Beyond Puntland: The Islamic State in Somalia
In recent weeks, reports have surfaced about businesses in Bosaaso closing due to pressure from the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). Business owners rang the alarm bell in June, citing threatening phone calls from the terrorist group if they refused to pay ISS extortion demands. The threats weren't idle, at least one shop was targeted by a grenade attack after failing to pay the militant group. Bosaaso’s business community convened a meeting with the Bari region’s administration on 23 August to protest their extortion.
The Islamic State group, also known by its Arabic acronym Da’esh, first appeared in the Horn of Africa in 2015, when a splinter group of Al-Shabaab (AS) in north-eastern Somalia announced a change of allegiance. The newly-formed ISS soon established a base in the Qandala district in the Bari region, to the east of the port town of Bosaaso in Puntland. Led by an elderly Somali returnee from the UK, Abdulqadir Mumin, a small group of fighters pledged support to the Islamic State, an affiliation not reciprocated until 2017.
Extortion disguised as taxes by ISS is nothing new for the business community in Bosaaso. In 2017, ISS demanded 0.25% of all business revenues in the city, potentially raising up to USD 700,000. The militant group has since continued to expand its tax base and develop its capacity to monitor revenues and enforce payment. ISS has also managed, like AS in Mogadishu, to acquire access to Bosaaso’s port records, including details of import consignments, the companies to which they belong, and their value. In 2022, according to the US State Department, the militant group collected nearly USD 2 million in extortion taxes, though this marked a fall of USD 500,000 from the previous year. In July, the US State Department sanctioned ISS head of finance, Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf, citing his role in extorting financial institutions, mobile money service providers, and other businesses in Bosaaso.
In the rest of the country, as well as in Mogadishu, ISS has tried, without much success, to compete for influence with Al-Shabaab. Still, in 2022, ISS conducted 32 attacks, mostly in Puntland and Mogadishu, including an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in Mogadishu that injured police officers. This year, ISS launched several attacks on Somalia’s security forces, including Somali National Army soldiers and Puntland forces. These attacks, however, pale in comparison to the scale of AS attacks and influence across Somalia. ISS, still led by Mumin, has just an estimated 200-250 fighters, several magnitudes smaller than the 10,000 fighters estimated to be part of AS by US Africa Command. AS and ISS competition has occasionally taken on a deadly nature with recent clashes between the two militant groups in Puntland’s Bari region in July.
While ISS presence in Somalia is relatively small, and while its position in the Qandala mountains does not currently provide a viable base from which the group can launch major operations across the region, this does not mean that the Somali security apparatus can afford to be complacent. Recent arrests reveal the diverse nature of ISS fighters. At the end of June and early July, Puntland security forces reported that 12 ISS militants had surrendered in the Bari region, including 6 foreign nationals. Three foreigners came from Sudan, while the remaining three were Ethiopian nationals. In April, Kenyan security forces announced the arrest of three Kenyan nationals in Isiolo County on suspicion that they planned to travel to Puntland to join the militant group.
ISS aspirations are also not limited to taking territory in Puntland, but rather to forming an international cell which makes up the larger Islamic State network. The terrorist group has openly declared its ambition to establish a more substantial presence in Africa. It has built ties with local jihadist groups in Libya, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique and Yemen, effectively encircling much of the Horn and East Africa.
The Islamic State’s Al-Karrar office is also based in Puntland, responsible for transferring funds to other branches of the terrorist organisation. The office has reportedly sent roughly USD 25,000 a month in cryptocurrency to the Islamic State Khorasan Province, its affiliate in central Asia. Financial ties have also been found between ISS and the insurgency of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist rebel group largely based in eastern DRC, dating back to late 2017. A year later, the Islamic State formally declared the existence of its Central Africa Province (ISCAP) and began claiming attacks in the DRC in 2019. Research has linked Islamic State funding to the ADF bombings in Uganda and an attempted bombing in Rwanda in 2021. In Mozambique, a laptop belonging to Islamist insurgents seized by Rwandan forces contained correspondence addressed to ISS.
A US special forces raid in the Qandala mountains in January 2023 killed ISS senior leader Bilal al-Sudani, dealing a significant blow to the terrorist group. Al-Sudani was responsible for the global financing of the Islamic State and the growth of the militant organisation in Africa. The full impact of his killing is yet to be seen. While the extortion of Bosaaso’s businesses is undoubtedly concerning, ISS does not yet present a substantial threat to Somalia’s overall security. The danger of ISS is largely in its position as a conduit for other Islamist extremist groups in Africa and the Islamic State network as a whole.
It could yet expand, though, particularly if the rumbling political crisis in Puntland leaves a vacuum that ISS can exploit. The militant group has repeatedly shown itself to be adept at tailoring its approach to the context in which it finds itself. An unfortunate example of struggles faced by the administration was when soldiers at the end of July abandoned their posts in the Golis mountains, a notorious ISS base, in protests of their unpaid salaries. The Puntland administration swiftly disbursed the salaries, but such mishaps can be ill-afforded.
The Somali Wire team
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