Issue No. 574

Sequencing for Success: Liberation, Stabilisation and Reconciliation

In recent years, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has undertaken several clearing offensives against Al-Shabaab (AS), many of which have initially proven successful from a military standpoint. Yet these initial territorial successes often usher in a far more difficult challenge– stabilising seized territory. Failures to effectively stabilise liberated areas have repeatedly led to FGS and regional force withdrawals. And failures to reconcile divided communities have allowed fresh conflict to spring up in AS’s absence. But if Mogadishu can combine military operations with reconciliation and stabilisation efforts, the FGS can increase the chances of achieving sustainable peace and development in liberated areas.

The challenges facing effective stabilisation and reconciliation can be tackled through strategic preparation and sequencing. Both are crucial elements of realising the ‘clear, hold and rebuild’ strategy of the FGS for liberating territories under AS control. The first element of this strategy, ‘clear,’ has seen success. Previous FGS offensives, such as Operation Badbaadho in Lower Shabelle in 2019-2020, showed clearing AS was eminently possible. But three years on from liberating 5 bridges over the Shabelle River, the FGS is still struggling to stabilise these liberated areas. Despite driving out the militant group, the provision of aid and government services remains inadequate and superficial. And the presence of AS close to the reclaimed areas adds further complexity to the ongoing stabilisation efforts.

Relying solely on military operations cannot effectively address the myriad needs of communities freed from AS control. Expectations among liberated communities for better services may be high after years of neglect, especially if they helped displace AS from their territory, as happened last year in central Somalia. Managing and responding to these expectations and needs is crucial to ‘holding’ liberated areas. Equally important is navigating the complex, often contentious, relationships between clans that may have been suppressed or exploited by AS. Finding consensus on governance and resource sharing between communities, and local and federal authorities is the backbone of stabilising liberated areas.

Stabilisation policies should be carefully planned alongside military operations before attempting clearance operations. Integrating community stakeholders into stabilisation plans and preparations for military operations would go someway in navigating the complexities of reestablishing federal and regional authority. This collaboration can also provide communities insight into upcoming operations, allowing them to prepare in advance. Pursuing closer relationships with clan militias and elders has also allowed the FGS to reach further into rural areas, rather than being limited to urban centres.

Clearing AS-held territory without clan support has proven challenging. FGS attempts to mobilise clans in the Haradheere district in Galmudug in phase one of the offensive stalled amid internal clan divisions and a belief that Mogadishu had failed to support them. But through meaningful and early engagement, the FGS and regional authorities can better respond to the concerns of historically marginalised communities. Support for Mogadishu’s offensive against AS in southern Somalia will likely be more limited than it was in Galmudug and Hirshabelle, only increasing the need for early outreach and preparation.

Navigating and stabilising collaboration with clan militias can be complex, however. Clan militias’ intimate knowledge of their communities and terrain has played an integral role in the ongoing FGS offensive. But there have been several occasions where emboldened militias have carried out illegal activities, threatening to undermine local goodwill. Incorporating clan militias into regional forces such as the Darawiish could help professionalise and integrate them into the state’s security architecture. Maintaining a shared focus on fighting AS must be supported to prevent potential disintegration into clan conflicts. Reconciling clans and sub-clans with histories of antagonism should also help limit any rogue militia activity. Simultaneous planning for stabilisation is thus imperative to avoid any power vacuum post-liberation and prevent historical conflicts from re-emerging.
 
Common cause between communities and the FGS does not create indefinite goodwill towards Mogadishu and regional authorities, however. But providing long-neglected essential services, government structures, and basic infrastructure in liberated areas should help shore up support. Capacity building for local authorities and security forces can also help ensure proper governance and maintain law and order. In a few short months, Haradheere, freed from AS’s grip in January, has flourished. The coastal town has internet access for the first time, and maternal health centres have returned with support from government authorities.

Military successes in recent years have revealed that stabilisation is often far more challenging than seizing territory, especially regarding AS. The militant group has repeatedly shown itself to be deeply adaptive to pressure, able to retreat and regroup before hitting back. Before further operations in southern Somalia, the FGS and its partners should work to consolidate gains in central Somalia. An overstretched Somali National Army as African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces gradually draw down could be disastrous on several fronts. Particularly as the much-heralded ‘Operation Black Lion,’ made up of Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Djiboutian forces, is yet to appear. To prevent the SNA and regional forces from fighting rearguard actions as it attempts to press on in southern Somalia, it should double down on attempts to stabilise and reconcile liberated territory in central Somalia.