Issue No. 576

Published 09 Aug 2023

New Offensive, Old Pathologies

Published on 09 Aug 2023 15:52 min
New Offensive, Old Pathologies
  
Last week, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) arrived in Galmudug's regional capital Dhuusamareeb to lead the much-anticipated offensive against Al-Shabaab (AS). Images of shiny new equipment and forces preparing for conflict have abounded across social media in recent days. Preparations for what is officially being called ‘Phase II’ of the offensive to clear AS from central and southern Somalia are gathering pace.
 
Galmudug is the heart of Sufi Islam in Somalia and produced the Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’ah (ASWJ) armed movement. There is strong social impetus to fight back against the Salafist AS. HSM’s presence also indicates Villa Somalia is confident a speedy victory is feasible. 
 
Thousands of clan fighters and an estimated 10,000 Somali National Army (SNA) troops have been mobilised. Fresh recruits trained in Uganda are expected to join the offensive. The Ugandan-trained contingent is paid for and equipped by the UAE, a close security ally of HSM. Mogadishu hopes Abu Dhabi’s support of these new forces will help provide the vigour needed to clear central Somalia from the insurgent group. 
 
Villa Somalia is also banking on the United Nations Security Council to relax the UN arms embargo further to allow the UAE and Turkey to deploy combat drones to Somalia to support the offensive. The UK is the current president of the UNSC, and the Somali government is intensively lobbying London for support in easing or lifting the remaining sanctions.
 
The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) has further signalled support for the operation. Ugandan helicopter gunships are expected to provide combat support for the SNA. The US has also expressed willingness to utilise its powerful air support, in addition to training and equipping the Danaab special forces. Airstrikes from the US, and others, have previously proven critical in degrading AS forces. Recent open-source aviation reporting suggested the US may be moving some heavy-duty combat air assets to Djibouti, perhaps in readiness to support the Somali army and allied clan fighters. One report revealed the deployment of a Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey aircraft - a uniquely versatile aircraft that can serve multiple roles in combat theatres.
 
SNA units have begun ‘harassing’ AS and conducting ‘probing’ attacks in the region. But the formal launch of the offensive is being kept a secret. It is likely that it will not become evident until the significant fighting begins. There are reports that AS is already beginning to pull out of areas of Galmudug, perhaps to conserve its forces for fighting in southern Somalia. 
 
Phase I of the military offensive against Al-Shabaab between August 2022 and February 2023 stuttered for several reasons. First, everyone, including Mogadishu, was caught by surprise by the speed of the clan revolt and the Ma’awiisley’s success. Mogadishu soon moved to ‘own’ and direct the armed revolt. But the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) had little time to craft and implement an effective strategy. Policy was often decided on the hoof.
 
By February 2023, the Phase I offensive had stalled. Al-Shabaab rolled back into villages and towns they had lost to the government and the Ma’awiisley. Clan competition for control of liberated areas in parts of Hirshabelle triggered weeks of tense standoffs and, in some instances, deadly clashes. Many liberated areas have now reverted back to a state of semi-anarchy, with no clear authority in charge. And no meaningful basic services were provided to the communities that had been ‘liberated.’ The SNA gallantly trucked in water and food, in addition to its dual role of clearing and holding territory, but it quickly became too thinly stretched and has since lost control of several Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).
 
Mogadishu insists it has learnt from Phase I of the offensive. It had appointed former Hirshabelle President Mohammed Abdi Waare as Special President Envoy for Civilian Protection and Stabilisation to help centralise stabilisation efforts. Villa Somalia says it is working to invest in local politics, and to mend potentially ruinous inter-clan rifts that might undermine Phase II of the offensive. The World Bank released USD 75 million in late July to support the government's development and stabilisation priorities. 
 
The reality is more complicated. Chronic inter-departmental fights have paralysed planning for proper stabilisation. Multiple FGS agencies compete for supremacy and for donor attention. And the important appointment of Mohammed Abdi Waare has not yet borne fruit. But perhaps the biggest lapse, and the one likely to lead to failure, is the near absence of locally-appropriate holding forces. The Ma’awiisley serve an important auxiliary function, but they cannot be relied upon to serve as an effective holding force in recovered areas. They will need training and regularisation. Technically, this ought to have been the role of state-level Daraawish. 
 
As things stand, there is no coherent stabilisation plan, nor is there clarity on which agency will hold territory. It is almost certain the burden will fall on the already overstretched SNA. Proper stabilisation planning must now be the priority. Clearing AS from central Somalia is eminently possible, especially if AS retreats. But to effectively hold newly liberated areas, and make a tangible difference to communities there, more must be done. 

The Somali Wire team

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