Issue No. 577

Published 11 Aug 2023

Seizure of Goof Gaduud Burey

Published on 11 Aug 2023 13:57 min

Seizure of Goof Gaduud Burey

Last week, on 6 August, Al-Shabaab (AS) seized control of Goof Gaduud Burey, a strategic town just 30km from Baidoa, the provisional capital of South West State. AS attacks on Goof Gaduud have become increasingly commonplace in recent years. Since May, however, there has been a concerning rise in their number and intensity. On several occasions, AS briefly established control over the town, before retreating as South West Darawiish and Somali National Army (SNA) forces moved to recapture it. 

This latest episode, however, appears different. AS now looks to be strengthening its position in Goof Gaduud, rather than preparing for another strategic withdrawal. With the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) Phase II offensive against AS gathering steam in central Somalia, the militant group’s continued strength in South West State should not be underestimated. 

Al-Shabaab’s latest capture of Goof Gaduud happened without violence. By early August, a sizeable number of Al-Shabaab fighters had coalesced near the town. AS was observed deploying over a hundred militants accompanied by several technical vehicles mounted with heavy weapons towards Goof Gaduud Burey on 5 August. Nearly 100 more AS fighters, also armed with technical vehicles, were deployed towards the town from Ceel Boon, a village near Wajid town in the Bakool region. SNA forces subsequently withdrew from their 60th Division Forces base in the town before the AS assault, presumably assessing that they would be unable to defend it, and that no government reinforcements were coming. Goof Gaduud was seized just a day later and remains under AS control. 

AS began to intensify its attacks against the SNA base in May, after approximately 250 fighters amassed in the surrounding villages in anticipation for a series of assaults. The militant group launched hit-and-run attacks against the military base, ostensibly preparing for a larger onslaught. On several occasions, AS deployed forces on the road connecting Baidoa to Goof Gaduud, deterring possible SNA reinforcements from reaching the town during an attack. Preparations for a series of significant attacks then began in earnest. Assaults on the Goof Gaduud base resumed on 17 July, shortly followed by AS targeting SNA checkpoints surrounding Baidoa on 21 July. The targeting of the checkpoints effectively choked off any potential government reinforcements reaching Goof Gaduud from Baidoa. 

On the afternoon of 23 July, AS launched a full-scale assault from two directions on the town. AS fighters seized the town after targeting the SNA base, looting it of weapons and ammunition. Several Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were planted on the road to Baidoa, striking two military vehicles carrying government reinforcements travelling towards the town that same day. Nevertheless, SNA and South West Darawiish forces re-established control on 25 July. US Africa Command (AFRICOM) airstrikes the next day prevented Al-Shabaab fighters from re-grouping and attempting to re-capture the town. An AFRICOM airstrike also killed a senior AS commander operating in the Bay region. This dynamic was repeated just days later when AS fighters attacked the base on 30 July. Again they seized control, for approximately two hours, before retreating at the sight of fighter jets and SNA reinforcements. 

In recent days, the militant group has tightened its grip on the town, now the longest period that AS has controlled Goof Gaduud. Placing fighters and technical vehicles on the road connecting it to Baidoa, AS has signalled an increased willingness to defend it from a likely attempt by government forces to retake the town. 

Goof Gaduud Burey’s geographical position is critical for the Somali government, and for AS. Located on a key route between Baidoa and the Bakool region, Al-Shabaab's control of the town will inevitably hinder any security forces travelling to Bardheele, Awdiinle, and Luuq, as well as any Ethiopian National Defence Force forces that might travel toward Baidoa. The militant group already has a presence on the western main road leading from Baidoa to Luuq. Establishing more permanent control over Goof Gaduud, on the eastern road, would further expand AS’s influence across much of the Bay region, covering Baidoa, Awdiinle, and Dinsoor. Control over such a frequently used route would also no doubt bring significant taxation revenue to the group. 

The clashes over Goof Gaduud Burey have already displaced hundreds. On 7 August, Radio Ergo, a Somali humanitarian news organisation, reported that nearly 400 families had been displaced, and now lack both food and shelter. AS’s continued control of the main road between Wajid and Baidoa would likely further hamper the movement of humanitarian aid to drought-afflicted areas across the whole Bay region. 

Al-Shabaab had faced significant pressure from SNA and African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces in the Bakool region. The frequent attacks on Goof Gaduud Barey have now forced the SNA's to divert forces to the Bay region. SNA and ATMIS forces have been relocated from Bakool region and deployed to Wajid, near Goof Gaduud Barey. Any hope over the Phase II offensive beginning in central Somalia should not cause undue optimism of what southern Somalia might herald. And mobilising security forces and attention towards Galmudug should not come at the cost of security elsewhere in Somalia. If AS can secure Goof Gaduud and its strategic location between Baidoa and Bakool, it would have calamitous repercussions for southern Somalia’s security. 

The Somali Wire team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 128
The US Eritrea Pivot – Opportunities, Risks, Dilemma
The Horn Edition

A flurry of media reports in recent months suggest the US and Eritrea could be inching towards a potential deal to reset decades of frosty relations and a partial lifting of American sanctions imposed in 2021. The news of discreet talks between the two sides, mediated by Egypt, was initially reported by the influential Washington Post newspaper in April 2026 and have since been partially confirmed by official sources.


34:56 min read 29 May
Issue No. 957
How Somalia's South West Vote Went South
The Somali Wire

On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.


17:12 min read 27 May
Issue No. 956
The Perils of a Grey Transition
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.


0 min read 20 May
Issue No. 955
Averting Disorder: The Case for External Mediation in Somalia
The Somali Wire

Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.


0 min read 14 May
Issue No. 127
Total War in the Horn of Africa
The Horn Edition

'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.


27:16 min read 30 Apr
Issue No. 954
The Malian Mirror
The Somali Wire

A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.


10:18 min read 29 Apr
Issue No. 329
Washington eyes Asmara
The Ethiopian Cable

Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.


0 min read 28 Apr
Issue No. 953
A Coronation in Mogadishu – How Clans Stormed the Citadel
The Somali Wire

Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.


21:22 min read 27 Apr
Issue No. 952
Fishy Business: IUU Fishing in Somalia
The Somali Wire

With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.


21:07 min read 24 Apr
Scroll