Issue No. 573

On 19 July, the US carried out its latest airstrike against Al-Shabaab (AS) near Hareeri Kalle, about 15km from Galcad in Galmudug. Reportedly killing 5 militants, the strike was justified through the ‘collective self-defence airstrike’ rationale behind most American airstrikes on AS. This latest strike brought the year’s total to 13 United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) strikes, supporting a Somali National Army (SNA) operation that state media claimed killed nearly 100 AS militants. As the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) offensive against AS now approaches its second phase, it is worth considering the ramifications of greater air support from the US, and others.
 
The ‘gloves off’ approach of the Trump administration is over. American airstrikes are now typically used to defend the small contingent of US forces in Somalia or the more common ‘collective self-defence’ use for Somali forces, particularly Danaab special forces. Less common are strikes targeting senior Al-Shabaab leaders, but they still occur, such as the strike in late May that reportedly injured Moalim Osman, AS’s head of external operations. In 2020, an AFRICOM spokesperson outlined the purpose of US airstrikes as attempting to “degrade… [AS] ability to recruit, train, and plot terror attacks.” 
 
Under the Trump administration, nearly 220 airstrikes were carried out in just four years. During much of this period, AS militants could not travel in convoys due to the intensity of the strikes. Today, Al-Shabaab’s relative ease of movement through much of Somalia was on worrying display during its attack on the SNA Geriley base at the beginning of July. Hundreds of fighters moved with ease to overrun the base, seemingly without fear of airstrikes. But American air support remains critical in supporting Somalia’s US-trained Danaab special forces, who have particular access to US airstrikes. One AS attack on Danaab forces in January 2023 near Galcad was devastated by an American airstrike, allowing Danaab forces to push back. 
 
The asymmetric nature of the frontline in the FGS’s war against Al-Shabaab complicates the use of airstrikes for several reasons. AS is deeply embedded across Somalia, engrained in the social fabric of much of the country. Striking AS accurately and repeatedly without civilian casualties is extremely difficult. AFRICOM collects significant information before it strikes and repeatedly insists that civilian casualties are limited.
 
Yet similar claims have proven misleading on occasion in recent years. One Amnesty International investigation into US drone strikes in Somalia in 2019 revealed that several civilians had been killed and injured and might have broken international humanitarian law. AFRICOM has always denied such allegations. What is clear, however, is that Al-Shabaab regularly exploits foreign intervention and strikes in its propaganda and recruitment. 
 
There are examples of international strikes that have perhaps done more harm than good. At least two civilians were reportedly killed in a Kenyan airstrike in El-Adde in neighbouring Somalia’s Gedo region at the beginning of July, prompting a furious reaction. A Somali Member of Parliament for Gedo, Mursaal Khaliif, tweeted, “As long as Al-Shabaab is in El-Adde, Kenya has a valid reason to massacre civilians in Gedo and go on with its ethnic cleansing.” Several community elders in Gedo even reportedly called for residents to attack Kenyan forces. And this is not the first time Kenyan airstrikes in Gedo have sparked condemnation for reportedly killing civilians. In 2021, Somalia’s federal government called for an investigation into the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) strikes after similar reports. 
 
Somalia is also pushing for UN Security Council approval of Turkish and Emirati drone support. In December 2021, Turkey delivered a cache of its Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mogadishu, later ruled a violation of the arms embargo by the UN as Turkey failed to clear their delivery. The FGS has since denied their use. But Turkish air support is markedly different from AFRICOM in a crucial way. Unlike American strikes in Somalia, which typically require Washington’s approval, Turkish drone strikes only require a Turkish officer's sign-off on the ground. This could rapidly improve strike times in a fast-changing combat environment, but it also raises the risks of civilian casualties without the detailed intelligence AFRICOM depends upon. If Turkish and Emirati drone support is approved, it will also likely not be limited to the US’s ‘collective self-defence’ rationale, potentially dramatically increasing the number of strikes. With Somalia hoping to rebuild its limited air force, it is eager to receive any help it can get. 
 
Airstrikes alone are not a panacea to the complex fight against AS. The high numbers of strikes during the Trump administration were not matched by a similar operational intent by its Somali partners on the ground under former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. As military expert Paul D. Williams said, US airstrikes alone have not been able to “blunt Al-Shabaab’s ability to… [use] a combination of asymmetric tactics.”
 
If airstrikes, American or otherwise, can now be effectively combined with coordinated operations by regional and SNA forces against AS, they have the potential to be devastating. Simply driving AS from its territory will not be enough. The militant group will need to be significantly degraded if the second phase of operations is to be successful, something airstrikes have shown their potential to support.