The Cost to Somalia’s Children
There are over 7 million malnourished children under the age of 5 in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, according to UNICEF. Somalia’s under-5 mortality rate is some 112 per 1000 live births, more than one in ten. Nearly 70% of Somalis live below the international poverty line; around 1.8 million children are acutely malnourished. Let’s breathe for a moment and let that sink in.
In Somalia and across the Horn of Africa, children are experiencing unprecedented hunger, water scarcity, and armed conflict-related insecurity. Millions are at risk of dying from severe malnutrition. Drought is certainly a leading factor contributing to this dire situation, with families and entire communities losing their livelihoods over the past several years of failed rains. Millions of children and families have been forced to leave their homes in search of food and water, becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs) in their countries, and refugees in neighbouring states. Displaced women and girls are particularly vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence.
Armed conflict and political instability are also significant factors devastating the lives of Somalia’s children. The youngest are missing safe homes, as well as safe drinking water, regular meals, and adequate medical care. Many of those from 5-15 are without basic education, and their lives are forever impacted by child labour, forced recruitment by non-state armed groups, and violent conflict in their communities.
In Al-Shabaab (AS) controlled areas of southern and central Somalia, children who can attend school have been subject to extremist Islamist curricula. Some 3.85 million children need education in emergencies (EiE) support, 48% of them IDPs. The Federal Government of Somalia plans to recruit and train 3,000 more teachers, an important start but the country’s perennial insecurity and limited resources will undoubtedly continue to hold back educational development.
While most Somalis support government-led security operations to disrupt AS across their country, children and youth in any village or town in which fighting takes place suffer not only material loss, but psychological trauma. Children are all too often among civilian victims of ground conflict, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and air attacks. On 6 September, a woman and her two children were killed after AS planted an IED in their home in Eel Laheley in Galgudud to target those returning following the area's liberation by government forces.
As security operations continue, and future stabilisation efforts are considered in areas retaken from AS, basic health care services must include psycho-social support, as well as education, for Somalia’s youth. Ignoring these needs will only lead to further social and political upheaval in the future. Routes into individual indoctrination and militancy are complex and myriad, but there is no doubt that early trauma and exposure to extremist ideology plays a significant role.
Somalia ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 2015, 26 years after it was first adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1989. The Convention outlines dozens of human rights to be protected for every child under age 18. These include the inherent right to life, the right not to be separated from parents, the right to primary and developmental health care, the right to education, the right to protection from economic exploitation, the right to protection from sexual exploitation and abuse, the right to protection in armed conflict, and the right to play.
In addition, countries must take all legislative, administrative, social and other measures to protect children from physical and mental violence, abuse, neglect, maltreatment and exploitation. In reality, however, many of these rights and protections are a distant dream in Somalia.
Somalia has yet to sign the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; just one of only 5 AU member states not to have done so to date. The African Charter includes many of the same requirements of the UN Charter, as well as provisions requiring the protection of disabled children, and prohibitions against child marriage and damaging cultural practices, which could be interpreted to include female genital cutting. The country has one of the highest rates globally, with 98% of girls between 5-11 having undergone the most extreme form of cutting, infibulation.
Nationally, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has yet to enact laws prohibiting child abuse, including labour trafficking, commercial sexual exploitation, and recruitment by non-state armed groups. Most children in Somalia in 2023 are at extreme risk of being subjected to physical, social, economic and environmental human rights abuses.
The country faces a particularly extreme youth bulge, with over half of Somalia’s population 18 million under the age of 15, and the median age just over 15. They are coming of age in an ever-warmer world and in a country that, despite some notable progress, remains wracked by violence and displacement. Beyond the gravity of the current situation, it would benefit the FGS, Somalia’s Federal Member States, and all those in positions of authority in the country to consider the future consequences of neglect of today’s children on tomorrow’s society.
The Somali Wire team
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Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.
While much international attention is on Mogadishu – understandably so - another electoral crisis is brewing in the regional state of Galmudug. Historically unstable, prone to Al-Shabaab violence and destabilisation and wracked by chronic inter-clan frictions and periodic armed hostilities, the looming vote appears likely to aggravate the situation and foment more divisions.
Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.