Issue No. 573

Published 02 Aug 2023

Airstrikes in Somalia

Published on 02 Aug 2023 14:41 min

Airstrikes in Somalia 

On 19 July, the US carried out its latest airstrike against Al-Shabaab (AS) near Hareeri Kalle, about 15km from Galcad in Galmudug. Reportedly killing 5 militants, the strike was justified through the ‘collective self-defence airstrike’ rationale behind most American airstrikes on AS. This latest strike brought the year’s total to 13 United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) strikes, supporting a Somali National Army (SNA) operation that state media claimed killed nearly 100 AS militants. As the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) offensive against AS now approaches its second phase, it is worth considering the ramifications of greater air support from the US, and others.
 
The ‘gloves off’ approach of the Trump administration is over. American airstrikes are now typically used to defend the small contingent of US forces in Somalia or the more common ‘collective self-defence’ use for Somali forces, particularly Danaab special forces. Less common are strikes targeting senior Al-Shabaab leaders, but they still occur, such as the strike in late May that reportedly injured Moalim Osman, AS’s head of external operations. In 2020, an AFRICOM spokesperson outlined the purpose of US airstrikes as attempting to “degrade… [AS] ability to recruit, train, and plot terror attacks.” 
 
Under the Trump administration, nearly 220 airstrikes were carried out in just four years. During much of this period, AS militants could not travel in convoys due to the intensity of the strikes. Today, Al-Shabaab’s relative ease of movement through much of Somalia was on worrying display during its attack on the SNA Geriley base at the beginning of July. Hundreds of fighters moved with ease to overrun the base, seemingly without fear of airstrikes. But American air support remains critical in supporting Somalia’s US-trained Danaab special forces, who have particular access to US airstrikes. One AS attack on Danaab forces in January 2023 near Galcad was devastated by an American airstrike, allowing Danaab forces to push back. 
 
The asymmetric nature of the frontline in the FGS’s war against Al-Shabaab complicates the use of airstrikes for several reasons. AS is deeply embedded across Somalia, engrained in the social fabric of much of the country. Striking AS accurately and repeatedly without civilian casualties is extremely difficult. AFRICOM collects significant information before it strikes and repeatedly insists that civilian casualties are limited.
 
Yet similar claims have proven misleading on occasion in recent years. One Amnesty International investigation into US drone strikes in Somalia in 2019 revealed that several civilians had been killed and injured and might have broken international humanitarian law. AFRICOM has always denied such allegations. What is clear, however, is that Al-Shabaab regularly exploits foreign intervention and strikes in its propaganda and recruitment. 
 
There are examples of international strikes that have perhaps done more harm than good. At least two civilians were reportedly killed in a Kenyan airstrike in El-Adde in neighbouring Somalia’s Gedo region at the beginning of July, prompting a furious reaction. A Somali Member of Parliament for Gedo, Mursaal Khaliif, tweeted, “As long as Al-Shabaab is in El-Adde, Kenya has a valid reason to massacre civilians in Gedo and go on with its ethnic cleansing.” Several community elders in Gedo even reportedly called for residents to attack Kenyan forces. And this is not the first time Kenyan airstrikes in Gedo have sparked condemnation for reportedly killing civilians. In 2021, Somalia’s federal government called for an investigation into the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) strikes after similar reports. 
 
Somalia is also pushing for UN Security Council approval of Turkish and Emirati drone support. In December 2021, Turkey delivered a cache of its Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mogadishu, later ruled a violation of the arms embargo by the UN as Turkey failed to clear their delivery. The FGS has since denied their use. But Turkish air support is markedly different from AFRICOM in a crucial way. Unlike American strikes in Somalia, which typically require Washington’s approval, Turkish drone strikes only require a Turkish officer's sign-off on the ground. This could rapidly improve strike times in a fast-changing combat environment, but it also raises the risks of civilian casualties without the detailed intelligence AFRICOM depends upon. If Turkish and Emirati drone support is approved, it will also likely not be limited to the US’s ‘collective self-defence’ rationale, potentially dramatically increasing the number of strikes. With Somalia hoping to rebuild its limited air force, it is eager to receive any help it can get. 
 
Airstrikes alone are not a panacea to the complex fight against AS. The high numbers of strikes during the Trump administration were not matched by a similar operational intent by its Somali partners on the ground under former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo. As military expert Paul D. Williams said, US airstrikes alone have not been able to “blunt Al-Shabaab’s ability to… [use] a combination of asymmetric tactics.”
 
If airstrikes, American or otherwise, can now be effectively combined with coordinated operations by regional and SNA forces against AS, they have the potential to be devastating. Simply driving AS from its territory will not be enough. The militant group will need to be significantly degraded if the second phase of operations is to be successful, something airstrikes have shown their potential to support. 
 
The Somali Wire team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 968
Somalia: Why Transition Call Makes Sense
The Somali Wire

Somalia’s opposition - frustrated by months of stagnant dialogue - has for the first time proposed a transitional mechanism to break the country's protracted political deadlock. In an open letter addressed to a crucial extraordinary summit of African Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TPCCs) which opened on Wednesday in Kampala, the Somali Future Council (SFC) said that a new transitional governance arrangement was vital and necessary and is hoping the initiative will gain traction among regional actors who have boots on the ground and share a vested interest in a durable political settlement.


