Inside Operation Hilaac
Puntland's military operations against the Islamic State-Somalia (ISS) in the rugged Al-Miskaad mountains are now well underway. After several months of preparations in 2024, the northern Federal Member State (FMS) is deploying considerable forces as part of Operation Hilaac (Lightning) to quash the influential jihadist wing located near the port city of Bosasso.
Around 3,000 Puntland forces have been mobilised for the offensive, with Armo village being wielded as the operational base. The numbers are significant– and far more than the estimates of several hundred ISS militants in the mountains– but it is still a fragmented mix of forces, with tensions both within and between them. Along with local Puntland militia, the assembled forces include the UAE-backed Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), Daraawiish, and the Puntland Presidential Guard. Moreover, hundreds of technical vehicles have also been kitted out for the offensive and displayed in a procession through Dharjaale several weeks ago. What is clear is how significantly the Puntland administration has invested in its military capacity in recent months, both economically and politically, with Operation Hilaac a testament to the progress it has made.
Units have been deployed to several locations to form a loose seal around ISS positions in the mountains, including at Qandala and Timirshe, with the better-trained Puntland forces now pushing in. So far, the FMS troops have seized several water sources in Ameyra and Hobato while also having cleared the contested Timirishe-Balidhidin road. However, ISS fighters have yet to engage significantly with the gradually advancing Puntland forces and have instead mostly retreated to their home turf in the mountainous terrain. Tackling small units of ISS fighters in these areas is likely to prove challenging, particularly with the added difficulties of sustaining the Puntland troops in these remote areas.
The extremist group has struck out from its positions in the mountains, targeting the military camp in Dharjaale at the end of December with a complex attack. It was a blatant show of force and attempt to disrupt the offensive, with two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices deployed alongside four suicide bombers, killing several Puntland soldiers in the process. What was notable was that, according to the jihadist group's post-attack statement, 12 fighters from 7 different countries were involved in the operation. Unlike Al-Shabaab, whose rank-and-file and leadership are both dominated by Somalis, ISS has a vastly different transnational composition, drawing wannabe jihadists from across the Horn, East Africa, and beyond. After some speculation, Puntland's Information Minister Mahmoud Aydid Dirir recently clarified that these foreign fighters will also be granted amnesty if they surrender. Yesterday, ISS fighters targeted Puntland forces with a number of suicide drones that were shot down, revealing a degree of technological sophistication within the jihadists.
While Puntland manages its own security primarily from its own budget, it is receiving some military support for these anti-ISS operations. Though it was suggested that the US military may offer assistance to the campaign, it has not yet done so. Still, AFRICOM has previously conducted several strikes against ISS, including one in May 2024, southeast of Bosasso, that unsuccessfully targeted Mumin and killed three militants. American special forces also conducted a raid on the extremist group in January 2023 that killed Bilal Al-Sudani, then-head of the Al-Karrar Office. Led by Emir Abdulkadir Mumin, now believed to be in his 70s, the importance of ISS lies not in the territory it controls but rather in its strategic significance within the international jihadist movement. The Al-Karrar Office coordinates with other regional IS affiliates in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, and plays a central role in the extremists' global financing of operations. Ethiopia and the UAE, meanwhile, have both provided varying degrees of military support for the Hilaac campaign, including the former dispatching munitions to the Deni government to the fury of Mogadishu last year.
Most importantly, President Said Abdullahi Deni has invested significant political capital and time in engaging with Puntland's major clans against ISS, which will be absolutely critical if the operations are to prove successful. Support from the Ali Saleban sub-clans that populate the ISS-controlled areas between Qandala and Iskushuban, who have long felt disillusioned with the Garowe administration, has been secured but will have to be sustained. Core leadership within ISS hails from Ali Saleban and particularly the Bidyahan Ali sub-clan, including Mumin, who has long wielded his clan ties in the area for quotidian support. In turn, Puntland Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohamed 'Baari,' who hails from the Ali Saleban, and others have been tasked with spearheading the mobilisation of these communities with promises of greater development in the Bari region. The parliamentary official also narrowly survived the ISS attack on Dharjaale on 31 December.
