As ATMIS Exits, A Dangerous Security Vacuum Looms
African soldiers serving in Somalia under the aegis of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) have begun leaving their Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). By the end of September 2023, 3,000 ATMIS soldiers will have left the country. ATMIS is also expected to hand over 5 FOBs to the Somali National Army (SNA), including at Dhusamareeb’s Airport, Kismayo’s Old Airport, the Federal Parliament, the State House, and Biyo Adde. The Burundian Defence Forces have already handed over the Biyo Adde FOB under their control to the SNA. Four additional bases are to be permanently closed as part of the phased draw down.
Over the weekend, images of ATMIS heavy armoured vehicles from the Biyo Adde base, making their way to the Port of Mogadishu, were widely shared on social media. Somalis appear largely pleased to see ATMIS forces withdraw, in the hope that Somali soldiers will now take full charge of the country’s security. But some are also venting frustration at what they perceive as ATMIS ‘stinginess,’ accusing them of carting away crucial FOB equipment, including generators.
The completion of the ATMIS draw down comes against growing concern the pull-out is creating a dangerous vacuum in large pockets of Somalia. On 19 September, Somali National Security Advisor Hussein Sheikh Ali wrote to the United Nations Security Council, urging the body to facilitate a 90-day temporary “technical pause” to allow Mogadishu to recover from recent battlefield setbacks and reorganise. The letter stressed the “exposed vulnerabilities” facing the SNA due to “unforeseen” events. This request seems to have thrown the ATMIS withdrawal into limbo.
The UNSC has yet made no formal reply to the last-minute request from Villa Somalia, in part because the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) was not consulted in advance. The request has also come mid-second phase withdrawal, without a clear indication of how ATMIS forces in need of rest and recuperation will remain, how equipment will be sustained, or how additional time will be financed. Relations between Villa Somalia and the AU have recently soured amid increasing pressure from Al-Shabaab on Somali and allied forces.
Mogadishu’s counter-insurgency has been driven by overconfidence that the SNA can replicate the extraordinary success of last year’s offensive. It has become clear that the blitzkrieg by the SNA is in fact counter-productive - driven more by a desire to project confidence than to make sustainable gains. It is estimated the government has lost over 3,000 soldiers in the campaign in recent months. Instead of negotiating a flexible timetable for the takeover of FOBs, Somali forces are now stretched thin over a large swathe of hostile terrain. The bulk of the FOBs abandoned by ATMIS in June have now been seized by Al-Shabaab.
Hopes of help from neighbouring countries have also foundered. Neither Kenya nor Ethiopia appear eager to commit fresh forces to Somalia. On Friday 22 September, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud travelled to Djibouti to meet with US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin to solicit greater support for the SNA. Austin praised Hassan Sheikh, saying he “wants to do everything that he can to maintain momentum,” but did not comment on the ATMIS extension request. Hassan Sheikh reportedly also met with his Djiboutian counterpart, Ismael Omar Guelleh, to request a delay in the withdrawal of Djiboutian forces at Dhusamareeb’s FOB.
More politicians are meanwhile travelling to the frontlines to mobilise clans. Last week Speakers of the Federal Parliament of Somalia, Adan Mohamud Nur Madobe and Abdi Hashi Abdullahi, joined Hassan Sheikh in Dhusamareeb before he left for Djibouti. There is little indication these efforts are paying off, however. While most clans say they will support the president in his popular war campaign, some degree of reticence appears to be slowing things down. But even in the best-case scenario, clan militias and the SNA alone cannot win the fight against Al-Shabaab.
And the SNA remains as dysfunctional as ever, with the recent minor reshuffle of army command seeming to have done little to engender trust. If the ATMIS draw down continues as planned without modification, it is likely more territory will be freed up for Al-Shaabab to reclaim.
The withdrawal of the 3,000 ATMIS soldiers this month is likely inevitable and will place even greater pressure on the SNA. Shoring up supply lines and returning to the fundamentals of counter-insurgency are critical to preventing the collapse of the frontlines, as happened at the end of August. Cementing the gains the SNA has made in Galmudug and Hirshabelle must therefore come before any push into southern Somalia. Moving forward, however, the Somali Transition Plan clearly needs an urgent rethink. Otherwise, Somalia faces the grim prospect of a piecemeal return to jihadist control.
The Somali Wire team
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