Seizure of Goof Gaduud Burey
Al-Shabaab’s latest capture of Goof Gaduud happened without violence. By early August, a sizeable number of Al-Shabaab fighters had coalesced near the town. AS was observed deploying over a hundred militants accompanied by several technical vehicles mounted with heavy weapons towards Goof Gaduud Burey on 5 August. Nearly 100 more AS fighters, also armed with technical vehicles, were deployed towards the town from Ceel Boon, a village near Wajid town in the Bakool region. SNA forces subsequently withdrew from their 60th Division Forces base in the town before the AS assault, presumably assessing that they would be unable to defend it, and that no government reinforcements were coming. Goof Gaduud was seized just a day later and remains under AS control.
AS began to intensify its attacks against the SNA base in May, after approximately 250 fighters amassed in the surrounding villages in anticipation for a series of assaults. The militant group launched hit-and-run attacks against the military base, ostensibly preparing for a larger onslaught. On several occasions, AS deployed forces on the road connecting Baidoa to Goof Gaduud, deterring possible SNA reinforcements from reaching the town during an attack. Preparations for a series of significant attacks then began in earnest. Assaults on the Goof Gaduud base resumed on 17 July, shortly followed by AS targeting SNA checkpoints surrounding Baidoa on 21 July. The targeting of the checkpoints effectively choked off any potential government reinforcements reaching Goof Gaduud from Baidoa.
On the afternoon of 23 July, AS launched a full-scale assault from two directions on the town. AS fighters seized the town after targeting the SNA base, looting it of weapons and ammunition. Several Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were planted on the road to Baidoa, striking two military vehicles carrying government reinforcements travelling towards the town that same day. Nevertheless, SNA and South West Darawiish forces re-established control on 25 July. US Africa Command (AFRICOM) airstrikes the next day prevented Al-Shabaab fighters from re-grouping and attempting to re-capture the town. An AFRICOM airstrike also killed a senior AS commander operating in the Bay region. This dynamic was repeated just days later when AS fighters attacked the base on 30 July. Again they seized control, for approximately two hours, before retreating at the sight of fighter jets and SNA reinforcements.
In recent days, the militant group has tightened its grip on the town, now the longest period that AS has controlled Goof Gaduud. Placing fighters and technical vehicles on the road connecting it to Baidoa, AS has signalled an increased willingness to defend it from a likely attempt by government forces to retake the town.
Goof Gaduud Burey’s geographical position is critical for the Somali government, and for AS. Located on a key route between Baidoa and the Bakool region, Al-Shabaab's control of the town will inevitably hinder any security forces travelling to Bardheele, Awdiinle, and Luuq, as well as any Ethiopian National Defence Force forces that might travel toward Baidoa. The militant group already has a presence on the western main road leading from Baidoa to Luuq. Establishing more permanent control over Goof Gaduud, on the eastern road, would further expand AS’s influence across much of the Bay region, covering Baidoa, Awdiinle, and Dinsoor. Control over such a frequently used route would also no doubt bring significant taxation revenue to the group.
The clashes over Goof Gaduud Burey have already displaced hundreds. On 7 August, Radio Ergo, a Somali humanitarian news organisation, reported that nearly 400 families had been displaced, and now lack both food and shelter. AS’s continued control of the main road between Wajid and Baidoa would likely further hamper the movement of humanitarian aid to drought-afflicted areas across the whole Bay region.
Al-Shabaab had faced significant pressure from SNA and African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces in the Bakool region. The frequent attacks on Goof Gaduud Barey have now forced the SNA's to divert forces to the Bay region. SNA and ATMIS forces have been relocated from Bakool region and deployed to Wajid, near Goof Gaduud Barey. Any hope over the Phase II offensive beginning in central Somalia should not cause undue optimism of what southern Somalia might herald. And mobilising security forces and attention towards Galmudug should not come at the cost of security elsewhere in Somalia. If AS can secure Goof Gaduud and its strategic location between Baidoa and Bakool, it would have calamitous repercussions for southern Somalia’s security.
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Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.
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