Issue No. 772

Published 10 Jan 2025

Inside Operation Hilaac

Published on 10 Jan 2025 11:37 min

Inside Operation Hilaac

Puntland's military operations against the Islamic State-Somalia (ISS) in the rugged Al-Miskaad mountains are now well underway. After several months of preparations in 2024, the northern Federal Member State (FMS) is deploying considerable forces as part of Operation Hilaac (Lightning) to quash the influential jihadist wing located near the port city of Bosasso. 

Around 3,000 Puntland forces have been mobilised for the offensive, with Armo village being wielded as the operational base. The numbers are significant– and far more than the estimates of several hundred ISS militants in the mountains– but it is still a fragmented mix of forces, with tensions both within and between them. Along with local Puntland militia, the assembled forces include the UAE-backed Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), Daraawiish, and the Puntland Presidential Guard. Moreover, hundreds of technical vehicles have also been kitted out for the offensive and displayed in a procession through Dharjaale several weeks ago. What is clear is how significantly the Puntland administration has invested in its military capacity in recent months, both economically and politically, with Operation Hilaac a testament to the progress it has made.

Units have been deployed to several locations to form a loose seal around ISS positions in the mountains, including at Qandala and Timirshe, with the better-trained Puntland forces now pushing in. So far, the FMS troops have seized several water sources in Ameyra and Hobato while also having cleared the contested Timirishe-Balidhidin road. However, ISS fighters have yet to engage significantly with the gradually advancing Puntland forces and have instead mostly retreated to their home turf in the mountainous terrain. Tackling small units of ISS fighters in these areas is likely to prove challenging, particularly with the added difficulties of sustaining the Puntland troops in these remote areas.

The extremist group has struck out from its positions in the mountains, targeting the military camp in Dharjaale at the end of December with a complex attack. It was a blatant show of force and attempt to disrupt the offensive, with two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices deployed alongside four suicide bombers, killing several Puntland soldiers in the process. What was notable was that, according to the jihadist group's post-attack statement, 12 fighters from 7 different countries were involved in the operation. Unlike Al-Shabaab, whose rank-and-file and leadership are both dominated by Somalis, ISS has a vastly different transnational composition, drawing wannabe jihadists from across the Horn, East Africa, and beyond. After some speculation, Puntland's Information Minister Mahmoud Aydid Dirir recently clarified that these foreign fighters will also be granted amnesty if they surrender. Yesterday, ISS fighters targeted Puntland forces with a number of suicide drones that were shot down, revealing a degree of technological sophistication within the jihadists.

While Puntland manages its own security primarily from its own budget, it is receiving some military support for these anti-ISS operations. Though it was suggested that the US military may offer assistance to the campaign, it has not yet done so. Still, AFRICOM has previously conducted several strikes against ISS, including one in May 2024, southeast of Bosasso, that unsuccessfully targeted Mumin and killed three militants. American special forces also conducted a raid on the extremist group in January 2023 that killed Bilal Al-Sudani, then-head of the Al-Karrar Office. Led by Emir Abdulkadir Mumin, now believed to be in his 70s, the importance of ISS lies not in the territory it controls but rather in its strategic significance within the international jihadist movement. The Al-Karrar Office coordinates with other regional IS affiliates in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, and plays a central role in the extremists' global financing of operations. Ethiopia and the UAE, meanwhile, have both provided varying degrees of military support for the Hilaac campaign, including the former dispatching munitions to the Deni government to the fury of Mogadishu last year.

Most importantly, President Said Abdullahi Deni has invested significant political capital and time in engaging with Puntland's major clans against ISS, which will be absolutely critical if the operations are to prove successful. Support from the Ali Saleban sub-clans that populate the ISS-controlled areas between Qandala and Iskushuban, who have long felt disillusioned with the Garowe administration, has been secured but will have to be sustained. Core leadership within ISS hails from Ali Saleban and particularly the Bidyahan Ali sub-clan, including Mumin, who has long wielded his clan ties in the area for quotidian support. In turn, Puntland Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohamed 'Baari,' who hails from the Ali Saleban, and others have been tasked with spearheading the mobilisation of these communities with promises of greater development in the Bari region. The parliamentary official also narrowly survived the ISS attack on Dharjaale on 31 December.

If the operations are successful in the coming weeks and ISS can be degraded, it will strike a significant blow to the jihadist group not just in Somalia but to its broader aspirations in Africa as well. Moreover, if the personnel and materiel costs are not too severe, it will also free up Puntland forces for similar operations against the Al-Shabaab presence in the northern region. And politically, it will hand Deni strong anti-jihadist and security credentials for his probable run for the federal presidency in 2026 against Hassan Sheikh Mohmaud. As a consequence, the operations have left Villa Somalia in a quandary-- whether to support the successful and popular fight against terrorism in Puntland but reluctant to back one of its main political rivals who has withdrawn his FMS's recognition. In the meantime, while there are several hundred jihadists to contend with in complex and challenging terrain over the coming weeks, the auspices are promising.

The Somali Wire Team 

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