South West State: A Destablising Contest Looms
On 13 August, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s (HSM) Chief of Staff, Hussein Sheikh Mohamud, announced his immediate resignation. Rumours had been swirling over the cause of his departure, but it is increasingly clear that Hussein intends to run for the Presidency of South West State (SWS). The regional presidency is currently occupied by Abdiaziz Laftagareen, but his tenure has been marked by rolling political crises, the continued presence of Al-Shabaab (AS) in much of the Federal Member State (FMS), and an intense drought that has displaced thousands.
Hussein Sheikh Mohamud’s resignation statement was a thinly veiled criticism of the incumbent SWS president. He said he was “driven by an evolving earnestness of the situation” in the region, and that SWS now requires “attentive leadership with the expertise, trust and knowledge.” With regional presidential elections scheduled for January 2024, he appears to be gearing up for a bid.
Bouts of violence have marked SWS electoral processes in recent years, most notably over controversial elections in December 2018. Flagrant vote-rigging and political machinations by Somalia’s former President Farmaajo that secured the presidency for his ally Laftagareen left a bitter taste for many. The arrest of then-candidate Mukhtar Robow, a former Al-Shabaab leader and popular figure among his sub-clan Leysan of the Rahanweyn, was particularly contentious. The widespread protests that followed Robow’s arrest and Laftagareen’s ascension were put down by force, with Ethiopian security forces co-opted into suppressing the opposition.
A semblance of stability gradually resumed, but deadly clashes sparked again in December 2022 following ratcheting tensions over the one-year extension to Laftagareen’s term. An opposition candidate's, former Somali Minister of Finance Mohamed Aden Farketi, house was raided, triggering deadly violence between opposition militias and regional forces. The political reconciliation between SWS opposition and the Laftagareen administration negotiated in February 2023 still holds. But tensions are far from fading.
Much of the Federal Member State remains deeply unstable. The SWS administration, however, appears largely unconcerned about this dysfunctionality, beset by clan divides and AS exploitation. The militant group has a particularly significant presence in Lower Shabelle, undermining limited attempts at state-building and stabilisation. AS controls the Sablale and Kuntunwarey districts in Lower Shabelle, as well as swathes of SWS rural areas.
Laftagareen has done little to combat Al-Shabaab. Despite being in office for over four years, his administration has conducted no significant offensives against AS. Even July’s siege of Baidoa by the militant group triggered little response from the SWS administration. The semi-permanent security crisis in the FMS has allowed Laftagareen to ignore any calls for substantive political change. Meanwhile, AS has continued its campaign of targeting electoral delegates and officials, reportedly killing several in the Bay and Bakool regions in July. Particularly notable was the assassination of SWS Justice Minister Hassan Ibrahim Lugbur in Baidoa.
Part of Laftagareen’s ability to avoid a serious offensive against AS and to avoid internal reconciliation arises out of the historical dependence of SWS on Mogadishu. The state’s formation in 2014 was significantly influenced by the FGS, and Ethiopia, establishing a deeply compromised political system. Laftagareen, and previous SWS presidents, have historically relied on support from Villa Somalia and Ethiopia to prop up their administrations, rather than broad consensus in the state. The Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) remains intimately involved in SWS security. Without capable regional forces to secure SWS security, the Baidoa administration remains deeply reliant on others, to its detriment.
In the longer-term, the promise of one-person, one-vote elections in SWS, as put forth in the May 2023 National Consultative Council proposals, is likely unachievable, for several reasons. First, the administration lacks coherent control of the state, with deep political divisions undermining the possibility of credible elections. Second, the control AS exerts over areas of SWS makes it extremely unlikely they will be cleared, stabilised, and reconciled in time for the proposed January 2024 election. Talk of the NCC proposals has already cooled, with the FGS and President Hassan Sheikh now largely focused on the military offensive against Al-Shabaab in central Somalia. But uncertainty around regional presidential elections, and their nature, continues to swirl, and undermine the political stability necessary to conduct coherent offensive operations.
The promise of elections in January 2024 offers an opportunity for critical political change in South West State, but, considering recent history, it is equally fraught with risk. According to the February reconciliation agreement, the federal Ministry of Interior is to oversee the region’s presidential elections. If this is the case, then preparations must begin immediately. Barring Puntland’s ongoing divisions over the actions of current regional President Said Abdullahi Deni, SWS elections may become the most contentious. These elections will need to be handled with the utmost care.
The Somali Wire team
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A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
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