Issue No. 587

Published 04 Sep 2023

Corruption in the Somali National Army

Published on 04 Sep 2023 12:45 min

Corruption in the Somali National Army
 

Last week Somalia suffered its worst military setback in a year after Al-Shabaab (AS) routed two Somali National Army (SNA) brigades in Owsweyne in Galmudug. The militant group killed dozens of SNA soldiers and seized significant quantities of weapons, ammunition, and military vehicles. The botched operation, and the cascading withdrawals that followed, have triggered intense speculation over the precise events and who is to blame for these failures. While most Somalis have rallied around the government and the army, a sense of unease is growing about the health of the SNA.
 
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has so far resisted calls to fire Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur ‘Jama.’ But many are reportedly furious that an ill-trained, freshly-minted Somali unit was on the frontline without sufficient logistical support and seemingly against the wishes of general SNA command. Yesterday 3 September, HSM flew to the town of Mahas, a strategic hub in the Hiiraan region. In the coming days, he plans to meet with local clan elders and security forces to regain momentum in the offensive.
 
The failure at Owsweyne is not catastrophic-- yet. Lessons have been learnt, and the SNA may still correct itself. But there are several disturbing signs that it could also be a symptom of a far deeper malaise many are yet unwilling to admit. The deadly assault by Al-Shabaab followed a 6-month pause in Somalia’s Phase I operations, supposedly to conduct a ‘strategic review’ of military operations and to enable a change in military leadership. But if AS can still mount deadly raids and retake towns with relative ease, something has fundamentally gone awry with the mission.
 
Armed forces are only as good as the political systems they serve. Soldiers, like citizens, feel alienated from their political elites when they appear to be corrupt and self-serving. Nepotistic recruitment and promotion, pilfering of weapons and supplies, inflating of numbers, and divided and weak command structure, cumulatively combine to create ‘shell’ militaries. These may appear substantial in size, well-trained and equipped with the latest shiny equipment, but they can still prove ineffective in combat.

During the collapse of the frontline last week in southern Galmudug, SNA forces reported major logistical problems, including limited fuel and food. Even the most experienced forces cannot effectively fight when they have such limited resources. This lack of fuel was reportedly partly responsible for the SNA brigades in Owsweyne abandoning dozens of vehicles.
 
Soldiers cannot be expected to stretch or sacrifice themselves in such toxic conditions. Elite corruption saps forces’ morale, corroding and enfeebling institutions until they are rendered dysfunctional. Discontent within the SNA should not be ignored. With 3,000 African Union forces also expected to withdraw in September, the SNA will likely take on even greater responsibilities. Listening to those on the frontline is paramount.
 
HSM’s rhetoric of fight-to-victory has not yet been matched by strategic thinking and action. Villa Somalia appears unable to adequately tackle corruption in its administration or in the military. Dismissals over corruption have not yet led to prosecutions. The number of officials openly feathering their nests, in both Mogadishu and regional capitals, appears to be growing. 
  
Apparent chaos in the implementation of the national security architecture mirrors the wider political malaise in Somalia. Successive failures to address elite corruption head-on, dismiss tainted officials, and appoint the right people to key posts, are establishing a context in which failure seems likely, if not inevitable. To do so they have to take action now. Visibly tackling the perennial scourge of corruption in the military can still restore confidence within the SNA.


The Somali Wire team

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