The ENDF Ambush
On 17 September, Al-Shabaab (AS) ambushed two Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) convoys near Rabdhure town in the Bakool region of South West State. Part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), the main ENDF convoy ambushed was en route to an Ethiopian base in Wajid town. It was a typical AS attack, using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices to disorient, before pouring in large numbers of fighters. And it was seemingly successful, though AS claims of hundreds of ENDF soldiers killed are almost certainly exaggerated, Ethiopian casualties were likely heavy.
AS also purported to have seized military vehicles, arms and ammunition, and taken several ENDF soldiers alive, including 5 medics. Ethiopian Ambassador to Somalia Mukhtar Mohamed Ware, however, has firmly denied the deaths of any Ethiopian soldiers, dismissing it as “propaganda.” Ethiopian authorities instead claimed to have killed 55 AS fighters.
The deadly ambush comes amid faltering preparations for the Phase II offensive in southern Somalia and September’s ATMIS drawdown. ‘Operation Black Lion’ (OBL) seems dead in the water, despite months of planning in Mogadishu. Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Djiboutian security officials coordinating the offensive left the capital weeks ago, and there seems little appetite for the necessary slog to clear AS in South West State and Jubaland. Southern communities and clans are historically more reluctant to support the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and the upcoming El Nino rains are further expected to favour AS mobility. With flooding likely, Somali security forces will have to fight in immensely tough conditions as well as sustain complex supply lines. AS has further repositioned its forces in southern Somalia in anticipation of the Phase II offensive. The rapid seizure of swathes of Galmudug and Hirshabelle last year is unlikely to be easily replicated.
On 16 September, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) published its communique over the withdrawal of 3,000 ATMIS personnel by the end of the month. While supporting the drawdown, the AUPSC “expresse[d] concern” that AS may “exploit any gaps during or following the drawdown.” The AUPSC’s comments reflect that AS has stepped up its attacks on security forces in the face of intensified pressure from the FGS and its allies. Recent weeks have seen major attacks on Somali National Army (SNA) forces in Owsweyne and Awdhegle, reportedly resulting in substantial casualties.
While in the past few days, SNA forces have seemingly regained momentum and pushed AS from several towns and villages in Mudug, the ATMIS drawdown at this critical juncture is concerning. On Sunday, 17 September, Burundian Defence Forces handed over an ATMIS base to the SNA in Middle Shabelle. Recently transferred Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) have been repeatedly targeted by AS looking to reassert its influence over an area, as well as plunder weapons and intimidate new SNA forces. For instance, in mid-July, AS seized control of a SNA base in Geriley in south-west Gedo less than two weeks after Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) vacated the base as part of the ATMIS drawdown.
Addis has three probable options following Sunday’s ambush. First, to increase their presence and recommit to OBL to degrade AS in South West State and Jubaland. With ongoing instability across much of Ethiopia, including insurgencies in the Oromia and Amhara regions, the Federal Government of Ethiopia may be unwilling to commit significant forces to Phase II operations. It would also certainly come with major risks, including navigating communities suspicious of Ethiopian presence in Somalia. However, scaling up the offensive against AS, even if a bitter pill after years of military presence, offers the best chance to reduce the militant group’s threat in Somalia and, by extension, Ethiopia as well.
The second is to entirely withdraw ENDF soldiers from Somalia and redeploy them along the border to limit AS infiltration. In recent weeks, there has been a marked increase in AS activity along the border following months of relative quiet. Kenya has also redeployed KDF forces to its own border with Somalia following an intensification in attacks.
The final option that Ethiopia may turn to is a logistical shift of using helicopters to deliver support for its more exposed bases, helping mitigate the risk of AS ambushes. This is not the first time Ethiopian forces serving under ATMIS have sustained such heavy casualties from an AS ambush. In 2019, ENDF forces were ambushed by AS between Baidoa and Burkhaba in South West State, with roughly 60 soldiers killed in the attack. Whatever the eventual decision, ATMIS and the FGS should reinforce their supply routes to protect potentially vulnerable forces and deny AS access to sophisticated military equipment.
In April, it was estimated that 3,500 African Union soldiers had been killed since early 2007, when the regional body first deployed forces to Somalia. The African Union peacekeeping mission has proven to be the deadliest mission in decades, and as Sunday’s ambush reveals, shows little sign of abating. While the ATMIS drawdown in September seems certain to continue, clarification of the future nature of Ethiopian and other external forces' military presence in Somalia is urgently needed. The successes in Galmudug should be celebrated, but there should be no doubt about the scale of the challenge facing Somalia, and its allies, in the coming months.
The Somali Wire team
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