the Ma'awiisley uprising in Galmudug that displaced the jihadist group from much of central Somalia. Some of the disparate Ma'awiisley, too, were later criticised for the proliferation of checkpoints in newly liberated territories, though this was in large part a consequence of the lack of federal support for the militias.
Meanwhile, the legacies of the 'isbaaro wars' and resource capture are still keenly felt in inter-clan grievances, such as between the Hawaadle and more marginalised clans in Hirshabelle, including the Jajele and the Gaalje'el. Unsurprisingly, those from more influential clans are able to traverse checkpoints with fewer problems and costs than lower-caste clans. In Lower Shabelle, for instance, the brokers that navigate checkpoints for traders are overwhelmingly Hawiye/Abgaal or Hawiye/Habar Gedir, as it is these sub-clans that dominate the region's trade. In turn, those from lower-caste and more disenfranchised clans in the area routinely face higher prices. For small-scale farmers and herders, navigating these myriad patchworks of checkpoints is a costly business.
The prevalence of checkpoints in Somalia also mirrors the continued struggles of government administrations to expand their tax bases. With the federal and regional governments incapable of administering swathes of the country and unable to extract meaningful taxes, moving goods are levied instead-- including in ports. The typical placement of checkpoints on entrances/ exits of major towns often reflects the extent of the administration's territorial control. However, checkpoints serve another purpose- tying together militias and their leaders to Somalia's tortured state-building project by associating them with a particular district or administration to prevent them from raising funds at will.
Simultaneously, Al-Shabaab's governance can be felt through its network of checkpoints, predominantly in Jubaland. Though most of the checkpoints in central-southern Somalia are operated by government-associated forces, the jihadist group nevertheless operates a significant number in areas under its control. Al-Shabaab has a far more standardised version than their competing, ad hoc counterparts under the auspices of government-affiliated forces. In fact, though farmers and truckers may pay more to bring their produce short distances in Al-Shabaab-held territory, they spend more over long distances through government-associated land due to the multiple checkpoints. However, the extremist group does not typically tax small-scale farmers as they do not produce enough to pass the financial level required to extract 'zakat.' The jihadists also routinely attack government checkpoints, such as Ex-Control, as a way to undermine the symbols of the administration.
Though the wanton violence associated with checkpoints in the 1990s and early 2000s has eased, they remain a key contributor to Somalia's deep economic imbalances. To tackle the engrained nature of checkpoints in Somalia, a holistic approach is needed. Rather than understanding them solely from a security or counter-terror perspective, engaging with them from a political and socio-economic lens is the only route to breaking down the structural impediments.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
In the 17th century, the Ottoman polymath Kâtip Çelebi penned 'The Gift to the Great on Naval Campaigns', a great tome that analysed the history of Ottoman naval warfare at a moment when Constantinople sought to reclaim maritime supremacy over European powers.
Villa Somalia has prevailed in Baidoa. After weeks of ratcheting tensions, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen proved a paper tiger this morning, unable to resist the massed forces backed by Mogadishu. After several hours of fighting, Somali National Army (SNA) forces and allied Rahanweyne militias now control most of Baidoa and, thus, the future of South West. In turn, Laftagareen is believed to have retreated to the protection of the Ethiopian military at Baidoa's airport, with the bilateral forces having avoided the conflict today.
Last October, Al-Shabaab Inqimasin (suicide assault infantry) overran a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) base in Mogadishu, freeing several high-ranking jihadist detainees and destroying substantial quantities of intel. A highly choreographed attack, the Inqimasin had disguised their vehicle in official NISA daub, weaving easily through the heavily guarded checkpoints dotting the capital to reach the Godka Jilicow compound before blowing open the gates with a suicide car bomb. In the months since, Al-Shabaab's prodigious media arm-- Al-Kataib Media Foundation-- has drip-fed images and videos drawn from the Godka Jilicow attack, revelling in their infiltration of Mogadishu as well as the dark history of the prison itself. And in a chilling propaganda video broadcast at Eid al-Fitr last week, it was revealed that among the Inqimasin's number was none other than the son of Al-Shabaab's spokesperson Ali Mohamed Rage, better known as Ali Dheere.
The Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA) did not emerge from a shir (conference) in October 1995 to defend a government, nor to overthrow it. Rather, the militia —whose name was even explicit in its defence of a unified Digil-Mirifle identity —arose from the ruin of Bay and Bakool in the years prior, and decades of structural inequalities.
The battle for South West—and Somalia's political future—continues apace. With the brittle alliance between South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud having broken down spectacularly, the federal government is pouring in arms and forces to oust the Digil-Mirifle leader. Staring down the barrel of the formal opposition holding three Federal Member States and, with it, greater territory, population, and clan, Villa Somalia is looking to exploit intra-Digil-Mirifle grievances—and convince Addis—to keep its monopolistic electoral agenda alive. But this morning, Laftagareen announced a 9-member electoral committee to hastily steer his re-election, bringing the formal bifurcation of the Somali state ever closer.
The worm, it seems, has finally turned. After years serving as a prop for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's monocratic aspirations, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, the leader of South West State, has clapped back against Villa Somalia, accusing the federal government of – among other things - dividing the country, monopolising public resources, colluding with Al-Shabaab, and leading Somalia back into state failure.
Last April, General Sheegow Ahmed Ali-- once the highest-ranking military officer hailing from the Somali Bantu-- died in ignominy in a Mogadishu hospital. A senior commander who had previously spearheaded operations in south-central Somalia, Sheegow had been summarily sentenced to 10 years in prison in 2023 for operating a militia in the capital. His death-- mourned widely and protested in Mogadishu and Beledweyne-- returned the spotlight to the pernicious issues of discrimination in the Somali National Army (SNA).
The Horn of Africa's political fate has always been wired to external commercial interests, with its expansive eastern edge on the Red Sea serving as an aorta of trade for millennia. A Greek merchant's manual from the 1st century AD describes the port of Obone in modern-day Puntland as a hub of ivory, tortoiseshell, enslaved people and cinnamon destined for Egypt. Today, as so often quoted, between 12-15% of the world's seaborne trade passes along the arterial waterway, with the Suez Canal bridging Europe and Asia. But well before the globalised world or the vying Gulf and Middle Powers over the Red Sea's littoral administrations, the logic of 'gunboat diplomacy' underpinned the passage over these seas.
At the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s, the bloated, corrupt, and clan-riven national army was nevertheless in possession of vast quantities of light weapons. Much of it sourced during Somalia's ill-fated alliance with the USSR and later Western and Arab patrons, government armouries were soon plundered by warring militias across Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Baidoa, and every garrison town as the country descended into chaos, providing the ammunition for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people.