Kismaayo has been triumphant in its victory, with Jubaland security forces releasing a photo of Hassan 'Iraqi,' the commander of the federal troops in Ras Kamboni, seemingly captured from the military base overrun by the regional Daraawiish. Images of dozens of SNA troops trudging across the Kenyan Ishakani border after the heavy fighting have also been widely shared alongside piles of discarded weapons. Meanwhile, in a supreme display of confidence, Madoobe was photographed grinning in a Kismaayo supermarket on Wednesday evening, his position as president of Jubaland secure. With the Ras Kamboni debacle hopefully over, the regional administration yesterday released a magnanimous statement expressing sadness at the clashes, accusing Hassan Sheikh of wielding the SNA for political purposes and calling for military efforts to go towards liberating Al-Shabaab-held territory. The statement concluded that the "solution lies in negotiation and compromise, not in armed conflict."
Yet the federal administration is doubling down once again, asserting that Madoobe is collaborating with Al-Shabaab even while its own destabilising, centralising attempts of the past 12 months have empowered the jihadist group. Deprived of Ras Kamboni, the federal government has claimed Madoobe struck a deal with Al-Shabaab to allow Jubaland troops "passage" to strike innocent federal forces. It is a risible attempt to make the stinging rout of the SNA in Ras Kamboni more palatable. And contrasting the end of the Jubaland and federal statements is more than telling, with the latter in the aftermath of Wednesday's chaos ominous, asserting that "these treasonous acts will not go unpunished." Yesterday, Deputy Information Minister Abdirahman Al-Adala further revealed that the Council of Ministers had agreed to establish a committee to investigate the purported links between Al-Shabaab and Madoobe.
The notion that Madoobe, one of the longest bulwarks against Al-Shabaab in Somalia and despised by the jihadists, is somehow conspiring with them is devoid of reality. The use of "treasonous" again is notable, with Madoobe also charged with 'treason' by Banaadir's Regional Court in the wake of his re-election last month. The word has been increasingly wielded by a number of Al-I'tisaam-affiliated sheikhs and politicians when referencing Madoobe and others opposed to the federal government's ambitions towards a more unitary state. Influential elements of the secretive transnational Salafist group, infamous for its jihadist roots and ties with former spy chief Fahad Yasin, have now come behind the Damul Jadiid president in Mogadishu. They aspire to remove Madoobe for several reasons, including his stalwart opposition to Al-Shabaab, their intentions on Kismaayo's deep sea port, and his position as a strong federalist that runs contrary to Al-I'tisaam's vision for an Islamist, centralised Somalia. The return of Al-I'tisaam should alarm all invested in Somalia's future.
Meanwhile, the continued insistence that the Ras Kamboni deployment was about Al-Shabaab falls apart quickly under minimal scrutiny. If the deployment of these Gorgor troops was really part of the long-stalled offensive against Al-Shabaab, why issue an INTERPOL Red Notice for Madoobe? Why not coordinate the offensive with Jubaland, as has happened in Galmudug and elsewhere, instead of confronting both Jubaland and Al-Shabaab simultaneously? And what were just a few hundred isolated federal soldiers in Ras Kamboni going to achieve without cooperation from Jubaland? The Ras Kamboni forces were always a clear shot across the bow to Madoobe, with the confused messaging from Villa Somalia betraying its true intent. The withdrawing Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) forces stationed in Lower Juba were not even part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) as Mogadishu claimed but instead were bilaterally deployed under Operation Amani Boni. The mobilising of federal troops to threaten a FMS leader, even following a choreographed re-election, has been one of the most egregious misuses of power and precious resources in the fight against Al-Shabaab.
The repeat jeopardising of the country's national security and stability in a bid to consolidate power in Villa Somalia has enabled the resurgence of Al-Shabaab. It is expected that the jihadists, anticipating a further draw-down of African Union peacekeepers, will soon launch a major offensive in early 2025 and seize advantage of the demoralised and divided SNA. The blatant politicisation of the national army has been immensely corrosive. A senior US-trained Danab commander in Jubaland, General Odowaa Yusuf Raage, was removed from his position earlier this week after he criticised the weaponisation of federal troops– particularly the rapid promotion of defecting Jubaland Daraawiish over experienced officers and, of course, the misplaced deployment of Gorgor soldiers. But it goes deeper and broader than this-- beginning months back with the insistence on photo-ops near the frontlines over substance and concerted security sector reform. Since Villa Somalia has got the bit between its teeth on amending the Provisional Constitution and handing itself carte blanche to lay waste to the country's fragile political settlement, any prospect of serious progress against Al-Shabaab has been cast aside.
