Issue No. 767

A Showdown in Lower Juba
 

On Wednesday morning, the dam broke in Ras Kamboni in Lower Juba as fighting erupted between federal Gorgor troops and Jubaland Daraawiish soldiers. The result was decisive, with hundreds of Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers either routed or captured in a humiliating end to Mogadishu's attempt to wrest power from Ahmed Madoobe in Jubaland. With Villa Somalia unable to remove the long-serving Federal Member State (FMS) leader either through subterfuge or force, now must be the inflexion point for the federal government. The deaths of Gorgor troops and Jubaland Daraawiish fighters was a deeply avoidable tragedy-- and the responsibility of which lies with Villa Somalia.

Kismaayo has been triumphant in its victory, with Jubaland security forces releasing a photo of Hassan 'Iraqi,' the commander of the federal troops in Ras Kamboni, seemingly captured from the military base overrun by the regional Daraawiish. Images of dozens of SNA troops trudging across the Kenyan Ishakani border after the heavy fighting have also been widely shared alongside piles of discarded weapons. Meanwhile, in a supreme display of confidence, Madoobe was photographed grinning in a Kismaayo supermarket on Wednesday evening, his position as president of Jubaland secure. With the Ras Kamboni debacle hopefully over, the regional administration yesterday released a magnanimous statement expressing sadness at the clashes, accusing Hassan Sheikh of wielding the SNA for political purposes and calling for military efforts to go towards liberating Al-Shabaab-held territory. The statement concluded that the "solution lies in negotiation and compromise, not in armed conflict."

Yet the federal administration is doubling down once again, asserting that Madoobe is collaborating with Al-Shabaab even while its own destabilising, centralising attempts of the past 12 months have empowered the jihadist group. Deprived of Ras Kamboni, the federal government has claimed Madoobe struck a deal with Al-Shabaab to allow Jubaland troops "passage" to strike innocent federal forces. It is a risible attempt to make the stinging rout of the SNA in Ras Kamboni more palatable. And contrasting the end of the Jubaland and federal statements is more than telling, with the latter in the aftermath of Wednesday's chaos ominous, asserting that "these treasonous acts will not go unpunished." Yesterday, Deputy Information Minister Abdirahman Al-Adala further revealed that the Council of Ministers had agreed to establish a committee to investigate the purported links between Al-Shabaab and Madoobe.

The notion that Madoobe, one of the longest bulwarks against Al-Shabaab in Somalia and despised by the jihadists, is somehow conspiring with them is devoid of reality. The use of "treasonous" again is notable, with Madoobe also charged with 'treason' by Banaadir's Regional Court in the wake of his re-election last month. The word has been increasingly wielded by a number of Al-I'tisaam-affiliated sheikhs and politicians when referencing Madoobe and others opposed to the federal government's ambitions towards a more unitary state. Influential elements of the secretive transnational Salafist group, infamous for its jihadist roots and ties with former spy chief Fahad Yasin, have now come behind the Damul Jadiid president in Mogadishu. They aspire to remove Madoobe for several reasons, including his stalwart opposition to Al-Shabaab, their intentions on Kismaayo's deep sea port, and his position as a strong federalist that runs contrary to Al-I'tisaam's vision for an Islamist, centralised Somalia. The return of Al-I'tisaam should alarm all invested in Somalia's future.

Meanwhile, the continued insistence that the Ras Kamboni deployment was about Al-Shabaab falls apart quickly under minimal scrutiny. If the deployment of these Gorgor troops was really part of the long-stalled offensive against Al-Shabaab, why issue an INTERPOL Red Notice for Madoobe? Why not coordinate the offensive with Jubaland, as has happened in Galmudug and elsewhere, instead of confronting both Jubaland and Al-Shabaab simultaneously? And what were just a few hundred isolated federal soldiers in Ras Kamboni going to achieve without cooperation from Jubaland? The Ras Kamboni forces were always a clear shot across the bow to Madoobe, with the confused messaging from Villa Somalia betraying its true intent. The withdrawing Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) forces stationed in Lower Juba were not even part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) as Mogadishu claimed but instead were bilaterally deployed under Operation Amani Boni. The mobilising of federal troops to threaten a FMS leader, even following a choreographed re-election, has been one of the most egregious misuses of power and precious resources in the fight against Al-Shabaab.

The repeat jeopardising of the country's national security and stability in a bid to consolidate power in Villa Somalia has enabled the resurgence of Al-Shabaab. It is expected that the jihadists, anticipating a further draw-down of African Union peacekeepers, will soon launch a major offensive in early 2025 and seize advantage of the demoralised and divided SNA. The blatant politicisation of the national army has been immensely corrosive. A senior US-trained Danab commander in Jubaland, General Odowaa Yusuf Raage, was removed from his position earlier this week after he criticised the weaponisation of federal troops– particularly the rapid promotion of defecting Jubaland Daraawiish over experienced officers and, of course, the misplaced deployment of Gorgor soldiers. But it goes deeper and broader than this-- beginning months back with the insistence on photo-ops near the frontlines over substance and concerted security sector reform. Since Villa Somalia has got the bit between its teeth on amending the Provisional Constitution and handing itself carte blanche to lay waste to the country's fragile political settlement, any prospect of serious progress against Al-Shabaab has been cast aside.

It is not just the national opposition-- predominantly led by former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, ex-PM Hassan Ali Khaire, and Abdirahman Abdishakur-- that have been unequivocal in their condemnation of the violence, but many of Somalia's closest allies as well. A UK statement released in the wake of the clashes summed up many of the widely shared sentiments that it was "deeply regrettable that political differences have resulted in serious conflict and that calls for de-escalation have been ignored."

Jubaland is prepared to negotiate, but Villa Somalia must see that it has gone too far and that soldiers' deaths as a result of unworkable electoral plans and constitutional gerrymandering cannot fly. This is the latest trough in a year of several lows for the Hassan Sheikh administration, but a desperately needed reset appears to be no closer. And as Mogadishu refuses to negotiate-- so far-- it is also important to return to the question of 'what mandate?' In 2022, the president was not handed a popular mandate to pursue his policies to such an extreme degree, which were not even elucidated prior to his election for a second non-consecutive term. Moreover, if those in Villa Somalia believe a unitary state is the solution to Somalia's many ills, why not propose it as a position for national dialogue and consensus instead of introducing it through manipulation and subterfuge? If Mogadishu can make peace with Addis in Ankara after months of heightened tensions and explosive rhetoric, it should surely be able to withdraw from its hostile positioning against Puntland and Jubaland, among others. A negotiated and consensus-driven political settlement may still be possible, but with every moment that passes and every new scheme of Mogadishu's, it becomes that much harder.

The Somali Wire Team