Another Centre for Combating Extremism
Since reassuming office in May 2022, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has made Somalia’s security his central priority. HSM has temporarily relocated to Galmudug’s regional capital of Dhusamareeb, aiming to complete Phase I of the offensive against Al-Shabaab (AS) in central Somalia. His presence closer to the frontlines is reportedly galvanising momentum, and there is some optimism that the renewed offensive may be able to clear AS from the remainder of Galmudug.
Back in Mogadishu, yet another institution has been created to counter the scourge of violent extremism in Somalia. On Sunday 13 July, Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre announced the creation of a new national counter-terrorism centre called ‘Tubsan,’ which translates as ‘right path’ or ‘repented.’ Its remit is reportedly largely centred on AS defectors, and may assume responsibility for the defector programme from the Ministry of Internal Security and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). Former Internal Security Minister Abdullahi Mohamed Nor has been named Director, with Ibrahim Aden Ibrahim (Nadara) as his deputy. A former senior AS Commander, Sheikh Ibrahim Nadara served as the militant group’s head for education in the Bay and Bakool regions of South West State, before surrendering to the Somali government in August 2016.
The Tubsan Centre for the Prevention and Combating of Extremist Ideologies is aimed at accelerating efforts to combat violent extremist ideologies. The Centre marks a shift from a previous over-reliance on monotonal, non-coercive security strategies, which have proven largely unsuccessful. Today, there is a growing awareness that even if AS is defeated militarily, its pervasive and violent strain of Salafism will not simply disappear. The creation of the Tubsan Centre may signal a shift towards longer-term efforts to neutralise extremist ideology, alongside the ongoing military offensive in central Somalia.
The two officials heading up the institution, Nor and Sheikh Nadara, come with the relevant experience needed to realise its vision. Nor previously served under former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo as internal security minister, and has acted as advisor to HSM on violent extremism. The perception is that while he has some experience combating AS through conventional security measures, there is less confidence that he is the right person to lead Somalia’s counter-terrorism policy. Conversely, Sheikh Nadara has an intimate understanding of what motivates the militant group, and may be able to gather intelligence if the Centre’s vision can be fully realised.
What is less clear, however, is how exactly Tubsan will fit into Somalia’s already congested security architecture. Successive Federal Governments of Somalia (FGS) have failed to streamline the parallel offices currently working to prevent and counter extremism. Today, there are units working on extremism in the President’s office, the Prime Minister’s office, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Internal Security, and the Ministry of Religion and Endowment, as well as various centres for the rehabilitation of AS defectors. Competing mandates and projects have undermined the cohesion and clarity in countering extremism in Somalia.
A seemingly endless flow of new centres and projects to respond to violent extremism has also complicated international support for the country’s war against AS. There are real concerns about increasing donor fatigue for financing this array of counter-terrorism programmes. And perceptions and frustration with perennial corruption in Somalia have further dampened enthusiasm. Streamlining and clarifying the mandates, roles, and funding for the parallel institutions will be critical if Tubsan is to have a real impact in the fight against extremism. Abolishing defunct centres must also begin immediately.
For the Tubsan Centre to be successful, rather than simply another donor-capturing unit, it will also need a well-tailored mandate that is relevant to Somalia. Its long-term vision, briefly outlined by Prime Minister Barre, is commendable, but it will need capable staff, employed on merit, to realise it. Developing comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies is deeply complex and requires officials that grasp the various root causes and incentives that drive many Somalis towards AS and Daesh.
Countering strains of extremist ideology must also push back against AS’s assault on human rights using the pretext of Islamic values. Framing democratic governance and the rule of law within Islam is pivotal in reclaiming religious and secular space from Salafism in Somalia. In South West State, Friday sermons were powerfully used by the election technical team in local mosques to engage communities in indirect elections. Replicating this strategy across the country could be one effective strategy.
If Tubsan is to assume total responsibility for countering extremist ideology, it must examine it in the round. In-depth research and analysis to understand the myriad causes of terrorism in Somalia, including the roles of poverty, inequality, and ideology in radicalising individuals, can help form specific and nuanced policies towards AS. Tubsan should now clearly detail its goals and vision for deterring and detecting extremism across the country. Another empty institution is something Somalia can little afford.
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