Competing Electoral Timelines
Ten days ago, opposition politicians from South West State (SWS) and Jubaland met in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. These conferences intended to navigate a position on the possible divergence from previously agreed-upon electoral timelines in their Federal Member States (FMS). At the heart of these deepening tensions are SWS President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe’s push for presidential term extensions based on May’s National Consultative Council (NCC) proposed electoral cycle.
In Nairobi, the newly-formed opposition Union of Presidential Candidates in Jubaland declared it had stopped recognising Madoobe as president in August and called for inclusive elections to prevent any administrative vacuum. Meanwhile in Addis, the South West State Salvation Council said it would not accept Laftagareen’s push for another year in office. Jubaland and SWS are not alone; nearly every FMS is now seeing some form of political upheaval over disagreements in their electoral timelines. Galmudug is preparing for elections while simultaneously awaiting the possibility of an extended presidential term, and the constitutional crises in Puntland rumble on.
The sweeping NCC proposals, however, are yet to receive any official ratification by the federal parliament. And since the resumption of the military offensive against Al-Shabaab in central Somalia, discussions over the major constitutional changes have largely been sidelined. Following August’s NCC meeting in Dhusamareeb, however, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) hinted at further consultations on the proposed electoral format. But with the federal parliament now in recess and the NCC without clarification, competing electoral timelines are setting the stage for months of political flux.
In the coming months, as each FMS President’s term expires or the proposed election date passes, these political tensions will likely intensify. These disagreements have shown the potential to spill into violence if left unchecked. In June, dozens were killed in clashes between opposition militia and Puntland security forces as the regional parliament debated contentious amendments to the FMS voting system. With FMS political stakeholders in Jubaland and SWS calling for adherence to their original electoral timelines, there is also a problematic divide between Mogadishu’s objectives and the aspirations of these political movements.
The recent developments in SWS are of particular concern. The SWS opposition, including former Villa Somalia Chief of Staff Hussein Sheikh Mohamud, heavily criticised Laftagareen in their communique on 12 September for failing to “effectively combat the Khawarji [Al-Shabaab] and mobilise SWS communities.” With Laftagareen’s term set to expire in October, as per February’s negotiated Baidoa Agreement, the FMS opposition is now demanding elections before any military offensive in SWS.
Some have accused Laftagareen of deliberately delaying any significant offensives as a tactic to maintain his grip on power. Prominent politicians, including former Speakers of parliament’s Lower House Mohamed Jawari and Mohamed Mursal, and former Finance Minister Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, have further criticised a perceived concentration of power in Laftagareen’s familial and clan networks in SWS. Without political consensus, it is highly unlikely that the FMS major clans and respective militias will fully engage with the already delayed Phase II offensive in SWS and Jubaland.
While the focus has understandably been on the military offensive in central Somalia, it is impossible to disconnect Somalia’s security from its politics. The noticeable gap between federal political and military planning threatens to undermine the important political progress made under HSM. But political cohesion is a prerequisite for effective stabilisation; otherwise, the Somali National Army is arguably freeing communities for fresh political tensions to fill the space left by Al-Shabaab.
It’s not a new idea that Somalia requires negotiated political settlements for its stability. HSM has taken steps in this direction, temporarily shelving his international commitments to personally lead military campaigns and engage with clan leaders to support the counterinsurgency. These negotiations have shown some notable progress, heralding the return of former Hiiraan Governor Ali Osman Jeyte, a key figure in the Hawadle resistance to Al-Shabaab, to the offensive.
Clarity is essential over the future of the NCC proposals and the FMS electoral timelines. Key stakeholders in Jubaland and SWS should be urged to engage in meaningful dialogue to chart an electoral timeline acceptable to all. Allowing these conflicts to grow would be a grave mistake, Villa Somalia can no longer ignore the fraying political settlements from Puntland to Jubaland.
The Somali Wire team
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