20:58 min read 30 Jul
Issue No. 967
Somaliland - The Return of the Prodigal Daughter
The Somali Wire

In a significant symbolic blow to Somali unionism, Fahiima Yusuf Quuje - a prominent Dhulbahante activist from the Jama Siyaad sub-clan who was instrumental in mobilising grassroots support for the armed insurrection in Laas Anood - late last week declared she was repudiating Somali unionism and the ‘Greater Somalia’ ideology, tendering her resignation from her regional assembly seat in the fledgling, Mogadishu-backed Northeastern State of Somalia (NES) and would be returning to Somaliland. A day after the announcement, Quuje landed at Egal International Airport in Hargeisa, where she was greeted by high-ranking dignitaries, garlanded in the Somaliland flag, and serenaded with patriotic anthems.


19:38 min read 22 Jul
Issue No. 966
A New Spring in His Step: How HSM Engineered His Rebound
The Somali Wire

Today marks exactly two months since Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) unveiled his unilateral one-year term extension. While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, HSM has evidently survived, rebounded, and consolidated power in ways that defy earlier predictions. A leader whom many had been wont to dismiss as too tarnished to retain executive power beyond May 2026 remains firmly in the saddle, holding the political initiative and dictating terms. His opponents, meanwhile, are in deep disarray. Their cohesion is fracturing, they lack a coherent, unified strategy, and they are locked in a dialogue of attrition designed to wear down their will and force their capitulation.


24:38 min read 16 Jul
Issue No. 965
The Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU: Ethiopia Missed a Milestone While Somaliland Avoided a Historic Mistake
The Somali Wire

The Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was hailed as a historic breakthrough. In reality, it was a strategic gamble built on contradictions—and its apparent failure may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Somaliland and Ethiopia.


6:03 min read 10 Jul
Issue No. 964
Part II/The Human Rights Deficit in Somalia's New Penal Code
The Somali Wire

For the first time in over six decades, Somalia has overhauled its foundational criminal law - the 1962 Law No. 5. Now awaiting parliamentary and presidential approval, the Draft Somali Penal Code (SPC) nonetheless struggles with multiple hurdles and will likely face significant objection, not least, from Somalia’s Western partners and liberal-minded younger generation of Somalis disappointed with the new text’s failure to break away from its historical illiberal roots.


16 min read 08 Jul
Issue No. 963
Part I/The Fault Lines in Somalia’s Penal Reform
The Somali Wire

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has published a new Draft Somalia Penal Code (SPC) - marking its first comprehensive legal overhaul in 64 years. The 136-page draft was first submitted to Parliament in January 2026 and underwent its first reading but the process of endorsing it became entangled with the escalating electoral and constitutional dispute, forcing the government to shelve it. The changes aim to update the 1962 Law No. 5 Penal Code and codify Islamic criminal law (uqubat). If endorsed by parliament and approved by the President, they will formally embed the three pillars of the Sharia punitive framework into the statute - fixed punishments (hudud), retributive justice (qisas), and statutory judicial discretion (ta'zir).


16:49 min read 03 Jul
Issue No. 129
Centring North Eastern Kenya - The Rise Of Kenya's Ethnic Somalis
The Horn Edition

A president does not pay a visit to Wajir by accident. When William Samoei Ruto chose Wajir as the centre stage for Kenya’s Madaraka Day celebrations on 1 June — the first sitting president to do so — he was not merely varying the ceremonial calendar. He was making a premeditated statement about who belongs at the centre of Kenya’s state and who no longer belongs at its margins. The message was not merely ‘taking Nairobi to NorthEastern.’ It was the centring and mainstreaming of an ethnic Somali-dominated region that, for much of Kenya’s post-colonial history, has been treated as a security issue rather than a political constituency.


28:45 min read 26 Jun
Issue No. 962
Somaliland’s Recognition Angst
The Somali Wire

Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro’s trip to Israel in June (from 14-17) was far more than symbolism. Not only was it a calculated strategic diplomatic play, and a chance for Somaliland to appear on the world stage, but also an opportunity for Somaliland to present itself as a fully-functional state, able to conduct foreign relations and cut bilateral deals. Irro, a seasoned former diplomat, navigated the intricate demands of state protocol with remarkable ease - cutting an immaculate, regal figure in his navy-blue suit. Accorded full head-of-state honours, he laid a wreath at the Theodore Herzl mausoleum, engaged in high-level talks with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, opened the new Somaliland embassy in Jerusalem and convened meetings with Knesset members, senior officials, and business leaders. For Israel, hosting President Abdirahman Irro in Jerusalem functioned to signal its strong commitment to deepening strategic ties while also countering perceptions of waning diplomatic momentum.


22:37 min read 24 Jun
Issue No. 961
Deciphering Al-Shabaab's Radio Silence
The Somali Wire

Never interrupt your enemy when they are making a mistake. Napoleon Bonaparte’s classic rule of combat seems to be the guiding doctrine behind Al-Shabaab’s sudden, uncharacteristic radio silence as Mogadishu’s political elite tear themselves apart. As the ‘government-in-waiting’, one would have assumed the militants would take full advantage of its adversaries’ internal divisions, maximising the propaganda opportunities this offers, and campaign for their own cause. Typically quick to weaponise any intra-Somali division, the militant group's decision to sit out the latest intra-Somali fracturing is intriguing. By withholding its usual blitz of propaganda, the group is playing a longer, quieter game - waiting for the federal house to implode further before stepping in.


20 min read 17 Jun
Scroll