Issue No. 583

Confronting Al-Shabaab’s Patronage System

‘Either be a mountain, or lean on one,’ says the well-known Somali proverb. It captures the traditional reality that more vulnerable groups in Somali society must invariably lean on more powerful ones for protection, especially in times of peril. In exchange, these weaker communities pledge loyalty to their protectors, whose authority they acknowledge and whose political agendas they support. Loyalty can also mean putting their resources at the disposal of their patrons, and taking sides—at least temporarily—against any group the patron designates. 
 
This traditional view of power may help us understand the continued support Al-Shabaab (AS) enjoys in many parts of Somalia. AS presence offers anxious local communities a form of patronage and protection that the Somali government has only been able to deliver fitfully. The militant group promises benefits and fair treatment for those who follow their precepts while threatening any who stray with retaliation. AS is a mafia-style organisation, demanding protection money in exchange for security, social, and financial services. Their consistent message is that the alternative—the federal government—is self-serving and unreliable.  
 
From this perspective, a counter-terrorism strategy cannot solely rely on changing ideological outlooks. Rather, it must aim to change the calculus of where communities seek protection, economic assistance, and reliable legal redress. Estimating how many dedicated supporters AS has is something of a fruitless exercise. Apart from hard-core believers, of which there will always be some, most who side with AS do so for pragmatic reasons. They want a mountain to lean on, and in many districts, the militant group remains the most visible and viable option. 
 
One reason AS continues to wield influence is that it operates in a landscape where familiar Islamic institutions and practices have gained ground in the quest for solutions to the country’s many problems. The militant group has been adept at manipulating popular sentiments regarding the value of religious schooling, fair business practices, and concern for the marginalised in wider society. It is important to recognise some of the underlying trends that give traction to militant Islamists' claims that they represent the best hope for the country’s future. 
 
For example, UNESCO estimates that just 15% of Somali primary school students attend state-funded schools. The rest, even if still a minority of school-age children, attend private schools, largely funded by Islamic governments or non-governmental organisations. Muslim charities—including several headquartered in Western countries—are visibly active on the ground, delivering small schoolrooms for local children, water for drought victims, or Ramadan meals to needy communities. This is not to say that religious extremists control Somalia’s educational and humanitarian infrastructure, or that Muslim educators and aid practitioners subscribe to AS ideology. 
 
It is clear, however, that the country’s prolific Islamic schools frequently provide their graduates with scholarships to further their education in the Middle East, and returnees to Somalia typically find employment in the Islamic educational, legal, or NGO sectors. It is less apparent that state institutions have been able to meet the younger generation's aspirations for leadership roles back home; many of those positions continue to be filled by the Somali diaspora. 
 
In the financial sector, it is estimated that asset growth in Islamic financial institutions worldwide has grown by 10-15% annually over the past decade, a higher rate than most conventional banks. While reliable data are hard to come by for Somalia, it is clear that Islamic banking has also been expanding there. Each of Somalia’s 13 registered banks provides Sharia-compatible services, and the 8 or so microfinance institutions in the country—which often operate as subsidiaries of local commercial banks--are funded by Islamic countries or charities. 
 
Again, this does not mean that AS runs the financial system in Somalia. However, Islamic microfinance institutions do typically target small retailers and consumers in the poorest urban neighbourhoods. Surpluses from AS’s annual 2.5% zakat obligation and from its ‘taxes’ are often directed to supporters who run small and medium-sized businesses, even in districts where AS is not in direct control. It is suspected that AS is increasingly laundering its revenues through the country’s formal banking and financial services institutions, making it difficult to monitor its fiscal reach.
 
Overall, it appears that Islamic institutions are increasingly pervasive at the grassroots level. This reality will surely continue to shape the problem-solving approaches of the majority of the population outside the elite circle of Western-funded projects. In educational training, small-business support, and delivery of social services, the state and its international supporters may be missing the boat when it comes to targeting its resources to the majority of those who will be tomorrow's voters. A successful national agenda must acknowledge and demonstrate its support for these popular Islamic enterprises, lest AS be perceived as the only avenue to deliver them.
 
Winning hearts and minds requires more than eliminating violent extremists through conventional military operations or co-opting the occasional religious spokesman to support the government’s agenda. It requires more than improved capacity to detect and cut off foreign support for militant cells or curtail Somalia’s resources' illegal export. Such measures are valuable for reducing revenues that sustain AS’s patronage system. Though, they may, in the short run, compel the militant group to impose even more draconian schemes to collect domestic revenues from the Somali population.
 
A state cannot rid itself of mafia-like organisations unless it is committed to delivering the goods, services, and protections that those organisations offer, and to do so using less unsavoury means. If the federal government or its constituent member states expect to gain the trust and meet the people's aspirations, they must become reliable mountains on which their citizens can collectively lean.

The Somali Wire team