Issue No. 592

Stabilisation: More than Security

Despite the recent withdrawals from several strategic towns in Galmudug, the 2022-2023 offensive has brought the most significant territorial gains against Al-Shabaab (AS) in years. In the offensive's first phase, government forces liberated areas including Harardhere, Eldheer, Mahaas, Matabaan, Teedaan, Rage Cele, and Awan Yabaal in Hirshabelle and Galmudug. Villages such as Gulane, Darusalam, Harga-Dhere, and Mabah, among others in the Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle regions, have also been liberated.
 
Despite these gains, numerous challenges persist for the liberated communities. AS still lingers as a threat, and unemployment and poverty remain widespread. Moreover, these communities remain highly susceptible to ecological shocks and continue to grapple with deeply rooted inequalities. ‘Stabilisation’ is often understood as clearing AS from a village and ensuring its security, but it also offers the opportunity to distribute power and resources more equitably.
 
In December 2022, Somalia’s Interior Ministry unveiled its stabilisation programme for these newly liberated areas. The National Stabilisation Strategy (NSS) was the latest in a long line of stabilisation initiatives, including the Somali Transition Plan (STP), the 2020-2024 National Development Plan, and the Wadajir Framework for Local Governance. The NSS, however, was largely devoid of any detail on potential economic programmes to revitalise livelihoods in liberated territory.
 
Communities under the grip of AS are often severed from the rest of Somalia, and international support. The militant group's checkpoints and blockades have long restricted the movement of people and goods, and in recent months, AS has increasingly targeted the country’s telecoms infrastructure. At the beginning of August, AS reportedly banned 35 Hormuud centres, Somalia’s largest telecoms provider, from operating in several areas under its control after the company refused to suspend mobile salary payments to government forces. When AS retreats, it regularly lays Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on already dilapidated infrastructure, as seen on 11 September when AS withdrew from Eel Garaas in Galgudud, where they punitively mined the town boreholes.
 
As a result, newly liberated areas are often among the poorest in Somalia, where access to basic services remains distant. An estimated 69% of Somalia lives below the international poverty line of USD 1.90 a day. This poverty is particularly concentrated in rural areas, with pastoralist livelihoods decimated by the intense drought that has displaced millions. The humanitarian crises facing these communities have been compounded by the AS ban on international aid and rigid control. Restoring damaged infrastructure, including telecoms infrastructure, road networks, and boreholes, would offer tangible benefits to life under the federal government, rather than vague promises of security.
 
With the climate crisis only worsening, and the effects of El Nino yet to be fully felt, there is a pressing need to place climate-adaptive development front and centre in liberated areas. Agriculture, particularly livestock cultivation, remains the predominant sector across Somalia, but overgrazing and deforestation have caused cascading damage to inter-communal relationships and the environment. AS is far from the only threat to these areas' stability, with ever-increasing competition over reduced natural resources repeatedly triggering clashes between settled farmers and more itinerant pastoralists. With over 6 million people acutely food insecure in Somalia, a radical rethink of land use is urgently needed. Newly liberated areas offer the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and its international partners an opportunity to integrate climate-adaptive farming and alternate livelihoods into these communities.
 
Stabilisation further offers opportunities to bring women into a fuller economic role. Engrained cultural attitudes continue to hold women back from decision-making in their communities, but initiatives to enable women to engage economically would go some way in rebalancing this dynamic. This could come from microfinance initiatives or tax benefits to encourage female entrepreneurship.
 
There are also some positive institutional signs on Somalia’s horizon. Its long-awaited ascension to the East African Community (EAC) is on track for later in 2023, over a decade since the country first applied in 2012 during President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s first term. It is hoped that joining the EAC will deepen the country’s trade with member countries. There are concerns, however, that Somalia’s primarily agricultural economy may not be fully compatible with the quasi-industrialised economies of the EAC. The second seemingly imminent change that might bring more financing to the country is the completion of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. The process has allowed Somalia to incrementally access substantial grants from the IMF and other international institutions to support its flagging economy. With limited resources at the federal government’s disposal, accessing climate funding and budgetary support from the international community is needed to sustain complex and costly stabilisation projects.
 
As communities are liberated from AS control, it is possible to rebuild Somalia in a brighter image, one less dominated by clan relationships and structural inequity. While the aftermath of AS rule has left significant scars from its violence, subjugation, and economic suppression, the problems facing these communities are not insurmountable. Empowering communities, particularly women, to take charge of their livelihoods alongside restoring services and development would help begin to break the cycles of intercommunal violence and poverty.

The Somali Wire team