Issue No. 774

Jihadist Rebranding: The Damascus Playbook
 

On 8 December 2024, a coalition of Syrian rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) entered Damascus, ridding the Middle Eastern country of the long-serving dictator Bashar al-Assad after over 13 years of civil war. In the weeks since, Syria appears a country re-born and re-imagined, with icons of the Assad family and the regime's instruments of control cast aside. HTS has established a tentative governing coalition, while its leader Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Julani, has been at pains to express his secular credentials and re-engage with both Western and Gulf powers. It is early days, and managing a strategically divided and diverse Syria with its various competing factions will be no small task, but there is real optimism. With a seemingly reformed former al-Qaeda-linked group now running the country following a prolonged civil war and a divided nation, we should consider whether Mogadishu could be the next Damascus.

As HTS swept down the motorways from Aleppo to Homs to Damascus over a handful of days, the long-embattled and much-despised Syrian Arab Armed Forces simply melted away, abandoning their posts and uniforms to return to their homes. The demoralised forces preferred not to fight for a government few believed in than continue to risk their lives with the writing on the wall. A similar question might be posed of the Somali National Army (SNA), which remains essentially a corrupt patchwork coalition of clan-based militias barring the US-trained Danab and Turkish-trained Gorgor special forces. Morale within the SNA is rock-bottom– and some may be simply relieved the whole charade of military officials pretending the defeat of Al-Shabaab is imminent may be over. If Al-Shabaab were able to muster a couple of thousand fighters and launch a significant attack on Mogadishu, there are questions about what forces would be able to– or even seek to– resist such an assault. 

A Damascus or Kabul-style fall may well be on the cards. Several scenarios would be possible from this point on, particularly related to how Al-Shabaab would seek to politically position itself. For instance, there would be immediate questions about whether it would pursue vindictive retribution against certain Western 'collaborators' as the Taliban did or offer a more general amnesty as HTS has pursued in Syria. The indications are that it would probably be the former, considering how Al-Shabaab has blocked up wells and executed resistant clan elders in territory it has re-taken since January 2023. These issues, and others such as girls' education, would likely inform whether Western powers would engage or just maintain a watching brief from Nairobi or Addis. So far, for a number of reasons, HTS has been far more successful in engaging with Western administrations and shedding their extremist reputation than their Islamist counterparts in Kabul.

Central to the successive reinventions of HTS has been al-Sharaa, who, during their administering of Idlib, directed the careful and highly publicised outreach to minority groups, including Syria's Christian community. It was a long political journey for the leader, who formed the rebel al-Nusra Front in 2012 with the support of al-Qaeda but later disavowed the transnational jihadist group in 2016. Since his arrival in Damascus last month, al-Sharaa has repeatedly assured the now-reengaging Western countries that his Islamist group will not seek to impose its views on the country. To engage in talks, one would presume that Al-Shabaab would have to make a similar renunciation of its own al-Qaeda roots and follow their Syrian former bedfellows by dropping the 'Al-Mujahideen' from their full name– Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen - or changing it entirely.

Yet for Al-Shabaab, the attractiveness of Doha-mediated talks in light of the sudden collapse of the Syrian regime may also be diminishing. Years of careful negotiations and outreach to the Taliban still resulted in the rapid fall of Kabul, and with the federal government in Mogadishu in crisis, the appeal of dialogue for the jihadists may have receded. It was reported in December that an inspired Al-Shabaab was considering attempting a Syria-style takeover of Mogadishu. Villa Somalia also appears more concentrated on shoring up the chaotic transition to a 'new' African Union peacekeeping mission and maintaining its sovereign rents than any Qatar-driven negotiations at this current juncture. 

Far less is known about Al-Shabaab's leaders, such as Emir Ahmad Diriye, also known as Abu Ubaidah, who has been reported to be gravely ill at multiple points in recent years, and Mahad Karate, than the new Syrian transitional government. The various factions and distinct views within the Al-Shabaab leadership are harder to discern, making it more difficult to judge where the extremists are positioned in relation to talks and what issues they may be more amenable to negotiating over. Still, there are hints at outreach, such as the occasional propaganda videos that offer some insight into its health and educational services. Al-Shabaab has even released coverage depicting women honing their computer skills in its de facto capital of Jilib, and there are reports that the extremist group is considering opening some areas to western NGOs in the coming months.

Another comparison between Syria and Somalia is the issue of both governments' external backers being in disarray. The Russian war in Ukraine and Israel's systematic targeting of Iranian proxies left Assad's two principal allies in Moscow and Tehran distracted and unable to prevent the Turkish-backed offensive. Similarly, in Somalia, the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) continues to stumble from one mishap to another, and with funding still unsecured for a multi-month, let alone a multi-year deployment, there is a real risk the operations could unravel entirely. A politically divided country with a weakened security sector and flagging external support could refer to either Syria or Somalia.

There are, of course, several key differences between the Syrian and the Somali context, and it is important not to overread from one situation to the other. Most importantly, Al-Shabaab has not yet attempted a significant jihadist rebranding like the HTS coalition. And, unlike the mosaic of cultures and ethnicities in Syria, clan remains the principal structure of Somali politics and society. An Al-Shabaab attempt at a rapid takeover of the Hawiye-dominated capital, Mogadishu, could lead to the collapse of the federal security services and military, but it would not end three decades of conflict-- just usher in another iteration. First and foremost, Ahmed Madoobe's administration in Darood-majority Jubaland and Said Abdullahi Deni's in Darood-majority Puntland will forcibly resist any attempts by Al-Shabaab to forcibly impose its will on their territories. Madoobe battled the jihadists for Kismaayo in 2012 and will not countenance handing over the reins of the profitable deep-sea port to his despised enemies. Nor would clans such as the Leysan in South West State and the Hawaadle in Hiiraan, who have also fought the extremists over many years and incurred brutal losses, submit to a post-jihadist state. The potent combination of ideology and clan makes any Al-Shabaab takeover of Mogadishu unlikely to bring about national peace.

Nor has Al-Shabaab disavowed its transnational elements, with its Jaysh al-Ayman and Jaysh al-Habash wings still operating in Kenya and Ethiopia, respectively. Despite their differences, Nairobi and Addis have vested interests in securing buffer zones within Somalia and preventing ongoing extremist infiltration. For Ethiopia and Kenya, the known quantities of Madoobe, Deni, and even their South West State counterpart, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, would remain more appealing partners than a rebranded Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu. 

Finally, though much disliked in significant constituencies, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is no Bashar al-Assad. The incumbent in Villa Somalia has not overseen and directed the deaths of hundreds of thousands of his citizens or used chemical weapons. The political settlement of Somalia is splintering, undeniably in large part due to Villa Somalia's centralising constitutional agenda, but Hassan Sheikh is nowhere near the brutality and oppression of Assad, both father and son. And as seen in Galmudug and Hirshabelle in 2022, there are surely many who dislike the federal government but may still fight the jihadist group.

With the likelihood of any imminent victory over Al-Shabaab remaining essentially zero, no chance of credible one-person, one-vote elections on the horizon, and the multilateral peacekeeping force in shambles, there is a sense of Somalia unravelling at the seams. The country is in a serious crisis at this very moment, and absent a coordinated international approach, a dramatic scenario like the fall of Damascus is not inconceivable. But with little suggestion that Al-Shabaab is not yet ready to hang up its jihadist garb, that may be where the similarities between Syria and Somalia end. 

The Somali Wire Team