It is not just the national opposition-- predominantly led by former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, ex-PM Hassan Ali Khaire, and Abdirahman Abdishakur-- that have been unequivocal in their condemnation of the violence, but many of Somalia's closest allies as well. A UK statement released in the wake of the clashes summed up many of the widely shared sentiments that it was "deeply regrettable that political differences have resulted in serious conflict and that calls for de-escalation have been ignored."
Jubaland is prepared to negotiate, but Villa Somalia must see that it has gone too far and that soldiers' deaths as a result of unworkable electoral plans and constitutional gerrymandering cannot fly. This is the latest trough in a year of several lows for the Hassan Sheikh administration, but a desperately needed reset appears to be no closer. And as Mogadishu refuses to negotiate-- so far-- it is also important to return to the question of 'what mandate?' In 2022, the president was not handed a popular mandate to pursue his policies to such an extreme degree, which were not even elucidated prior to his election for a second non-consecutive term. Moreover, if those in Villa Somalia believe a unitary state is the solution to Somalia's many ills, why not propose it as a position for national dialogue and consensus instead of introducing it through manipulation and subterfuge? If Mogadishu can make peace with Addis in Ankara after months of heightened tensions and explosive rhetoric, it should surely be able to withdraw from its hostile positioning against Puntland and Jubaland, among others. A negotiated and consensus-driven political settlement may still be possible, but with every moment that passes and every new scheme of Mogadishu's, it becomes that much harder.
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Months of simmering tensions in the Hiiraan region and escalating political rifts with Mogadishu have morphed into a full-blown armed insurrection this week. This development compounds the widening revolt across Somalia's periphery against President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) administration, deepening its political isolation.
In a landmark ruling last week, five senior judges of Somalia’s Supreme Court declared incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s (HSM) May 2026 term extension unlawful and held that Parliament’s mandate had expired in April 2026, thereby rendering Villa Somalia’s "one-person, one-vote" (OPOV) electoral process illegal and its outcome invalid. Consequently, the judges directed all Somali political parties to agree on a new electoral framework within 30 days and conduct a credible poll within 90 days.
Every political system generates its own distinctive catchphrases, slogans, and metaphors, and Somalia is no exception. Indeed, the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has proven to be one of the country's most prolific creators of political branding. Among the most notable was the aspirational slogan "Soomali heshiis ah dunida naheshiis la ah" (Somalia at peace with itself and with the world). Always more ideal than reality, the phrase now rings hollow at a time when the nation remains deeply fractured internally and relations with regional neighbours have grown increasingly frosty. Similarly, the Simón Bolívar-style moniker "Dal xoreeye" (The Liberator) feels intensely contradicted by reality as significant swathes of the country risk reverting to Al-Shabaab control. Other slogans, such as "Birmade" and "Dan Qaran", have likewise been quietly discarded.
In social psychology, the term "desperation conundrum" refers to a psychological paradox wherein an acute, extreme, or severe need for an objective inadvertently impedes its attainment. This occurs because an intense sense of urgency frequently drives choices and behaviours that alienate the very outcome that is so desperately sought.
Somalia’s contemporary political trajectory is profoundly defined by the month of October. Within the Somali collective consciousness, October is not merely another page on the calendar; it is the recurring crucible of political upheaval, tragedy and systemic transformation.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has since 10 October been deploying National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces, specifically the little-known Public Protection Forces (Ilaalada Shacabka / People’s Protection Forces), in Wadajir. This mobilisation is concentrated close to the home of ex-President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – a development widely criticised by many Somalis as provocative. Some interpret the build-up as a prelude, possibly, to some form of armed action against the former president and leader of the opposition Somali Future Council, amid uncorroborated media reports that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has used Abgaal clan elders to relay an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of Sharif and other opposition figures.
It’s been a bruising week for the Somali Federal Government (FGS), headed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), whose constitutional term of office expired in May this year. Yesterday, forces aligned with the administration of Jubaland peacefully took control of the strategic border town of Beled Haawo in Somalia’s Gedo region – a lucrative customs post for trade and transit with Kenya. Roughly 1,000 Daraawiish paramilitaries loyal to Abdirashid Hassan Janan – a fickle politician who is notorious for changing sides in a volatile region – reportedly deployed across key sites in the town following negotiations with the previous local administration.
Plans are intensifying within Hiiraan to establish an autonomous "Hiiraan State." This development reflects deep-seated regional and clan cleavages reasserting themselves in local politics, set against the backdrop of a stalled federal process, a breakdown in talks between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and the opposition Somalia Future Council (SFC), and an unravelling Somali federation.
Nearly a month has passed since a powerful blast destroyed the home of General Mahad, widely known as Taliye Shub, in Doolow, a political dissident who opposed the government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.