Environmental Peacebuilding in Somalia
In the midst of Al-Shabaab (AS) attacks, rolling political crises from Puntland to Gedo, and the short-term nature of Somalia’s politics, environmental degradation does not always grab the headlines. But today, it is estimated that as much as 30% of Somalia’s land is degraded. Soil erosion from wind and water, deforestation driven by the charcoal trade, and livestock overgrazing have taken a heavy toll on the country. These factors are driving, and being compounded by, the increasingly devastating climate shocks that have plagued Somalia for decades.
Climate change has transformed the cyclical wet and dry seasons that Somalis have relied on for centuries into a cycle of drought and flooding. Over 70% of Somalia’s population depends on the agricultural sector for their livelihood. The worsening cycle of flooding and drought has left these communities unable to absorb and recover from shocks. Pastoralism has been decimated, and with its collapse, a vicious cycle of harmful coping mechanisms has emerged. Intense deforestation has badly eroded Somalia’s forests as people seek alternate livelihoods. This is particularly critical in central and southern Somalia, with Al-Shabaab closely involved in the charcoal trade out of the key port of Kismayo in Lower Juba.
Deforestation along the Juba and Shabelle rivers has also severely reduced the topsoil needed to prevent flooding and erosion. Flash floods in May devastated Beledweyne, the capital of the Hiiraan region, which sits on the Shabelle River. The flood displaced a quarter of a million Somalis, washing away homes and crops, and killing at least 22 people. In the aftermath, one resident said the city “no longer exists.” Meanwhile, prolonged drought has placed immense stress on water resources with increasing numbers of boreholes and wells threatening over-extraction of groundwater. Today, an estimated 80% of water resources in Somalia are thought to be at risk of drying up.
Forced migration has dramatically increased alongside the worsening climate shocks, with the number of internally displaced people in Somalia more than tripling between 2005 and 2018. This, combined with reduced natural resources and livelihoods, has led to increased conflict as communities compete for resources. Farmers and pastoralists have repeatedly clashed as the latter are forced to seek out new land for grazing livestock, coming into competition with farmers already facing adverse growing conditions.
Somalia contributes comparatively very little to the climate crisis, yet is the second most climate-vulnerable nation in the world, after Chad. Within Somalia, the burden also falls unequally. Historically, gender-based violence (GBV) against women and girls has risen in times of crisis, and the ongoing drought has proven no different. Among displaced populations, GBV increased by 200% in 2022. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable as they often must travel further for resources such as water and are exposed to myriad risks.
Al-Shabaab has also demonstrated its ability to exploit Somalia’s cyclical environmental crises. Outside of enabling an environment for extremist recruitment, climate shocks provide opportunities to abuse desperate communities. The militant group has used various tactics to extract obedience and resources from climate-vulnerable central and southern Somalia communities. This has included blocking access to water resources– including poisoning wells and destroying boreholes, and providing some services in areas where Somalia’s government and aid agencies are not present. But AS also regularly prevents the delivery of humanitarian aid to areas under its control, compounding crises.
Building climate resilience will not happen overnight. Environmental peacebuilding is one of the most effective ways to formulate solutions to this crisis. Addressing Somalia’s severe environmental degradation would have cascading effects that would provide immediate humanitarian relief while laying the foundation for increased social cohesion and long-term development.
In the Sahel region, the construction of water-spreading weirs has demonstrated remarkable results in restoring degraded landscapes, increasing agricultural production, water availability, and livelihood opportunities, and reducing flooding and forced displacement. Restoring degraded land can further support communities build resilience to climate change, reducing the vulnerabilities of marginalised groups and conflict over natural resources and decreasing opportunities for armed groups seeking to exploit crises.
The type of projects needed to restore degraded landscapes requires significant input from local communities and authorities, alongside technical experts. As Climate Security and Environmental Advisor to Somalia Christophe Hodder said, there is a pressing need to combine “traditional Indigenous knowledge that is often lost… with modern technologies.” Land access and tenure are deeply ingrained in the culture and local knowledge of Somali communities. Accessing this knowledge will be critical to building resilient solutions to the new realities of the climate crisis.
With Phase II of the Federal Government of Somalia’s offensive against Al-Shabaab imminent, incorporating climate-supporting policies into stabilisation plans for newly-liberated territory is critical. The country will not be able to rid itself of its perennial instability if it does not begin to tackle these issues that will hurt communities for decades to come. The prolonged cycle of flooding and drought in Somalia should no longer be seen as an anomaly to survive, but rather a new reality to adapt to. Restoration of degraded landscapes provides one of the best opportunities to accomplish this.
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