Hijacking off Eyl: Revisiting Puntland's Troubled Waters
In late November, the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) informed the European Union's anti-piracy naval force, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, that pirates may have hijacked a Chinese-owned fishing vessel off the northern coast of Somalia. On 1 December, after contacting the vessel, the EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission confirmed that Somali pirates had indeed seized control with up to 18 crew members on board, and later revealed it had been spotted two nautical miles off the coast of Eyl in Puntland. The recent incident was the first following a 5-month lull after the resurgent pirate activity that began in late 2023 with the hijacking of the Iranian vessel Al-Meraj 1.
The ancient port town of Eyl in Puntland's Nugal region, located in predominantly Issa Mahmoud territory, was once a hotspot for illicit fishing in the 1990s and later gained notoriety as the centre of Somalia's pirate industry at its peak in the mid-2000s. The highly profitable pirate networks declined following a concerted, coordinated campaign between Puntland's regional administration and local leaders, alongside the deployment of international naval vessels to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Still, an area just north of Eyl has been again identified as a piracy hotbed in the past year and the location where the Maltese-flagged M/V Ruen and the Bangladesh-flagged M/V Abdullah were anchored after their hijackings.
Equipped with AK-47s and machine guns, the pirates included individuals who were reportedly contracted to provide the ship with protection. Having seized the vessel several days ago, the pirates briefly approached the coast near Eyl on Friday but returned to sea, seemingly fearing a confrontation with Puntland forces. According to a local clan elder, a USD 300,000 ransom offer by a Somali company working for the vessel was rejected by the pirates. Meanwhile, a senior Puntland security official has insisted that the administration is opposed to ransom paying and has authorised an armed operation should the pirates refuse to release the vessel and its crew safely. Yet, while the PMPF remains accountable for anti-piracy efforts in the semi-autonomous northern region, as the practice has waned, so has the focus of the UAE-backed force on piracy. It has been forced to play catch-up in the past year, though the PMPF recently reported some arrests, including of three pirates and the capture of a boat in September in Ras Asayr. Instead, since late 2023, a combination of navies have been involved in the rescuing of hijacked dhows and merchant vessels. Nearly every seizure has failed to date, with the only major successful hijacking being the capture of the coal-carrying MV-Abdullah in March 2024, which saw its Bangladeshi owners pay a USD 5 million ransom in April to secure its release.
The latest incident follows a period of relative calm, with the most recent recorded attack occurring in early June. This decline has been largely attributed to the rough monsoon winds in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, which make the sea perilous for small boats that pirates mostly use. The monsoon winds are most active and rough between June and September, hampering pirate operations on small speed boats. This seasonal pattern partially explains the pattern of attacks amid the resurgence since late 2023, including the hijacking of the MV-Ruen in December of that year. That vessel was held for three months before Indian naval forces intervened to rescue the crew, returning 35 Somali pirates to Mumbai to face prosecution for the first time.
The hijacking also follows recently voiced discontent from clan leaders to the north and south of Eyl in the Gara'ad and Bargaal areas of Puntland about foreign fishing fleets in Somalia's territorial waters. Elders warned that if local fishermen were not adequately protected, their communities would be forced to take action. It is unlikely the latest incident was related to these warnings, but Somali fishing communities remain understandably frustrated with foreign vessels, mainly Chinese, Yemeni and Iranian, aggressive tactics and deploying sea-bed trawlers that have devastated delicate marine ecosystems. Taking advantage of Somalia's poor naval and law enforcement capabilities over its waters, foreign fishing vessels have long-ignored the 24 nautical miles restriction that is intended to prevent their presence close to the coast. About USD 300 million worth of fish has been estimated to be illegally captured annually from the Somali waters, a significant loss of potential income and livelihoods for fishing communities. Piracy provides an alternative economy from which disenfranchised fishermen seek to address both their frustration and declining fortunes-- never mind its poor success rate.
It is not anticipated that the hijacking of another Chinese fishing vessel will precipitate another significant wave of piracy in Puntland. Instead, it appears to have been an opportunistic act by apparent onboard security and others rather than a carefully designed and executed hijacking. Piracy infrastructure in Puntland remains diminished, with many former pirate leaders and networks having turned to other profitable illicit endeavours such as smuggling. Moreover, the anti-pirate procedures implemented by shipping companies, such as the deployment of armed guards, remain effective in deterring a broader surge in activity. That does not mean, however, that the root causes of piracy in Puntland and Somalia have been eradicated, with disillusionment and disenfranchisement amongst the peripheral Issa Mahmoud communities in Eyl still present. Governance and development of these areas have oft been treated as an afterthought by successive Garowe-based Puntland administrations.
The shores of the Red Sea have long been considered an inconvenience at best and an active threat at worst by many who traverse the world's most strategic waterway. For years, the deployment of gunboats to tackle the surface-level impacts of piracy has been successful in stifling attacks, but as the spate of the Houthi attacks from Yemen and pirate hijackings have revealed, these are no true fixes to their deeper political and socio-economic drivers. Even if no further hijackings are reported, tackling off-shore instability has to begin in the littoral countries that straddle the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
By the Somali Wire Team
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