Issue No. 572

After months of uncertainty, a date has finally been set for Somaliland’s next presidential election in November 2024, almost exactly two years behind schedule. Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (NEC) announced the decision on 17 July, following the Supreme Court’s decision to refuse the NEC a legal interpretation of its proposed electoral calendar. Notwithstanding the lengthy postponement, greater clarity over Somaliland’s next electoral cycle is a welcome development and cause for some optimism. But the way forward already appears fraught. Several senior opposition politicians have voiced their grievances about the structure of the proposed elections. More concerning are the reports of armed clashes between Somaliland forces and clan militia in Ga’an Libaah that have been brewing over the past few days.

Cynics may argue that a two-year extension of President Musa Bihi’s term was precisely what he wanted and that he has finally obtained it. But electoral delays are nothing new in Somaliland politics, and previous presidents have also benefited from unconstitutional term extensions. What distinguishes this particular delay from previous episodes, however, is that it is calculated to accommodate a prior poll in December 2023 that will determine which political parties will contest the presidential vote.

Somaliland’s electoral system allows for only three national political parties, typically selected through local and parliamentary elections and licensed to operate for 10 years. The licenses of the last three parties, including Bihi’s own Kulmiye party, expired in December 2022 meaning that new political associations are now eligible to compete for party status. The problem is that past irregularities in the electoral calendar mean that local and parliamentary elections have already taken place. Holding an election exclusively for the purposes of party selection is unprecedented and vigorously opposed by the two opposition parties that risk being overtaken by newcomers.
 
In theory, all three existing political parties are at risk since each represents, to a lesser or greater degree, a coalition of clan interests. The defection of major clan constituencies to any of the new political associations could potentially deal a lethal blow to any or all three. Kulmiye is no doubt counting on the advantages of incumbency to hold its political base together, whereas Waddani and UCID enjoy few advantages, if any, over their emerging competitors. Many Somalilanders are fatigued by having their politics monopolised by a handful of politicians over the past decade and are eager for change – if only for change’s sake.
 
The NEC’s electoral plan has also created serious discontent in various quarters. Feysal Ali Waraabe, the Chairman and presidential candidate of UCID, has rejected the timetable, demanding that the presidential poll precede any party election. A far more serious threat to the process is emerging from the Habar Yunis clan, historically Waddani’s political base. The causes of disaffection among the Garhajis, and the Habar Yunis in particular, are deep-seated and complex. Resentment towards President Bihi’s assertive leadership is widespread and genuine. The ruling Kulmiye is primarily an alliance between two of the other major Isaaq clans; Habar Awal and Habar Je’elo. In November 2021, Waddani elected Hersi Ali Hassan, a controversial Habar Je’elo political figure, as party chairman in an apparent bid to wean votes away from Kulmiye. Many of the party faithful now grumble that Abdirahman ‘Irro, Waddani’s presidential candidate, has essentially ceded the party leadership to Hersi, leaving Waddani’s future as a standard bearer for Habar Yunis clan interests in some doubt. But ‘Irro loyalists are reluctant to defect to Barwaaqo; a new political organisation headed by veteran Habar Yunis politician Dr. Mohamed Abdi Gaboose.
 
Abdirahman ‘Irro–himself a member of the Habar Yunis - has been muted in his response to the NEC decision. But the party’s Secretary General, Khadar Xuseen Cabdi, has openly warned that a new clan militia is assembling in the highlands of Ga’an Libaah, a Habar Yunis territory northeast of Hargeysa. During the last week of July, President Bihi ordered a paramilitary police unit headed by a Habar Yunis commander into the area to prevent any armed opposition from coalescing. Violent clashes now appear to have erupted between these clan militia and Somaliland security forces. The situation is still murky, but it is a deeply concerning sign that could further inflame clan grievances and provoke greater instability.
 
A certain degree of turbulence is to be expected at critical junctures in the electoral cycle, but the mood in Somaliland is exceptionally febrile. The proposition of stand-alone party elections is untested and bitterly resented by the incumbents. And the fighting in and around Laas Aanood since February 2023 has prompted more than a few observers to question whether Somaliland is in danger of unraveling.
 
The danger of political tensions spilling over into widespread violence is real– and not only from disenfranchised clans and political interests. Political entrepreneurs across the clan and political spectrum are already flirting with the threat of violence as a pathway to electoral relevance. Al-Shabaab has been aggressively expanding into the Sool region and has repeatedly sought to incite violence during elections as a means of de-legitimising the Somaliland state, the democratic system, and the very notion of constitutional rule.
 
But few Somalilanders are prepared to sacrifice their hard-won peace and economic growth on the altar of clan pride. The potential cost of war is too high to contemplate. Influential elders, business leaders, and members of civil society are striving to prevent the toxic political environment from spilling over into widespread violence. Their efforts so far have been limited by the Somaliland government’s insistence that their approach to the electoral process is constitutional, offering little room for reconciliation or appeasement. That may be so, but Somaliland has repeatedly been rescued from the precipice of conflict by its well-established tradition of political accommodation. Another such moment may be fast approaching. Somaliland, now more than ever, urgently needs a fair and agreed-upon electoral roadmap. This should be the common cause to bring all sides to the table to avoid tensions spiralling any further.