Issue No. 586

Collapse in Galmudug
 

The offensive front in southern Galmudug has collapsed. A devastating attack on two Somali National Army (SNA) brigades in the village of Osweyne by Al-Shabaab (AS) triggered a cascading withdrawal of Somali forces from several strategic towns this week. These withdrawals in southern Galmudug constitute a serious setback to the offensive in central Somalia, with wide-reaching security implications for southern Somalia and political fallout ahead.
 
On 26 July, AS launched an assault on the village of Osweyne in southern Mudug, which had recently been seized by government forces. A vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) began the assault at 6 a.m., supported by large numbers of AS fighters. Largely defended by an Emirati-funded SNA brigade and Turkish-trained Gorgor special forces, the village was still overrun. While casualty numbers are contested, they likely number well over 100 personnel killed. A sizeable cache of weapons and vehicles were also seized by the militant group as many as 40, including Armoured Personnel Carriers.
 
The fall of Osweyne was followed by the fall of several other towns in quick succession, including Budbud, Gal'ad, and Wabho, as SNA forces quickly withdrew. Holding the line has become the new priority for Somali forces; any hopes that their recent operations would soon kick-start a broader push into southern Somalia have now faded. SNA forces in Eel Buur also withdrew, to avoid over-exposing themselves, and AS has since re-entered the town. The withdrawal from Eel Buur, just days after SNA forces had seized it, is particularly chastening. While front-line fluctuations are typical in asymmetric conflict, these particular losses are painful.
 
The Federal Government of Somalia is now attempting to muster fresh forces to retake Eel Buur and regain momentum. With Emirati-trained and Gorgor forces in disarray, this will likely fall to Danaab and clan militia, and some pockets of SNA forces in Dhusamareb. Also, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has reportedly reached an agreement with the former Hiiraan Governor Ali Jeyte for his return. The influential commander was critical to the successes of the Ma’awiisley against AS in 2022. Fired by Hirshabelle President Ali Guudlawe Hussein in July of this year, the return of Jeyte could be a positive contribution to the offensive.
 
Yet political recriminations about the offensive have already begun. In the immediate aftermath of the Osweyne attack, former Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed called for a full investigation. Accusations of corruption and incompetence abound. On 29 August, in an address to the nation, HSM called for accountability for those who had “abused their responsibilities, committed treason, or undermined the army.” Insisting Somalia was still on track for defeating AS, he also denied that Osweyne had been overrun. Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre doubled down on this rhetoric in a speech to SNA forces in the Adan Yabal district in Middle Shabelle.

Following the sudden reversal of fortune of Somali operations, it seems a cabinet reshuffle may be imminent. Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur may be on his way out. Nur has faced allegations of corruption, particularly over reported connections with the UAE. Whether or not he is replaced in the coming days, political change in Mogadishu is all but certain. Villa Somalia is reportedly furious at recent territorial losses and apparent failures of the SNA.
 
Somalia’s over-extension of its forces into AS-held areas without sufficient coordination prevented the SNA forces in Osweyne from falling back safely. Each SNA unit essentially pushed forward alone, without adequate logistical support or backup. The assault on Osweyne was also reminiscent of the AS assault on Gal'ad in January, which also saw an initial VBIED attack followed by a large number of fighters. This similarity, and the string of recent Somali troop withdrawals, have raised serious questions about the learning capability of SNA leaders. The very viability of their tactics is in doubt, given the ease with which AS was able to withdraw, regroup, and strike Osweyne.
 
The strength of Somalia’s current operations was to serve as the bedrock of Operation Black Lion (OBL) in southern Somalia. But OBL is also in flux. Recent instability in Ethiopia’s Amhara region has drawn Ethiopian attention from Somalia; it is dampening expectations that Ethiopia will play the central role previously expected. Meanwhile, the flow of AS militants into Kenya and their attacks along Kenya’s border with Somalia have held Nairobi’s attention. This, along with ongoing plans for the withdrawal of a further 3,000 African Union forces, will almost certainly delay plans for Phase II of the offensive against Al-Shabaab.
 
Both political and military situations in Somalia remain volatile. It is possible that the FGS will in fact muster enough competent forces to reclaim Eel Buur and hold its ground. This week, however, proved to be a brutal reality check for the Somali government, its international partners, and all who have been hopeful for a new era of peace and stability in central Somalia. It seems that corruption and incompetence in the military have once again cut the legs out from under a potential success. The potential return of Jeyte and re-engagement with local clans are important steps towards regaining momentum, but there should be no doubt about just how damaging recent losses have been.

The Somali Wire team