Somaliland and Laas Aanood: Averting War
On 25 August 2023, SSC-Khaatumo rebels seized the key Somaliland military base at Gooja'ade near the disputed town of Laas Aanood. Intense fighting saw dozens of Somaliland soldiers killed, and hundreds more taken as prisoners of war. This setback to the Somaliland army, the most significant since the conflict began in February, has rapidly elevated the risk of all-out war in the eastern Somaliland territories.
In the last several weeks, pressure has been mounting on Somaliland President Muse Bihi to launch a counter-offensive to retake the base at Gooja'ade and punish the SCC rebels. Bihi, like many in Somaliland’s ruling elite, is a veteran of the historic campaign to overthrow the Barre dictatorship in the 1980s. Often referred to as ‘mujahideen’ or the ‘old hard men’ of the Somali National Movement (SNM), as a class they do not take military defeat lightly. Their psychological momentum to respond robustly with heavy fire-power remains strong.
In some towns in Somaliland, a campaign of mass mobilisation is already underway, with reports that hundreds of young men and women are enlisting to join the army. Social media and radio programs are saturated with messages calling for swift response, and revenge.
Earlier this week, a number of MPs in the Somali Federal Parliament arrived in Laas Aanood to ‘congratulate’ the Dhulbahante elders and the SSC-Khatumo administration for taking Gooja'ade. For those Somalilanders supportive of a renewed push towards Laas Aanood, this was tantamount to waving a red flag. The parliamentarians, most of them from the Darood, were quick to seize the opportunity to push their pro-union message. The Dhulbahante were praised as the vanguard of a Somali revolution to forcibly ‘bring back’ Somaliland and restore the Somali union. Their messages were not conciliatory and harmonious, but incendiary and divisive. The former Somaliland army camp is now being reconfigured into a war museum to celebrate ‘victory over secessionism.’ In early September, Puntland’s Vice-President Ahmed Elmi Osman, known as ‘Karaash,’ toured Laas Aanood and the former base. The hard-line message he conveyed has seemingly become the standard script for visiting politicians from Somalia.
On 15 September, the Somaliland government issued a lengthy statement in which it said it had credible information that a group of 600 Al-Shabaab, led by Fuad Muhammad Khalaf, known as Shangoole, had entered the town of Shulux, close to Buuhoodle. The statement claimed that the new group had been seconded to SSC-K Commander Abdi Madoobe.
Shongole is a prominent Dhulbahante Al-Shabaab commander and part of the movement’s core ‘historical’ leadership. A dual Somali-Swedish national, he is one of the most wanted jihadists by both Somali and American authorities. He is also sought by Kenya for involvement in the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, which killed 68 people.
Somaliland’s latest claims have been greeted with scepticism and even derision by many in Somalia. This is partly due to the ineffectiveness of Somaliland authorities in credibly communicating its proof regarding the presence of Al-Shabaab near Laas Aanood. Most released evidence has been circumstantial or anecdotal, not enough to convince the already dubious, including some international partners. It is likely that hard evidence is in fact being withheld to protect sources and Hargeisa’s system of intelligence gathering. But some commentators have suggested claims about Shongole may be part of a plan by Bihi to create pretext for renewed military escalation.
Renewed armed conflict in eastern Somaliland would be dangerous and hugely destabilising. It would more deeply draw in Puntland and Darood clans. And it is also possible it could move the Federal Government of Somalia from its position of relative silence on Laas Aanood. And that could end decades of uneasy détente between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, damaging the important principle of negotiated settlement that has guided relations between the two for some time.
The SSC-K rebels scored a major military victory and pushed back a formidable army. The Dhulbahante elite and new SSC-K Governing Council have an opportunity to establish their own administration and help ensure peace in Sool. But they should take care to resist the temptation to overplay their hand. Any attempt to push north to Oog, the next concentration of Somaliland forces, would be reckless at best. If the Council buys into a militant agenda and sees Laas Aanood as a springboard for an armed unionist campaign against Somaliland, they will be courting disaster.
A narrow window still exists to pull both sides back from the brink, and to defeat hard-line calculations drawing them into renewed violence. But this window is closing.
The Somali Wire team
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