Issue No. 570

Published 26 Jul 2023

Al-Shabaab in Kenya: Exploiting historic wounds

Published on 26 Jul 2023 13:48 min

Al-Shabaab in Kenya: Exploiting historic wounds
 

In early May, the Kenyan and Somali governments announced the gradual reopening of border crossings between the two countries. Yet just weeks after the proposed start of reopening on 15 June, the Kenyan government announced an indefinite pause after a surge in Al-Shabaab (AS) attacks in Kenya. Since the beginning of June, dozens of Kenyan security officers have been killed by improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and AS ambushes, from Lamu to Mandera on Somalia’s border. The immediate cause of this increase in AS activity is up for debate. What is clear, however, is that AS is again embedding itself in Kenya, attempting to exploit historical distrust of Nairobi amongst border communities.
 
Hopes that reopening the border-- which had been closed since the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) invaded Somalia in 2011-- would ease movement of goods and people have now been set back. For several months, small groups of AS militants have been observed crossing into Kenya before disappearing into presumably sympathetic ethnic Somali communities. One particularly deadly cadre of AS fighters is now reportedly based in the expansive Boni Forest, a past hide-out for the militant group. They have repeatedly attacked Kenyan security forces from the forest before withdrawing into the dense undergrowth. In Lamu, two IED attacks between Pandanguo and Witu resulted in more than a dozen casualties among Kenyan security forces. And on 24 June, the villages of Salama and Juhudi were attacked by suspected Al-Shabaab militants, who killed 5 civilians before escaping into a forest. In June in Kenya overall there were 19 violent AS incidents, nearly double the monthly average in 2022.
 
The cause of this uptick in deadly AS activity is unclear. The Kenyan government has rejected talk of a link between the proposed reopening of border crossings and the increase in AS attacks. However, one anonymous Kenyan government official suggested to the press that AS has escalated its attacks due to fears that its profitable smuggling networks might dwindle if borders were to fully reopen. Stepping up attacks keeps the borders shut. The Institute of Security Studies’ Isel Ras and Halkano Wario posited that the first phase of Somalia’s offensive against Al-Shabaab displaced militants in Jubaland and South West State, forcing a repositioning of fighters into Kenya.
 
Kenya’s response to this increased violence has been unequivocal. Defence Secretary Aden Duale said that any Al-Shabaab sympathisers would “not be spared in the fight against terrorism.” Fourteen fully equipped Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) along the Kenya-Somalia border have been installed, and the country is currently investing USD 200 million to upgrade Kenya’s military capacity. This upgrade will reportedly focus on improving military hardware; Kenyan security forces have been vulnerable to IED attacks, as their armoured vehicles have not been fully IED resistant. 
 
Long-held perceptions of exclusion and discrimination amongst ethnic Somali communities in Kenya have made many reluctant to share information with Kenyan security forces. The painful legacy of the secessionist 1963-67 ‘Shifta War’ in northeastern and coastal Kenya, which brutalised ethnic Somali communities, is still keenly felt. Decades of ethnic and religious profiling built onto disenchantment with the state. AS has sought to capitalise on this by framing these communities’ struggles as their own, with some success. As one woman in Lamu said, the “reality is that people have some sympathy for Al-Shabaab and fear the KDF.” Wajir Governor Ahmed Abdullahi recently said that AS “has a field day in luring… despondent youth into ranks or as sympathisers.” 
 
Kenyan security agencies have woken up to this threat. They are reportedly working with tips provided by local elders to target the militant group along the border, and reaching out to disenfranchised communities. And the Kenyan Witness Protection Agency’s 2023-2028 plan was launched in late June to support civilians at risk of intimidation or violence with critical information. But there is no quick fix to decades of under-investment and deep mistrust. 
 
While Kenya cannot easily prevent the flow of AS fighters across its porous border, it can begin to deepen engagement with those who may harbour sympathies for the militant group. Depriving AS of its potential social and economic oxygen in Kenya is critical to preventing it from further embedding in the country. Greater funding for forces like the National Police Reservists, which include members of local communities, will also enable better intelligence gathering. 
 
But today the presence of the militant group, as Lamu East MP Ruweida Obbo said, is hurting the “normal lives of residents.” Services are hampered, as well as the movement of people. A security-dominated approach to Al-Shabaab will only compound these disturbances to civilian life, and potentially do more harm than good. Thankfully, it appears that Kenya’s security forces have learnt from previous campaigns. 

 
The Somali Wire team

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