Issue No. 764

Groundhog Day: Echoes of Jubaland's Crisis in 2013 and 2019

There is a palpable sense of deja vu regarding the events unfolding in Jubaland today. The latest crisis– primarily between the federal government and the administration in Kismaayo headed by Ahmed Islam Madoobe – has more than a few echoes of the events of 2013 and 2019. Over 11 years later, many of the cast of characters are the same, including the Jubaland and federal presidents, Al-Shabaab, as well as Kenya and Ethiopia. And so are some of the issues being ostensibly fought over-- particularly the future of federalism and the Provisional Constitution in Somalia. Underpinning all three crises, though, is the broader context of the transitional and fragile nature of Somalia's politics, and all have been driven by centralising federal authorities stretching the political settlement to near-breaking point. The settlement is not permanently elastic, and after over a decade of destabilising cyclical political crises between the centre and periphery, we may be nearing a point of rupture.

In both 2013 and 2019, the first Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo administrations sought to cast Madoobe's position as unconstitutional. The case was weak, with neither recognising the provisional nature of the constitution, while wielding these arguments as a fig leaf to seize power and undermine Madoobe. As is the case today, both administrations deployed troops to Jubaland and sought to stoke discontent by backing rival candidates in efforts to unseat him. In mid-2013, this erupted into deadly violence in Kismaayo, with the involvement of warlord Baare 'Hiiraale' forces, who had declared himself the president of the newly-formed Jubaland with support from the federal government. In 2019, meanwhile, Farmaajo attempted another trick, seeking to deploy Ethiopian commandos from Baidoa to Kismaayo to unseat Madoobe and very nearly sparking clashes with the Kenyan army securing the airport. In both instances, Madoobe remained in power in Kismaayo and prevailed against Mogadishu, but not without cost to Somalia's fragile political settlement nor Jubaland's stability.

The fallout from the 2013 and 2019 crises differed considerably. In Hassan Sheikh's first term, it proved to be the critical inflexion point for the centralist-inclined leader to pull back from the brink, aware that the crisis went far beyond Jubaland. Then, and now, the Jubaland crisis threatened to entirely rupture relations between two major clan families, the Hawiye-dominated federal government and the Darood-led Puntland and Jubaland, barring the divided Mareehaan. Following negotiations by Addis, the federal leader returned to a more consensus-based form of politics and resuscitated his administration. Six years later, having failed to unseat Madoobe from Kismaayo, Farmaajo directed the deployment of troops to northern Gedo instead and installed loyalists across the region. Al-Shabaab took ready advantage of the instability and expanded its presence across predominantly Mareehaan-occupied Gedo. In 2019, Hassan Sheikh was on the other side of the divide as part of the national opposition, urging respect for Madoobe and Somalia's federal model. Again, the durability of the country's political settlement was heavily tested.

Even while forces are being mobilised in Lower Juba today, leaders in Mogadishu and Kismaayo are again basing their positions upon differing interpretations and 'defence' of the Provisional Constitution. In 2013, 2019, and 2024, the Jubaland president has been a strong proponent of federalism and resistant to Mogadishu's meddling– but remains no democrat. In July, Madoobe directed his loyal regional parliament to amend Jubaland's constitution to allow himself to serve a third consecutive term in scenes awfully reminiscent of those in the federal parliament in March with the Provisional Constitution. Still, Madoobe's positions are more firmly anchored in the provisional nature of the Provisional Constitution than Villa Somalia's attempts to impose its own abrogated version in the name of democracy. 

Though the current crisis has been couched in the rhetoric of one-person, one-vote systems, constitutionality, and the rule of law, Somalia's political settlement remains underwritten and predicated on the ability to call violence and militia in uniform to the fore. As the federal government deploys more troops to Ras Kamboni, it increasingly appears that it is only a matter of time before fighting erupts. Today, with greater foreign backing from Eritrea, Egypt and others, amped-up nationalism, and increasingly assertive Islamist elements within the federal government, Villa Somalia seems determined to bend Jubaland to its will this time.

In 2013 and 2019, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud overcame his autocratic, centralist instincts to promote the development of a negotiated, consensus-oriented federal system. His abandonment of those principles today is impelling Somalia back towards fission and conflict. It is more than just a small elite subset of the Ogaadeen in Kismaayo that is disenchanted with Mogadishu but a stretch of clans and communities spanning the length of Somalia. This year has seen a host of groups only tentatively aligned with the federal government break from Villa Somalia as it has pushed ahead with centralising and Islamising revisions to the Provisional Constitution and electoral system. But historically disadvantaged Dir-Mirifle communities in South West State are also resistant to the government's plans, increasingly in disarray, to compel the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from southern Somalia by year's end. Elsewhere, Hawadle communities in Hiiraan also fear the retaliation of a resurgent Al-Shabaab, having led the uprising that dislodged the extremist group in large parts of Galmudug in 2022. Somalia's array of clan and political leaders are not blind to the federal government stoking successive crises.

Over a decade after the formation of Jubaland, many of the most vexed questions relating to Somalia's politics– and, by extension, its security and economy– remain unanswered. In fact, much of the momentum in the early 2010s amid the formation of Jubaland and other Federal Member States has been lost, ground down by the realities of operating with a series of fraught and disinclined federal and state-level governments. In this light, characterising the looming standoff as a solely Jubaland-Mogadishu dispute between two elite camps or between a sovereign government and a truculent rebel group mistakes both the drivers and dangers of the current crisis. The quarrel between Mogadishu and Kismaayo should not be misconstrued as a spat between factions or squabble over constitutional nuances-- it represents much deeper and more dangerous political and social divisions in Somali society. The Provisional Constitution, despite its flaws, represents the last, best opportunity to translate Somalia's incomplete and elastic political settlement into a stable and enduring peace. 

By the Somali Wire Team