Issue No. 242

The Second Pretoria Review: Navigating Tigrayans Return
 

Last week, on 9 July, the Second Strategic Review on Implementation of the Pretoria Agreement took place in Addis Ababa. Representatives of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the federal government, the African Union, the US, and others attended the meeting, which covered a host of issues, particularly the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), disarmament of Tigrayan soldiers, and the continued occupation of swathes of Tigray by Amhara and Eritrean forces.
 
According to Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) President Getachew Reda, the meeting was "largely cordial," with some progress acknowledged on the return of IDPs' and a renewed commitment to Pretoria's implementation on all sides. However, several major sticking points remain, most notably the restoration of Tigrayan control in parts of North Western and Southern Tigray in recent weeks. While the federal government has asserted that it is committed to the IDPs' return to Western Tigray and dismantling of the unconstitutional, illegal Amhara administrations, it is far less clear whether Addis still intends to support restoring Tigrayan control across the region.
 
In a press conference on 13 July, TIA Vice President and Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede announced that the Amhara and Tigray regional governments and Addis had reached another agreement to streamline IDPs' return, as well as necessitating the removal of non-Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) militias and Amhara administrations. While these should have been disassembled months ago, Werede said that there remain well-armed Amhara militias, as well as newer settlers in Western Tigray, which is delaying the IDPs' return. He further accused the Amhara regional government of attempting to transform the demography of Western Tigray through settler programmes.
 
Elsewhere in Tigray, the Tselemiti district in North Western Tigray and Alamata town in Southern Tigray have become two particular points of contention. In late June and early July, busloads of Tigrayan IDPs' in two tranches, totalling several thousand, travelled to Tselemiti, most for the first time since their forcible displacement by marauding Amhara forces in the early months of the war. These IDPs' have suffered unimaginably since then, with a suspension of food aid by the World Food Programme and the USAID in March 2023, compounding an already dire humanitarian crisis in their camps. Hundreds subsequently starved to death.
 
The IDPs' return to Tselemiti in North Western Tigray was unlikely to prove straightforward, considering the continued reluctance of Bahir Dar and allied militias to abide by the Pretoria agreement. While the Amhara local administrations in Tselemiti are far less established than those in Western Tigray, some Amhara elders voiced concerns about the possibility of armed Tigrayan forces accompanying the IDPs'. Mobilising Tigrayan forces near Tselemiti were subsequently peacefully withdrawn at the behest of the ENDF and the local Amhara militias, who only partially withdrew in turn. But despite this acquiescence, when the IDPs' arrived in Tselemiti for the first time since their displacement, the remaining Amhara militias detained a number of them. Particularly concerning is that they were seemingly detained with the tacit support of the ENDF. The federal government has ostensibly attempted to appease both sides by supporting Tigrayan IDPs' return and allowing Amhara militias to remain in place, but their confinement is a blatant contravention of the spirit of the Pretoria agreement.
 
Meanwhile, in Southern Tigray, in May 2024, the ENDF did successfully dismantle the Amhara administrative structures in Alamata town and its environs, clashing with a handful of remaining militia. The ENDF initially facilitated the return of Tigrayan forces to Alamata, which also re-established control of nearby areas, including the Raya Bala, Korem and Zata districts. The presence of the Tigrayan forces proved highly controversial amongst the Amhara residents of Alamata, who repeatedly protested their return. Many of these residents, it should be noted, were also involved in the widespread ethnic cleansing of Tigrayans during the war.
 
On 3 July, however, after the ENDF had declared a curfew in Alamata, ordered the withdrawal of the Tigrayan forces from Alamata, and banned weapons carrying for all non-ENDF, a leaked phone call emerged. Purportedly between General Belay Seyoum, an ENDF commander, and an unidentified individual, the two men discuss mobilising Amhara youth to protest against Tigrayan forces in Alamata. While the authenticity of the call remains unclear, it has further sowed doubts that the federal government is fully committed to Pretoria. At the Strategic Review last week, the federal government accused Mekelle of deploying the still-mobilised Tigray Defense Force to Southern Tigray while the IDPs' were returning. Still, while the restoration of Tigrayan control is proving contentious, there is an expectation that thousands of IDPs' will soon be able to return home.
 
More troublesome is the prospect of Western Tigray, where many thousands of Amhara have settled following the mass ethnic cleansing of over 1 million Tigrayans from the territory. Even last year, months after the Pretoria agreement was signed in November 2022, the forcible removal of Tigrayans persisted under the direction of Amhara officials such as Belay Ayalew. Amhara forces expelled hundreds of Tigrayans from Western Tigray, particularly in Humera and Adebai towns, in late 2022 and early 2023 and beyond. Moreover, a number of these militias are linked to the Wolkait Amhara Identity Committee– an influential Amhara nationalist grouping that has long agitated for the control of the territory. Many of these communities are also doggedly opposed to Addis's proposed referendum to determine the future status of Western Tigray.
 
In Addis, influential Amhara elite are continuing to stoke fears within the federal government that if the TIA re-establishes control over Western Tigray to the Sudanese border, they will be able to restore critical weapon supply routes. And some are arguing that if Western Tigray returns to Tigrayan hands, the Fano insurgency will weaponise this against the government and draw greater numbers to the Amhara nationalist cause. While elements of the Oromo-dominated federal government are concerned that their irredentist claim on Western Tigray should not be indulged, in part due to Fano's claims on Oromia, these arguments have nevertheless gained some traction in Addis.
 
Subsequently, the federal government is currently attempting to appease both the Amhara and Tigrayan constituencies, but this strategy cannot last forever. A piecemeal implementation of Pretoria is doomed to dissatisfy all, and keep Tigray mired in a grim, untenable post-war limbo. Returning the IDPs' to their homes can only be part of the equation, and there is a real danger that these highly vulnerable communities could be exposed to the genocidal violence of Fano and others once again. The restoration of Tigrayan control over the swathes of northern Tigray, which are still occupied by the Eritrean military, must also be addressed. The half-hearted implementation and support for Pretoria by the federal government cannot continue if any semblance of peace is to take root in northern Ethiopia.