A re-engagement of the clans
The resumption of Phase I of the military offensive in Galmudug against Al-Shabaab (AS) is underway. Negotiations between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and clan elders in Mahaas and Adan Yabaal have brought the promise of fresh clan forces. Several Somali National Army (SNA) brigades have also reorganised with the expectation of parallel offensives to be launched from Mahaas to Wabho and from the Wisil-Ba’aadweyne front in the coming days. But an already immensely complex clearing campaign still lies ahead, further complicated by the territorial losses at the end of August. The re-engagement with Hiiraan and Galmudug clans, including the Hawaadle, Duduble, and Habir Gedir, among others, represents an important first step to regaining the initiative.
Following the significant setback at Owsweyne to Al-Shabaab (AS), and the subsequent withdrawals from strategic towns in Galmudug, including Gal’ad, Budbud, and Masagaway, a reevaluation of the offensive became necessary. Rather than returning to Mogadishu, HSM decamped to Mahaas town in the Hiiraan region to muster support from clan militia. Recent weeks have painfully underscored the challenges SNA forces face in holding liberated territory.
But clan relationships with Al-Shabaab, and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in central Somalia are far from homogenous. While several clan elders have offered support for a renewed offensive, clans seldom offer unequivocal support to the FGS, even if generally sympathetic. Communities risk reprisals, often in the form of execution of clan elders, from AS by aligning with Mogadishu when government forces withdraw. The volatile frontline has meant that territory repeatedly changes hands in short periods of time. The liberation of Eel Garaas on the morning of 11 September exemplifies this, not even lasting a day before government forces withdrew following the death of two Galmudug politicians to an improvised explosive device (IED).
Nonetheless, if the clan militias can be effectively integrated into operational planning they may yet have siginificant influence in the coming weeks. The first half of the Phase I offensive in central Somalia in 2022 brought the most substantial territorial gains in years. The repression by AS of the Hawaadle and other clans formed the backbone of these successes, driven in large part by Ali Osman Jeyte’s mobilisation of clan militias.
HSM and Jeyte have now reportedly negotiated to again place Jeyte front and centre of clan operations in Hiiraan, and parts of Galmudug. Since June, Jeyte has been partially sidelined following his dismissal as Hiiraan governor by Hirshabelle President Ali Gudwale, and his subsequent unrecognised declaration of ‘Hiiraan State.’ But the collapse of the frontline in Galmudug, and the renewed intensity of AS attacks have returned him to the fore.
The re-engagement of Jeyte is a positive one. He remains influential amongst the Hawaadle, and has already begun to mobilise new forces. These clan militia can serve as critical holding forces that Somali security forces face a dearth of, particularly with the imminent departure of 3,000 African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces. Reconstituting SNA brigades, alongside Danaab and Gorgor special forces, will also be critical to support and organise the clan militia effectively. Many of the SNA forces in Galmudug have been on the frontlines for months on end, badly degrading their fighting capacity. Clan militias can further allow for rest and recovery. But clan militia are not a panacea to the deep-set problems facing the Somali National Army (SNA).
Better operational planning is now needed to match Villa Somalia’s rhetoric. Distrust is still swirling around the perceived competency of the SNA leadership, and the Ministry of Defence. Ensuring effective supply lines and coordinating competent SNA forces must be at the heart of any further offensives. Security officials reportedly believe AS surrounded Owsweyne as soon as SNA forces entered on 22 August. Importantly, the renewed offensive will now reportedly prioritise mobility and degrading AS over simply holding urban locales.
While Villa Somalia has sought to regain some offensive momentum, the recent territorial and personnel losses are intensifying political tensions. Former Hirshabelle President and Special Presidential Envoy for Stabilisation, Mohamed Abdi Waare has heavily criticised Somalia’s Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nour ‘Jama.’ Waare highlighted several issues, criticising perennial corruption and alleged political meddling in the SNA as well as accusing clans of not engaging in the offensive.
Meanwhile, at the Federal Member State (FMS) level, the lack of any military operations in South West State (SWS) has exacerbated frustrations over the incumbent President Abdiaziz Laftagareen. On 12 September, a meeting in Nairobi of opposition SWS figures, released a press statement claiming that “it is clear that liberation of SWS from the enemy” cannot occur until “a peaceful and democratic election is held.”
