Issue No. 514

Published 03 Mar 2023

Mogadishu's Security: A litmus test of operations against Al-Shabaab

Published on 03 Mar 2023 20:46 min
Mogadishu's Security: A litmus test of operations against Al-Shabaab
 
Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, is home to an estimated four million people and supports a vibrant commercial sector. Yet behind the façade of what appears to be an up-and-coming African capital is the specter of insurgents hiding in plain sight. Although Somalia’s government has had a run of success in the fight against Al-Shabaab over the past year, Mogadishu’s security is highly questionable, as the city’s suburbs have become a safe haven and base of operations for militants. Al-Shabaab is not the only problem. The crisis is deeper. Somalia’s security institutions remain disorganized and corrupt, and Mogadishu’s robust business community is often an accomplice to Al-Shabaab funding. 
 
There are different units of Somalia’s security forces operating in Mogadishu with separate command and control structures. The main security forces include the Somali National Army (SNA), the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), federal police, and municipal police. In addition, there are non-governmental armed forces including clan militia and private security companies. These units operate in Mogadishu wearing a hodgepodge of uniforms and carrying an assortment of weapons. 
 
The unfettered, uncontrolled security forces roaming the city with machine guns and technical -- vehicles with mounted weapons-- are causing their own security concerns. At checkpoints across the city, security forces drive through with little scrutiny. This absence of rigor allows loopholes through which Al-Shabaab can sneak through dressed like security forces. 
 
Frequent clashes between different security forces are another public problem. In recent incidents, these clashes have cost the lives of more than a dozen citizens. There are also armed and inebriated lone wolf soldiers who have killed and robbed civilians. Only a few of these perpetrators have been brought to justice.
 
Newly trained plain clothes NISA agents indiscriminately point guns at the everyday people they encounter. This week two of these recent trainees were killed and one was injured after attempting to stop armed police officers. It is difficult to follow the orders of gun-wielding agents when they have no proper identification. 
 
It is also known that Somali security forces have put up illegal checkpoints to collect money from public transport operators. This money does not go into government coffers but rather ends up in individual pockets. 
 
But the most critical problem is the lack of information sharing and cooperation among the security agencies. This serious lapse creates considerable opportunities for Al-Shabaab to maneuver within the system. Militants have even begun to bribe security officials to transport Vehicle Borne and other Improvised Explosive Devices into the city center and other target areas. 
 
While Mogadishu’s government institutions are concentrated in the city center, the suburbs belong to Al-Shabaab. This is especially true at night when police presence is minimal. 
The withdrawal of law enforcement agencies from the city's suburbs gives Al-Shabaab's covert elements the space to plan operations targeting the city center. Mogadishu’s suburbs are not a priority for the government; this neglect provides Al-Shabaab ample time and cover to plan IED and complex attacks. 
 
In addition, small kiosks dot the city, selling all types of drugs and other illegal substances. The primary customers of these kiosks are security personnel. Members of security forces rent out their clothes, weapons and even identification cards to drug cartels and gangs. Gangs then exchange the money and items they rob for drugs. In yet another disturbing trend, drug dealers have begun to target students and jobless youth. The result is further heightened insecurity and the emergence of drug problems among youth.
 
Further, the materials Al-Shabaab needs for conducting operations, particularly for IEDs and complex attacks, are well known. Al-Shabaab buys motorbike batteries for powering IEDs, sulphuric acid for producing IEDs, and metal casing for building IED containers. These materials are brought to Mogadishu and transported to Al-Shabaab controlled areas, evading detection by security services.
 
Mogadishu’s security problems require solutions beyond military operations. In Mogadishu, the absence of street addresses and resident registrations also allows for urban disorder— a perfect scenario for Al-Shabaab to hide in plain sight. It is essential for Mogadishu’s security apparatus to address the underlying factors that fuel the city’s insecurity-- poor collaboration and information sharing among security forces, lack of business regulation, the drug trade, and unintentional financing of Al-Shabaab. 
 
 
By the Somali Wire team

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