Issue No. 553

Published 14 Jun 2023

Political Discontent in the Gedo Region of Jubland State

Published on 14 Jun 2023 17:15 min
Political Discontent in the Gedo Region of Jubland State
 
Throughout his long tenure as Jubaland President, Ahmed Madoobe has repeatedly emphasised his intention to liberate the swathes of Al-Shabaab-controlled territory in the region. In April 2023, he again insisted that Jubaland forces would rid the Federal Member State (FMS) of Al-Shabaab. Yet little progress has been made in reclaiming territory since Madoobe's ascent to the presidency in 2013. Instead, Jubaland security forces, supported by African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and federal forces, have clawed back very little from Al-Shabaab. And a recent acceleration in the deteriorating relationship between Gedo politicians and the Jubaland administration now threatens Somalia’s wider security, and the borders of Kenya and Ethiopia.
 
Today, the Jubaland administration controls limited areas in the three regions that make up the FMS--  Middle Juba, Gedo and Lower Juba. Middle Juba remains dominated by Al-Shabaab, Gedo is not aligned with Madoobe's leadership, and just two of 6 districts in Lower Juba are under Jubaland state control. And Al-Shabaab continues to threaten Jubaland from beyond its borders, capitalising on the stuttering progress of Somalia’s military offensive in Hirshabelle and Galmudug. Cross-border attacks into Kenya and Ethiopia have resumed with increasing intensity. 
 
Any potential Jubaland offensive as part of ‘Operation Black Lion’ or otherwise are threatened by the protracted stand-off between Gedo politicians on one side and Villa Somalia and Madoobe's administration on the other. This political wrangling is increasingly undermining the united front needed to wage a cohesive offensive against Al-Shabaab. 
 
Recent cross-border attacks by Al-Shabaab should serve as a wake-up call to this danger. Attacks on Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Somalia have provided the group with worrying caches of weapons. By exploiting the unsteady government offensive, as well as distractions in Gedo and along Lower Jubaland borders, Al-Shabaab has struck from Mesagawaa to Bulo-Marer, and in Lamu and Garissa and Mandera counties in Kenya in recent weeks. A rocket-propelled grenade attack in early June killed two Kenyan police officers in Mandera County and revealed Al-Shabaab’s extensive weapons arsenal. 
 
Complex regional and domestic politics and clan relationships are intersecting in dangerous ways. Jubaland is inhabited by many clans, but the two dominant clans are the Marehan, mainly in Gedo and Ogaden clans largely in Lower Juba. Kenya originally supported Madoobe's presidency and remains highly invested in his continued tenure. However, analysts including Professor Peter Gwangju, have argued that this strategy has undermined Kenya’s relationships with several clans, by prioritising ties with Madoobe. The Kenya-Jubaland border area is largely populated by non-Ogaden clans-- the Marehan and Rahanweyn from Mandera to Geriley, and the Hawiye and Bajunis from Haluqo-Hoosingoow to Lamu-Kamboni. Kenya’s policy of non-engagement with major Jubaland clans has undermined its security cooperation with border communities.
 
The bombshell National Consultative Council (NCC) proposals, including the extension of all FMS presidential terms, have ratcheted up tensions in Jubaland. Gedo politicians, along with opposition politicians from the Ogaden, Hawiye and Rahanweyn clans, held a combative press conference in Nairobi in response. Among those opposed to the NCC proposals were the former Internal Security Minister of Jubaland Abdirashid Janan, current MP Mursal Khaliif, Senators Abdullahi Sheikh (Fartaag), Iftin Baasto and Hassan Dheere, former Senator Ahmed Abdihafid Mohamed (Bulsho), and former political advisor to Ahmed Madoobe, Abdi Ali Rage. Airing their concerns, they focused on the proposed extension of Madoobe's term in office at the same time there remains a dearth of initiatives to restore relations between Gedo and Madoobe's administration. According to the Jubaland Constitution, Madoobe's term is supposed to end on 22 August 2023. But the NCC proposals would extend his term– a highly controversial proposition for Jubaland opposition and Gedo politicians. These various politicians warned that if Villa Somalia does not immediately begin negotiations between opposition figures and Jubaland’s administration on the slated August election, they would hold the election anyway, potentially establishing a parallel administration based in Gedo. 
 
This sentiment has been echoed by clan leaders. The traditional leader of Marehaan Ugas, Mohamed Ugas Hashi, released a highly critical statement about the Jubaland president, accusing him of unconstitutionally overstaying his term. The elder further said he would begin mobilising local populations to exercise their voting rights come August 2023. Accusing Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of siding with Madoobe, he alleged that Somalia’s president had failed to uphold his campaign promise of ‘Somalia at Peace with itself and with the rest of the world.’
 
The people of Gedo had previously fallen victim to the rough interventions of the federal government of former Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmaajo), and they now appear to be in a similar predicament. The NCC proposals have damaged goodwill towards Mogadishu, cementing long-standing grievances and suspicions about the Madoobe administration in Jubaland. A resurgent Al-Shabaab along its border, coupled with increasing fears of armed conflict over Madoobe's proposed term extension, pose a looming threat for Jubaland and its neighbours that requires immediate attention.
 
As security experts and regional analysts have pointed out over the years, the Mandera Triangle that links Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia is a potential powder keg. The ripple effect from divisions between Gedo and the Jubaland administration not only threaten success against Al-Shabaab, but offer the group indifferent clan elders to exploit and disillusioned youth to recruit. A perceived imposition of the Federal Government of Somalia and Madoobe on Gedo could lead to mayhem across the Triangle. This spike in border violence may also threaten the recent promises of fully reopening the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia borders under the ‘Deris Wanaag’ project. 
 
Villa Somalia must now be seen to remove itself from Jubaland’s internal politics so it can better serve as an independent arbiter. The NCC proposals threaten to turn a tense situation into potential armed conflict, so the more clarity that can be provided, the better–particularly regarding the proposed extension of Madoobe’s term. Finally, if Madoobe is serious about purging Al-Shabaab from Jubaland, his administration should seek reconciliation over imposition in Gedo. This disunited front is imperilling the security of Jubaland and its neighbours.
 
The Somali Wire team

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