The collapse in Galmudug has revealed that the SNA alone cannot clear the country from AS. ATMIS, clan militia, and international support all play a critical role in the offensive. A more dynamic offensive is critical to keeping AS on the backfoot, rather than allowing the militant group to have the advantage and strike when government forces are most vulnerable. Preparations are underway and the right noises are being made, but the scale of the challenge should not underestimated.
The Somali Wire team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Another showdown over Tigray's political architecture is unfolding, with the future of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) once again at stake. For much of this year, fears of renewed war have loomed over Ethiopia's northernmost region, with the federal government mobilising substantial forces to the edges of Tigray.
In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare's tragedy Coriolanus, the tribune Sicinius addresses the gathered representatives and, rejecting the disdain the titular character displays towards plebeians, defends them, stating, "What is the city but the people?" Capturing the struggle between the elite and the masses of ancient Rome, the line has remained politically resonant for centuries--emphasising that a city, democracy, and state rely on the people, not just their leader. Or perhaps, not just its buildings. It is a lesson missed by Villa Somalia, though, with the twilight weeks of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term in office — at least, constitutionally — dominated by the government's twin campaigns in the capital: land clearances and the militarisation of Mogadishu.
On Tuesday, 14 April, the four-year term of Somalia's federal parliament ended, or rather, it didn't. Villa Somalia's (un)constitutional coup of a year-long term extension for the parliament and president in March remains in effect, leaving the institution in a kind of lingering zombie statehood. It is perhaps a fitting denouement for the 11th parliament, whose degeneration has been so thorough that its formal expiration means little in practice.
Yesterday, 15 April, marked three years of brutal, grinding warfare between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Wholly neglected by a fading international community, many grim landmarks have been passed; another genocide in Darfur, the weaponisation of rape and starvation, another famine, or the desecration of Khartoum, El Fasher, and other major cities. And with no ceasefire or settlement in sight, the war has continued to swell, drawing in each neighbouring African country as tussling Middle Eastern powers grapple for the upper hand-- leaving Sudan in tatters.
As global energy markets reel from the partial shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz and war insurance premiums skyrocket by nearly 4,000%, an unlikely maritime security provider is emerging as a critical stabiliser in one of the world's most vital shipping corridors. The Somaliland Coast Guard, operating from the port city of Berbera, has quietly begun providing maritime escort services, seeking to reduce shipping insurance costs—and consequently, the price of commodities and energy for consumers across the Horn of Africa and beyond.
Most nights in a number of dimly lit bars in Addis Ababa, one can hear a vibraphone hum over a syncopated bassline. The sprightly rhythm is unmistakably jazz, but the scales are Ethiopian; pentatonic, looping and melodic. Five decades after its pioneering by visionary musician Mulatu Astatke, Ethio-jazz remains in full swing, with its renaissance from the late 1990s persevering despite tough political and cultural conditions.
Over the weekend, a flurry of viral posts on X (formerly Twitter) highly critical of Türkiye by the Ugandan army chief risked tipping the three-way relations between Somalia, Türkiye, and Uganda into a new tailspin. General Muhoozi - the son of Ugandan President Yoweri K. Museveni and the Chief of the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) - accused Türkiye of disrespect, threatened to pull troops out of Somalia, and further demanded USD 1 billion in compensation from Ankara. Although the posts were deleted on Sunday, the storm the comments generated has not died down.
The 19th-century Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote in his novel, The Brothers Karamazov: “Above all, do not lie to yourself. A man who lies to himself and listens to his own lie comes to a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him.” In Somalia today, we are suffering because our head of state has lied to himself so much so, that Dostoevsky had alluded to, he has reached a point where he does not discern any truth either in himself or anywhere around him. However, before we delve into the nature or purpose of the lie and its grave national, regional, and international consequences, a bit of history is warranted on Somalia as a nation-state.
In September 2025, Feisal Mohammed Ali was arrested for possession and trading in two rhino horns worth USD 63,000. This was not the first time that this smuggler had seen the bars of a Kenyan prison cell. On 22 July 2016, Feisal - described as an “ivory smuggling kingpin” - received a 20-year prison sentence and fined USD 150,000 for dealing 314 pieces of ivory. Weighing over two tonnes, the ivory was estimated to have come from around 120 elephants. Hailed as a turning point in Kenya’s pioneering crackdown on Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT), Feisal’s incarceration became proof of the country’s commitment to safeguarding its wildlife. This frail pillar came crashing down in August 2018 when Feisal was released following the acquittal of his sentence due to alleged use of tampered evidence by the prosecution.