A smile and a hug in Addis
Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali met over the weekend in Addis Ababa to cement a tentative détente brokered in December by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The new momentum towards normalisation is welcome and certainly has the potential to de-escalate the dangerous tensions that have built up in the Horn in the last year. But beyond symbolism, will it change anything on the ground?
Abiy pulled out all the stops to give the Somali president an exceptionally warm welcome. Streets were festooned with the white-star-in-blue-ocean Somali flag. Billboards with the portrait of HSM were erected at major road intersections, emblazoned with 'Welcome to Ethiopia, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud'. A major hotel lit up the night sky in Addis decked in the Somali flag, and earlier in the day, the Somali president laid a wreath at the mausoleum dedicated to the Battle of Adwa and inspected a guard of honour of Ethiopian soldiers. Images of Abiy and Hassan Sheikh clasping hands and laughing were widely shared, a stark contrast to Erdoğan's firm manoeuvring of both men just a month ago.
The domestically embattled Abiy seemed to relish every moment, while Ethiopian media lapped up the pomp and circumstance associated with the trip. The official narrative is that a wise Ethiopian leadership had shown strategic patience, overcome a seminal crisis point, repaired ties with Mogadishu, and foiled Egyptian and Eritrean designs in the Horn. Unsurprisingly, the raging insurgencies in Oromia and Amhara were nowhere to be seen, nor the surges in instability and poverty across the country. In Mogadishu, meanwhile, the Somali president's core constituency – Islamists and nationalists – exploded in anger at the visit. Hassan Sheikh has since been accused of betrayal and even treason for 'capitulating' to Ethiopia.
After months of deteriorated ties and much still in flux, all are hedging their strategic bets and making no binding commitments. Despite a new administration in Hargeisa and its vocal unease about the MoU, Addis is attempting to keep the Somaliland option open while protecting its security and geopolitical interests in Somalia. Ethiopia calculates that participating in the latest iteration of the African Union peacekeeping mission is crucial in preventing the Egyptians from deploying troops to their border.
Egypt and Eritrea are almost certain to read the new developments in Addis as a tactical setback in their attempts to isolate Ethiopia. The meeting in Cairo was purposely designed to divert attention from the buzz around the Somali president's trip to Ethiopia and insist that the so-called 'tripartite alliance' remains unchanged. Asmara and Cairo are expected to make counter-moves in the coming weeks to attempt to scuttle or undermine the delicate process of Ethiopian and Somali re-engagement supported by Ankara. What form that will take is hard to divine, but one must not downplay the determination of Eritrea and Egypt to 'humiliate' Abiy. Reports of increased hostile military activity by Eritrean forces along its Ethiopian border suggest that the risk of regional conflict still remains despite the thaw in relations between Addis and Mogadishu.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate