Issue No. 591

A re-engagement of the clans

The resumption of Phase I of the military offensive in Galmudug against Al-Shabaab (AS) is underway. Negotiations between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) and clan elders in Mahaas and Adan Yabaal have brought the promise of fresh clan forces. Several Somali National Army (SNA) brigades have also reorganised with the expectation of parallel offensives to be launched from Mahaas to Wabho and from the Wisil-Ba’aadweyne front in the coming days. But an already immensely complex clearing campaign still lies ahead, further complicated by the territorial losses at the end of August. The re-engagement with Hiiraan and Galmudug clans, including the Hawaadle, Duduble, and Habir Gedir, among others, represents an important first step to regaining the initiative.
 
Following the significant setback at Owsweyne to Al-Shabaab (AS), and the subsequent withdrawals from strategic towns in Galmudug, including Gal’ad, Budbud, and Masagaway, a reevaluation of the offensive became necessary. Rather than returning to Mogadishu, HSM decamped to Mahaas town in the Hiiraan region to muster support from clan militia. Recent weeks have painfully underscored the challenges SNA forces face in holding liberated territory.

But clan relationships with Al-Shabaab, and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in central Somalia are far from homogenous. While several clan elders have offered support for a renewed offensive, clans seldom offer unequivocal support to the FGS, even if generally sympathetic. Communities risk reprisals, often in the form of execution of clan elders, from AS by aligning with Mogadishu when government forces withdraw. The volatile frontline has meant that territory repeatedly changes hands in short periods of time. The liberation of Eel Garaas on the morning of 11 September exemplifies this, not even lasting a day before government forces withdrew following the death of two Galmudug politicians to an improvised explosive device (IED).
 
Nonetheless, if the clan militias can be effectively integrated into operational planning they may yet have siginificant influence in the coming weeks. The first half of the Phase I offensive in central Somalia in 2022 brought the most substantial territorial gains in years. The repression by AS of the Hawaadle and other clans formed the backbone of these successes, driven in large part by Ali Osman Jeyte’s mobilisation of clan militias.

HSM and Jeyte have now reportedly negotiated to again place Jeyte front and centre of clan operations in Hiiraan, and parts of Galmudug. Since June, Jeyte has been partially sidelined following his dismissal as Hiiraan governor by Hirshabelle President Ali Gudwale, and his subsequent unrecognised declaration of ‘Hiiraan State.’ But the collapse of the frontline in Galmudug, and the renewed intensity of AS attacks have returned him to the fore.
 
The re-engagement of Jeyte is a positive one. He remains influential amongst the Hawaadle, and has already begun to mobilise new forces. These clan militia can serve as critical holding forces that Somali security forces face a dearth of, particularly with the imminent departure of 3,000 African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces. Reconstituting SNA brigades, alongside Danaab and Gorgor special forces, will also be critical to support and organise the clan militia effectively. Many of the SNA forces in Galmudug have been on the frontlines for months on end, badly degrading their fighting capacity. Clan militias can further allow for rest and recovery. But clan militia are not a panacea to the deep-set problems facing the Somali National Army (SNA).

Better operational planning is now needed to match Villa Somalia’s rhetoric. Distrust is still swirling around the perceived competency of the SNA leadership, and the Ministry of Defence. Ensuring effective supply lines and coordinating competent SNA forces must be at the heart of any further offensives. Security officials reportedly believe AS surrounded Owsweyne as soon as SNA forces entered on 22 August. Importantly, the renewed offensive will now reportedly prioritise mobility and degrading AS over simply holding urban locales.
 
While Villa Somalia has sought to regain some offensive momentum, the recent territorial and personnel losses are intensifying political tensions. Former Hirshabelle President and Special Presidential Envoy for Stabilisation, Mohamed Abdi Waare has heavily criticised Somalia’s Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nour ‘Jama.’ Waare highlighted several issues, criticising perennial corruption and alleged political meddling in the SNA as well as accusing clans of not engaging in the offensive.
 
Meanwhile, at the Federal Member State (FMS) level, the lack of any military operations in South West State (SWS) has exacerbated frustrations over the incumbent President Abdiaziz Laftagareen. On 12 September, a meeting in Nairobi of opposition SWS figures, released a press statement claiming that “it is clear that liberation of SWS from the enemy” cannot occur until “a peaceful and democratic election is held.” 
 
The collapse in Galmudug has revealed that the SNA alone cannot clear the country from AS. ATMIS, clan militia, and international support all play a critical role in the offensive. A more dynamic offensive is critical to keeping AS on the backfoot, rather than allowing the militant group to have the advantage and strike when government forces are most vulnerable. Preparations are underway and the right noises are being made, but the scale of the challenge should not underestimated. 

The Somali Wire team