The Spectre of Corruption
Somalia faces many challenges that have long hindered its progress and development. But among these, the spectres of nepotism, clannism, and corruption perhaps loom largest. The corrosive effects of corruption are well-known. It has seeped into every aspect of Somalia’s social, political, and economic life, from its judicial system to public procurement. It erodes trust in institutions and perpetuates cycles of exclusion and division, all while worsening poverty, hindering aid and investment, and undermining the fight against Al-Shabaab (AS). The narratives of Somalia as a corrupt country are equally well-known, with the nation marred at the bottom of several global corruption indexes, including Transparency International’s 2022 rankings.
One recent visible example of the country’s endemic corruption was the 100m race at the World University Games in Chengdu, China, at the beginning of August. Somalia’s representative, an untrained 20-year-old called Nasra Abukar Ali, was widely ridiculed after reportedly running the slowest 100m in the competition's history. Seemingly undeterred at her lack of pace, she crossed the finish line with a skip. Revelations of her family connections, however, soon fuelled criticism across social media. The Athletics Federation Chairwoman, Khadijo Aden Dahir, was suspended by Sports Minister Mohamed Barre Mohamud, who cited "abuse of power, nepotism, and defaming the name of the nation.”
The situation highlights a need for better oversight and support for Somali athletes. The real issue, however, lies in addressing nepotism within government institutions. And far more serious than some university games is how corruption has undermined government institutions and facilitated extremist groups in Somalia. The Somali National Army (SNA) is not insulated from the tendrils of corruption. Senior SNA officers have repeatedly exaggerated soldier numbers to access greater funding. Their clan and business networks often jostle for lucrative contracts to provide equipment or food for Somalia’s security forces. Corruption has also played a central role in hollowing out Somalia’s institutions, allowing AS to fill the gaps where the state should be.
Impunity for corruption is common, partly because it is so endemic. Indeed, last year’s delayed elections that eventually brought President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) to power were marred by reports of bribery and corruption. Corruption rises to its highest point in Somalia in each election cycle, with votes often auctioned off. While perhaps unrealistic and lacking clarity, the promise of one-person, one-vote elections in the National Consultative Council’s proposals would go some way in combating this corrosive tradition.
The current administration has an opportunity to take decisive action and help Somalia free itself from the web of clientelist networks that hold back the country. HSM’s signing of 8 anti-corruption directives in May was commendable. These directives were aimed at addressing corruption and promoting accountability within government institutions. And at a recent celebration for the 17th anniversary of the founding of Galmudug State, HSM warned the public against inducing clan loyalties to defend individuals accused of corruption. The incident surrounding Nasra Abukar Ali, however, raises doubts about the effectiveness of such measures. It revealed just how deeply ingrained corruption is within Somalia.
To confront this pervasive issue, Somalia’s government must follow through with the repeated promises of institutional reforms to promote transparency and accountability. Past leaders' involvement in nepotism and corruption should serve as a stark reminder of the challenges ahead. From as far back as 1969, when Mohamed Siad Barre seized power, his regime’s motto was maxaa taqaan rather than ayaa taqaan, ‘it is what you know,’ over ‘who you know.’ Yet Barre’s administration produced a more polarised clan-based country than that of his predecessor, with half of his first cabinet from his own Darood clan.
The nation's transition and persistent conflicts make the task more difficult, but it is precisely during such crises that the call for genuine change becomes imperative. President Hassan Shiekh, in his attempt to address these entrenched issues, must foster a sense of national identity and unity. A more united Somalia can yet rise above divisive clan affiliations that sustain corruption and work towards a more inclusive society. Emphasising transparency and equal opportunities for all citizens, regardless of clan, will be crucial in restoring faith in the government's ability to deliver impartial services.
The starting point lies in finalising the Provisional Constitution. A well-crafted constitution, upholding the rule of law and ensuring an independent judiciary, can form the backbone of an equitable society. By better incorporating provisions for transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption measures, the Constitution could yet establish a strong framework for good governance and begin to eradicate the scourge of corruption.
HSM appears to have set Somalia on the right path, but the journey to lasting change will be complex and challenging. It demands strong commitment from all stakeholders to build a more inclusive and equitable society, and even a willingness to potentially forego wealth and favours. The fight against corruption and nepotism requires collective determination. Only with that can Somalia truly unlock its potential and forge a better future.
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