Issue No. 575

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Understanding the strength of militant groups is a perennial problem for policymakers and analysts alike, and nowhere in the world is that truer than in Somalia. Al-Shabaab (AS) has been frequently, and accurately, characterised as Al-Qaida’s strongest affiliate. Even after its losses last year, it still controls more territory than any other affiliate. It consistently accrues more resources than other Al-Qaida affiliates through its robust ‘taxation,’ i.e. extortion racket, even running a budget surplus some years. It has a wing in Kenya, Jaysh Ayman, and has made strides in developing one in Ethiopia as well. Though Osama bin Laden was initially reluctant to anoint AS as an affiliate, at least publicly, the decision has paid dividends for Al-Qaida.

Al-Shabaab is also Al-Qaida’s largest affiliate, or at least tied for it, according to the US State Department. Admittedly, credible estimates of the group’s size are hard to come by, and the basis for estimates is often unclear. In the most recent ‘Country Report on Terrorism’ available, the US State Department estimated that AS had between 7,000-9,000 members. However, that was also its estimate for the preceding 5 years even though the group reportedly lost at least 1,300 militants to US airstrikes alone during that same period. It is unclear whether these estimates include Jaysh Ayman; the Country Reports on Terrorism make no reference to the unit though it notes Kenya as an area of Al-Shabaab operations. The report does not discuss AS’s presence in Ethiopia, though the 2022 UN Monitoring Group report estimated that the size of Al-Shabaab in Ethiopia alone is 1,000.

The only other Al-Qaida affiliate that the US State Department estimates to be of comparable size is Al-Nusra Front in Syria, which commands between 5,000-10,000 fighters. In fact, the only Sunni extremist group the State Department identified as decisively larger than AS is the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, with between 11,000 and 18,000 fighters. Admittedly, the State Department numbers focus on designated Foreign Terrorist Organisations and are not authoritative, even within the US government. In 2020, U.S. Africa Command estimated AS commanded up to 10,000 fighters, while the UN Monitoring Group put the militant group’s size at 5,000-10,000 in 2022.

Yet these estimates—and by extension assessments of AS’s strength—are almost certainly too low because of a fundamental, yet under-appreciated issue– who ‘counts’ as a member of AS? This is a far more complicated question than one might expect.

All would presumably agree that its fighters in the ‘Jabahaat,’ operatives in the ‘Amniyaat,’ and police in ‘Jaysh al-Hisbah’ should be included in the tally. Estimates of the militant group’s size appear to be focused on these personnel. But AS also has a sizeable cadre who are not directly involved in violence but are equally important to its reach within Somalia. It is a complex organisation that is a mixture of a terrorist group, an insurgent organisation, a mafia, and a shadow government. And it has personnel for all those functions. It employs administrators, judges, and tax collectors, among others. Beyond its operatives, the Amniyat runs double agents, sources, and informants who have penetrated Somalia’s institutions, its economy, and society as a whole. Some work with the group on a clandestine, part-time, or ad hoc basis. They move materials, deliver messages, and report on everything from cooperation with the government to economic activity. And they are impossible to count.

In other words, AS has a spectrum of ‘members’ ranging from suicide operatives to accountants and everything in between. Their involvement spans from full-time to occasional support. And the current estimates fail to capture these individuals, who are critical to AS’s reach and accurately assessing the militant group’s strength.

Moreover, though Al-Shabaab has had internal dissension, it has long been and remains more unified than its adversaries. AS is larger than the sum of its parts while its adversaries are often less. Not only is the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) declining in size, but it has also largely had a defensive posture for years. Credible estimates of the Somali National Army (SNA) are also difficult to come by, but those numbers have to be tempered by the corruption problems, divided loyalties, limited motivation, and uneven training that plague the force. Military expert Colin Robinson estimated that there are only 7,000-8,000 reliable forces in three units– the Brigade 77 presidential guard, Danaab, and the Gorgor Brigade.

Above all, the reality is that AS has infiltrated Somali society so deeply that it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify who is a member. As a result, estimates of the militant group’s size are of limited utility in devising approaches to effectively counter the group. And though military operations may often produce dubiously large numbers of killed and captured AS forces, these losses still will not add up to genuinely weakening AS unless they also address all the layers of AS forces and supporters, even the militant group’s ideological brethren in Al-I'tisaam. Ultimately, the militant group’s thorough penetration of Somalia society is what has made it so difficult to counter and such an invaluable Al-Qaida affiliate.

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Dr. Tricia Bacon is an Associate Professor at American University’s School of Public Affairs and directs the Policy Anti-Terrorism Hub. Dr. Bacon worked on counterterrorism for over 10 years at the US Department of State, including in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Bureau of Counterterrorism, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.  Maria Guiditta Borselli is a PhD student at the American University's School of Public Affairs.