If the operations are successful in the coming weeks and ISS can be degraded, it will strike a significant blow to the jihadist group not just in Somalia but to its broader aspirations in Africa as well. Moreover, if the personnel and materiel costs are not too severe, it will also free up Puntland forces for similar operations against the Al-Shabaab presence in the northern region. And politically, it will hand Deni strong anti-jihadist and security credentials for his probable run for the federal presidency in 2026 against Hassan Sheikh Mohmaud. As a consequence, the operations have left Villa Somalia in a quandary-- whether to support the successful and popular fight against terrorism in Puntland but reluctant to back one of its main political rivals who has withdrawn his FMS's recognition. In the meantime, while there are several hundred jihadists to contend with in complex and challenging terrain over the coming weeks, the auspices are promising.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate
In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare's tragedy Coriolanus, the tribune Sicinius addresses the gathered representatives and, rejecting the disdain the titular character displays towards plebeians, defends them, stating, "What is the city but the people?" Capturing the struggle between the elite and the masses of ancient Rome, the line has remained politically resonant for centuries--emphasising that a city, democracy, and state rely on the people, not just their leader. Or perhaps, not just its buildings. It is a lesson missed by Villa Somalia, though, with the twilight weeks of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term in office — at least, constitutionally — dominated by the government's twin campaigns in the capital: land clearances and the militarisation of Mogadishu.
On Tuesday, 14 April, the four-year term of Somalia's federal parliament ended, or rather, it didn't. Villa Somalia's (un)constitutional coup of a year-long term extension for the parliament and president in March remains in effect, leaving the institution in a kind of lingering zombie statehood. It is perhaps a fitting denouement for the 11th parliament, whose degeneration has been so thorough that its formal expiration means little in practice.
As global energy markets reel from the partial shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz and war insurance premiums skyrocket by nearly 4,000%, an unlikely maritime security provider is emerging as a critical stabiliser in one of the world's most vital shipping corridors. The Somaliland Coast Guard, operating from the port city of Berbera, has quietly begun providing maritime escort services, seeking to reduce shipping insurance costs—and consequently, the price of commodities and energy for consumers across the Horn of Africa and beyond.
Over the weekend, a flurry of viral posts on X (formerly Twitter) highly critical of Türkiye by the Ugandan army chief risked tipping the three-way relations between Somalia, Türkiye, and Uganda into a new tailspin. General Muhoozi - the son of Ugandan President Yoweri K. Museveni and the Chief of the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) - accused Türkiye of disrespect, threatened to pull troops out of Somalia, and further demanded USD 1 billion in compensation from Ankara. Although the posts were deleted on Sunday, the storm the comments generated has not died down.
The 19th-century Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote in his novel, The Brothers Karamazov: “Above all, do not lie to yourself. A man who lies to himself and listens to his own lie comes to a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him.” In Somalia today, we are suffering because our head of state has lied to himself so much so, that Dostoevsky had alluded to, he has reached a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him. However, before we delve into the nature or purpose of the lie and its grave national, regional, and international consequences, a bit of history is warranted on Somalia as a nation-state.
On Monday, a politician widely regarded as Ankara’s primary proxy in Somalia was inaugurated as a Member of Parliament (MP) under circumstances that Somali citizens and political observers are denouncing as a brazen institutional theft. This unprecedented case of electoral misconduct occurs in the twilight of the current parliament’s mandate, signaling a deep-seated crisis in legislative integrity.
In the 17th century, the Ottoman polymath Kâtip Çelebi penned 'The Gift to the Great on Naval Campaigns', a great tome that analysed the history of Ottoman naval warfare at a moment when Constantinople sought to reclaim maritime supremacy over European powers.