Issue No. 588

Published 08 Sep 2023

Securing Mogadishu

Published on 08 Sep 2023 13:41 min

Securing Mogadishu

Mogadishu’s security has long ebbed and flowed, reflecting and informing the city's makeup today. While Al-Shabaab (AS) attacks remain the most visible symbol of the city’s enduring insecurity, it is by no means the only actor contributing to it. The capital has a deep socio-economic stratification which is reflected in the contrasting experiences of ‘security’ by different communities within the city. 

The capital’s fluid and contested security dynamics mirror Somalia’s contested political settlement. Non-state security actors, including clan militia, hold significant influence in the city, despite repeated attempts to bring them in line. The patchwork security architecture regularly competes over checkpoints, access to resources, and political affiliation. Police forces, the Presidential Guard, the Somali National Army, the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), private security outfits, and clan militias all operate in Mogadishu to varying degrees.
 
Though there may be a police station in every district in Mogadishu, the total number of officers is estimated to be just 5,000-6,000. They are overstretched, and in recent years have been forced to juggle rising drug abuse, rogue clan militias, AS, and the increasing politicisation of security forces under former Somali President Farmaajo. But since the introduction of Ugandan-trained Somali National Army (SNA) brigades, there have been increasing attempts to clear the illegal checkpoints dotted through the capital. 
 
The relationship between Mogadishu’s security forces and its residents is also far from uniform. Many of the capital’s most disadvantaged have understood the police and security forces as another threat. Somali Public Agenda, a public policy think-tank in Mogadishu, has also argued that responding to the threat of AS in the city centre has taken precedence over the security needs of those in the peripheries. 
 
AS does not have a substantial institutional presence in the capital. While it may not operate schools, AS still collects its infamous ‘zakat’ taxes from businesses in Mogadishu. The militant group has also made its presence felt through exercising its twisted morality. In early March, AS reportedly killed 10 individuals accused of selling drugs in the city’s Yaqshid and Daynile districts. Some residents also travel to Mogadishu’s outskirts, where AS has a more permanent presence, to have cases heard in their courts. However, ascertaining the precise scale and nature of AS presence is difficult. 
 
After an IED attack in the Daynile district on 2 September, Mogadishu’s Mayor, Yusuf Hussein Jimale, voiced suspicions that AS could not carry out these attacks without insider support. The militant group has undoubtedly penetrated elements of the country’s security apparatus to deadly effect. Particularly shocking was the suicide bombing at the Jaalle Siyaad Military Academy on 24 July. Dozens of Somali National Army (SNA) forces were killed and injured in the attack. Fourteen SNA officers were arrested shortly afterwards, accused of aiding the suicide bomber.
 
The relative lull in AS attacks in Mogadishu in the first half of 2023 ended with the resumption of the SNA offensive against the militant group in central Somalia. Some have speculated that the rise in attacks is part of a campaign to emphasise its ongoing strength. Whatever the reason, AS has resumed its characteristic targeted attacks on state-affiliated individuals and security forces. On 22 August, in the Kahda district, this took the form of coordinated attacks on two SNA checkpoints, the district police station, and an administrative building. The district’s police station was previously destroyed in February 2022 in a similarly coordinated attack.

Mogadishu has also rapidly swollen in recent years, driven by mass displacement due to the collapsing pastoralism, and armed conflict. The UNOCHA has estimated Banaadir’s vast internally displaced persons (IDPs) population at over 900,000. These IDPs are largely settled in the sprawling, chaotic camps on the edge of Mogadishu or in abandoned buildings in the city centre. They hold few rights and little influence, and largely belong to the marginalised Digil-Mirifle clan and the Somali Bantu. 
 
Urban security has generally improved since 10 years ago in the aftermath of AS control of the capital. Enduring concerns of robbery and violence still remain, however, particularly at night. The murder of robbery victims is not uncommon. This has been particularly linked to the rise of youth gangs in the capital, known as ‘ciyaal weero’ or ‘aggressive children,’ since 2021. These groups have been accused of various crimes, including street theft and sexual assault.
 
The different security needs of communities in Mogadishu are complex. Reflecting these needs is critical to ensuring a more stable city, rather than simply viewing the capital’s security through the lens of counter-terrorism. This is not to say that AS does not pose a serious threat to Mogadishu, but rather it is one piece of an extremely complicated security dynamic. Clarifying the roles that competing security forces play within the city is needed to better address the concerns of marginalised communities. This would allow for greater outreach and ease the constant balancing of counter-terrorism and community policing that the police must navigate. 


The Somali Wire team

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