Issue No. 293

Ethiopia is fast approaching another grim anniversary-- two years of the Fano insurgency in the Amhara region, an armed conflict that shows no sign of abating and that has exacted a savage humanitarian toll. In August 2023, a disparate collection of former militiamen from the Tigray war, former Amhara Special Forces, and disgruntled farmers under the banner of 'Fano' militias escalated their operations, attacking and seizing government buildings and military posts in the Amhara region. In the preceding months, the government had sought to suppress elements of their former allies, seeking to arrest and disarm the varied movement with prominent strains of Amhara nationalism, but to no avail. And in the two years since Fano fighters briefly seized Lalibela on 1 August 2023, much of the Amhara region has witnessed a near-total breakdown in governance and law and order, with several thousand killed and many tens of thousands displaced.

After losing the historic town of Lalibela and intense clashes in other cities, a declaration of a State of Emergency soon followed, as did the resignation of the Amhara regional president and a raft of other senior Amhara figures purged from the government. Since then, a deadly stalemate has ensued with Fano unable to seize and hold major cities, nor Addis to quash the insurgents. Offensive after offensive has been launched against Fano in its rural strongholds in Gojjam, Shewa, Wollo and Gondar, only to be repeatedly repulsed by the Amhara fighters in the rural highlands. Such large-scale operations appear not to have dented Fano's increasing cohesiveness nor capacity, with dozens of Prosperity Party officials and army commanders having been assassinated by the militias. Further, the guerrilla tactics of Fano have proven highly effective at isolating the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) into a handful of major cities and towns by striking convoys on key highways. The breakdown of transport within Amhara and to Addis has compounded the humanitarian emergency raging across the region, and the high cost of living with trade so curtailed by the threat of kidnapping and violence.

Though it has been unable to quell the insurgency, the ENDF has continued time and again to launch large-scale operations, undertaking yet another in Raya Kobo in North Wollo, as well as in Wollega earlier this month. In response, the Amhara Fano National Force coalition claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties on the ENDF, killing over 90 and capturing dozens more--and while the numbers are unconfirmed, it is highly suggestive about the nature of the brutal attritional warfare ongoing in Amhara. But alongside the army, the government has also turned to allying with militias and other non-state armed groups to fight Fano, including Oromo militias. A partial breakdown in inter-ethnic relations between the Amhara and Oromo has become all too clear in recent years, with tit-for-tat massacres carried out by competing groups. Just last week, Fano denied responsibility for the killings of dozens of civilians in West Shewa in Oromia in early July. Fano militias do operate in Oromia, while much of their propaganda output remains focused on portraying the central government as 'Oromo-orchestrated' and seeking to carry out an 'Amhara genocide.'

Meanwhile, elements of the diverse insurgency have become increasingly professionalised, promoting defected military officials and commanders within their own ranks to key positions. One of the outcomes of this increased cohesiveness was 'Operation Unity' in March, where dozens of Ethiopian military installations were targeted across Gojjam, Gondar, and Wollo in a highly sophisticated and coordinated attack by several Fano factions. Among these factions, Gojjam Fano remains pre-eminent and is led by the figurehead of Zemene Kassie, a battle-hardened individual whom his Amhara nationalist followers almost worship. But there remain other competing groups, despite continued attempts by the diaspora to unite them, including a coalition aligned with Eskinder Nega-- an Ethiopian nationalist. Within and between these groupings is significant ideological overlap and divergence, with genocidal violence towards Tigrayans, Orthodox Christianity, Amhara land claims on neighbouring regions, and sustaining their war economy all playing a role in motivating these forces. Some of these grievances are legitimate, but the government's myopic and broad-brush strategy has helped empower some of the more fascistic elements that carried out ethnic cleansing in Tigray.

This is partially because, since the beginning, the conflict in Amhara has been further defined by a string of human rights violations committed by both parties. With the government having lost control over swathes of Gojjam as well as North Shewa, North Gondar and South Wollo, it has increasingly resorted to large-scale operations and drone strikes. On several occasions, dozens of civilians have been killed by individual strikes, including on a market in November 2024 and more recently in Gedeb in East Gojjam in April, one of the epicentres of the insurgency. Meanwhile, thousands of ethnic Amhara have been arbitrarily jailed in Addis as well as within the region, while senior opposition Amhara figures have either fled the country or been jailed. Several high-ranking members of the Amhara nationalist opposition party, the National Movement of the Amhara (NaMA), have been detained for months, including MP Christian Tadelle, who was reported to be extremely unwell late last year. None of this has endeared local rural Amhara communities to the government's side, with most wearied by years of intermittent conflict, inflation, and difficulties in accessing fertiliser.

Though telecommunications and the internet remain curtailed in much of the northern region, by all accounts, the war has taken a heavy toll on the predominantly rural society. Around 900,000 are estimated to be displaced in Amhara, with half a million of those facing acute shortages of essential supplies, including food and water. Malnutrition rates, too, have soared above 30%, alongside cases of preventable diseases such as cholera and malaria. The shuttering of USAID and consequent severe cuts to development and humanitarian assistance, alongside the enduring insecurity of much of rural Amhara, have undermined aid delivery. 

Two years in, the question is, as ever, what comes next? With little sign of the fighting easing or negotiations taking hold, this grinding, bloody stalemate will probably continue for some time to come. Already troublesome due to its disparate nature, Kassie and other Fano leadership are believed to be reluctant to enter into any comprehensive peace negotiations without sufficient international guarantors. On several occasions, Addis has quietly entreated with figures in Fano to begin talks through religious and traditional leaders, but has been rebuffed—in large part because the federal government's seeming inability to hold to its word in peace accords. 

And after long denying any relationship between Asmara and Fano, the federal government has now begun to wield their former allies' ties as a thinly-disguised casus belli against Eritrea. But the flood of Eritrean arms to Fano could become a torrent if war were to break out between Addis and Asmara, with Fano one of the main levers accessible for Eritrea to destabilise its neighbour. The tinderbox that remains north-western Ethiopia, including Western Tigray, Eritrea, and eastern Sudan, could explode almost at any moment.