Somaliland and Laas Aanood: Averting War
On 25 August 2023, SSC-Khaatumo rebels seized the key Somaliland military base at Gooja'ade near the disputed town of Laas Aanood. Intense fighting saw dozens of Somaliland soldiers killed, and hundreds more taken as prisoners of war. This setback to the Somaliland army, the most significant since the conflict began in February, has rapidly elevated the risk of all-out war in the eastern Somaliland territories.
In the last several weeks, pressure has been mounting on Somaliland President Muse Bihi to launch a counter-offensive to retake the base at Gooja'ade and punish the SCC rebels. Bihi, like many in Somaliland’s ruling elite, is a veteran of the historic campaign to overthrow the Barre dictatorship in the 1980s. Often referred to as ‘mujahideen’ or the ‘old hard men’ of the Somali National Movement (SNM), as a class they do not take military defeat lightly. Their psychological momentum to respond robustly with heavy fire-power remains strong.
In some towns in Somaliland, a campaign of mass mobilisation is already underway, with reports that hundreds of young men and women are enlisting to join the army. Social media and radio programs are saturated with messages calling for swift response, and revenge.
Earlier this week, a number of MPs in the Somali Federal Parliament arrived in Laas Aanood to ‘congratulate’ the Dhulbahante elders and the SSC-Khatumo administration for taking Gooja'ade. For those Somalilanders supportive of a renewed push towards Laas Aanood, this was tantamount to waving a red flag. The parliamentarians, most of them from the Darood, were quick to seize the opportunity to push their pro-union message. The Dhulbahante were praised as the vanguard of a Somali revolution to forcibly ‘bring back’ Somaliland and restore the Somali union. Their messages were not conciliatory and harmonious, but incendiary and divisive. The former Somaliland army camp is now being reconfigured into a war museum to celebrate ‘victory over secessionism.’ In early September, Puntland’s Vice-President Ahmed Elmi Osman, known as ‘Karaash,’ toured Laas Aanood and the former base. The hard-line message he conveyed has seemingly become the standard script for visiting politicians from Somalia.
On 15 September, the Somaliland government issued a lengthy statement in which it said it had credible information that a group of 600 Al-Shabaab, led by Fuad Muhammad Khalaf, known as Shangoole, had entered the town of Shulux, close to Buuhoodle. The statement claimed that the new group had been seconded to SSC-K Commander Abdi Madoobe.
Shongole is a prominent Dhulbahante Al-Shabaab commander and part of the movement’s core ‘historical’ leadership. A dual Somali-Swedish national, he is one of the most wanted jihadists by both Somali and American authorities. He is also sought by Kenya for involvement in the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, which killed 68 people.
Somaliland’s latest claims have been greeted with scepticism and even derision by many in Somalia. This is partly due to the ineffectiveness of Somaliland authorities in credibly communicating its proof regarding the presence of Al-Shabaab near Laas Aanood. Most released evidence has been circumstantial or anecdotal, not enough to convince the already dubious, including some international partners. It is likely that hard evidence is in fact being withheld to protect sources and Hargeisa’s system of intelligence gathering. But some commentators have suggested claims about Shongole may be part of a plan by Bihi to create pretext for renewed military escalation.
Renewed armed conflict in eastern Somaliland would be dangerous and hugely destabilising. It would more deeply draw in Puntland and Darood clans. And it is also possible it could move the Federal Government of Somalia from its position of relative silence on Laas Aanood. And that could end decades of uneasy détente between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, damaging the important principle of negotiated settlement that has guided relations between the two for some time.
The SSC-K rebels scored a major military victory and pushed back a formidable army. The Dhulbahante elite and new SSC-K Governing Council have an opportunity to establish their own administration and help ensure peace in Sool. But they should take care to resist the temptation to overplay their hand. Any attempt to push north to Oog, the next concentration of Somaliland forces, would be reckless at best. If the Council buys into a militant agenda and sees Laas Aanood as a springboard for an armed unionist campaign against Somaliland, they will be courting disaster.
A narrow window still exists to pull both sides back from the brink, and to defeat hard-line calculations drawing them into renewed violence. But this window is closing.
The Somali Wire team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.