What Somalia needs is Strong Institutions
Today's editorial in The Somali Wire is written by Ahmed Awad. This is the first part of a two-part series of editorials written by the former Foreign Minister of Somalia, the second will be published in Wednesday's edition of the Somali Wire.
We would like to extend an invitation to others who may wish to contribute to the Somali Wire in the future. We appreciate insightful perspectives on topics concerning Somalia crafted as editorials.
Please contact us for more information if interested.
Somalia can seem like an enigma, and Somalis have perplexed the world. We have become a mystery that defies explanation, provoking both sympathy and admiration in the minds of our partners.
Outside of Somalia, Somalis have shined. The diaspora has proven resilient, daring, creative, and resourceful, often in the most testing circumstances. Somalis have excelled in business overseas, as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa in countries like Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa. Across Europe and the US, Somalis have built impressive mosques and schools. And diaspora Somalis have seen considerable success in the politics of their new countries. Last year, in the US mid-terms alone, 14 Somali Americans won legislative seats.
Yet our people continue to suffer inside Somalia. The country remains a poster child for state collapse. Civil war, poor governance, clanism, corruption, violent extremism, recurrent droughts and flooding, and starvation have characterised the Somali nation over the past 30 years. For decades, many have wrestled with this juxtaposition of diaspora success and state collapse.
At the heart of Somalia’s dilemmas lie failed institutions, from health services to security forces. In other nations, well-functioning state institutions have provided Somalis with the rights and freedoms to successfully pursue their aspirations.
The most serious obstacle to Somalia’s political progress, and its fledgling institutions, is a culture that has given primacy to personality-driven politics. This is the painful legacy of decades of exploitative and destructive military dictatorship. The decrees of the ‘all-knowing’ and ‘all-powerful’ leader hollowed out Somalia’s state institutions. Siad Barre’s regime corroded the separation between private and public sectors, from justice to education, as cronies assumed in key positions in Somalia. This corrosion, and the enfeebling of institutions, drove the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s. Today, informal political and clan relationships still dominate a fragile state. And the still-unaddressed institutional void has been filled by a raft of other actors, including Al-Shabaab.
The concentration of political power in the hands of a single ruler and his cronies is far from unique to Somalia, nor are its shell-like institutions. Other countries, including Yemen, Libya and Sudan, were similarly governed at the whim of a single man, also for decades. Like Somalia, these countries' post-colonial history has been dominated by fragmented societies and sectarianism. In large part, this is due to past colonial exploitation, co-opted local leaders, political oppression, and the imposition of institutions alien to their indigenous populations by the British and the Italians.
Many political leaders today mimic similarly corrosive behaviours, entrenching pervasive nepotism and corruption that allows institutional weakness and poor governance. Patron-client networks have coalesced across the country as Somalis struggle for access to essential resources or political favour. Good governance is often an afterthought.
Somalia’s clientelist politics has also generated innate insecurity. Rather than standardised and accountable behaviour by officials and civil servants, the weakness of Somalia’s institutions allows bribery and patronage to dictate many engagements. And instability from political and armed conflict over resources and influence has driven years of upheaval. Somalia’s peripheries-- geographic, ethnic, and political-- have been the most brutally exploited for years, undermining the relationship between the state and its people.
We must demystify the ‘big man’ at all levels of government and society. Genuine sovereignty is rooted in the people, not unaccountable politicians and officials. A modern state cannot be managed by whims and patronage. It requires well-resourced institutions with competent bureaucracies accountable to the country and its constituents.
Somalia must pursue a new political culture of institutions, one that enshrines the people as sovereign and the government as servants. This is the only way to mend the deep fissures between many Somali communities and the state. Pursuing greater clarity of mission and accountability in Somalia’s primary federal institutions would render the state legitimate in the eyes of its people. This is the fastest and surest way of realising stability, economic development, and a more hopeful future for a united and modern Somali state.
Ahmed Awad is a former Foreign Minister of Somalia and current Puntland Presidential candidate.
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
In the past months, a number of unsettling images and videos have emerged from the Russian frontlines in the Ukraine war. Within the horrors of the grinding "kill zone," where kamikaze drones strafe the sky for any signs of movement, yet another concerning dimension has emerged—the use of African recruits by Moscow in the conflict, often under false pretences. Particularly drawn from Kenya, many reportedly believed they were signing contracts to work as drivers or security guards, only to be shipped to the front lines upon arrival. Such activities are illustrative of several issues, including Russia's relationship with countries in the Horn of Africa, one shaped more by opportunistic realpolitik than genuine partnership.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate
Another showdown over Tigray's political architecture is unfolding, with the future of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) once again at stake. For much of this year, fears of renewed war have loomed over Ethiopia's northernmost region, with the federal government mobilising substantial forces to the edges of Tigray.
In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare's tragedy Coriolanus, the tribune Sicinius addresses the gathered representatives and, rejecting the disdain the titular character displays towards plebeians, defends them, stating, "What is the city but the people?" Capturing the struggle between the elite and the masses of ancient Rome, the line has remained politically resonant for centuries--emphasising that a city, democracy, and state rely on the people, not just their leader. Or perhaps, not just its buildings. It is a lesson missed by Villa Somalia, though, with the twilight weeks of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term in office — at least, constitutionally — dominated by the government's twin campaigns in the capital: land clearances and the militarisation of Mogadishu.