On 24 June, Amhara militia launched a cross-border incursion into the Al-Fashaga triangle in Sudan. Since the eruption of widespread armed conflict in Sudan in April 2023, many have speculated that the Amhara militia present along much of Ethiopia's border with Sudan could take advantage of the neighbouring country's instability. And so they did, seemingly spying opportunity following the withdrawal of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to reinforce areas under threat from advancing paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Gedaref. Though it was not a significant incursion-- just 15 km into Sudan-- it was a potent symbol of how complex and febrile control of Al-Fashaga remains.
 
The highly fertile 250-square km territory in Sudan's Gedaref State straddles parts of Ethiopia's Amhara and Tigray regions all the way to the Eritrea-Ethiopia border. While historically administered by the Ethiopian Empire, the roots of the modern dispute over Al-Fashaga date back to Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II, who ceded the territory to Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in 1902. Since Sudan's independence in 1956, successive Ethiopian governments have contested Sudan's claim to Al-Fashaga, and in the 1990s, Amhara farmers increasingly settled there. An eventual compromise was reached in 2008 between the regime of Omar al-Bashir and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), agreeing that predominantly Amhara farmers could remain in Al-Fashaga while the territory would be officially designated as Sudanese. From 2014 onwards, however, intermittent clashes undermined this arrangement until its total collapse in late 2020 during the Tigray War.
 
While Sudan nominally agreed to close its border to prevent the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) from using its territory, SAF spied an opportunity to reassert control over Al-Fashaga after Amhara Special Forces (ASF) troops were deployed from the border to Tigray. Thousands of Amhara farmers who had practised Mofer Zemet, the seasonal farming of unoccupied border lands, were displaced as SAF built new roads and fortifications, including a forward operating base near the town of Abu Tuyour. In turn, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) built up its own presence along the border, with clashes reported between Sudanese and Ethiopian troops in Al-Fashaga and other border areas. The now-disbanded ASF, many of whom are now part of the Fano insurgency against the Ethiopian federal government, also targeted the Sudanese presence once occupied by their fellow Amhara.
 
The economic significance of Al-Fashaga to the Sudanese military should not be underestimated. Gedaref is a crucial part of Sudan's 'breadbasket,' and Al-Fashaga contains some 243,000 hectares of fertile agricultural land known for producing export-grade white sesame. Sesame produced in this area, known as 'white gold' for its colour and the price it commands, accounts for 30% of Sudan's national production. Since December 2020, SAF has consolidated control over the production of sesame in Al-Fashaga, with pre-war exports exceeded in value only by gold and roughly equal to that of livestock. Meanwhile, sesame production by Amhara farmers in occupied Western Tigray has been used to pay for ongoing Eritrean military support for Fano through cross-border smuggling networks.
 
Sudan is now embroiled in a devastating conflict with numerous external backers, and while Mekelle and Addis have established a tentative peace, the Fano insurgency continues apace. With Amhara militia control of Western Tigray being gradually dismantled in line with the Pretoria agreement, the occupiers and their atavistic diaspora are incensed. They view Al-Fashaga, swathes of Oromia, Western Tigray or 'Wolkait,' and parts of Benishangul-Gumuz as theirs, with or without historical precedent. Consequently, the withdrawal of some SAF presented a new opening for the militia to reassert their claim to Al-Fashaga. While the latest incursion does not appear to be the work of Fano commanders Eskinder Nega in North Shewa or Zemene Kasse in Gojjam, it aligns with their irredentist rationale.
 
In the maelstrom of alliances and armed actors in eastern Sudan and north-western Amahra, the Fano insurgents and SAF share an ally in Eritrea, which has been providing substantial military aid to the army and training militia drawn from the Beni Amer, Beja, and Rashida communities for deployment against RSF. Simultaneously, former allies Addis and Asmara are now at odds, with Eritrean military support for Fano also proceeding through Sudanese territory. While SAF is purportedly uneasy about the scale of this Eritrean military support, it has nevertheless acquiesced, in large part out of battlefield necessity. SAF still suffers a severe troop disadvantage against RSF and needs all the support it can get from Eritrea.
 
And Eritrean troops are not the only non-Sudanese present in Gedaref. While Eritrean troops continue to pass through Sudanese territory to reach Fano, several hundred former Tigrayan peacekeepers who served in Abyei are still stationed in eastern Sudan. Thousands of Tigrayan war refugees are also residing in the Tenedba and Um Rakuba camps in Gedaref, under increasing threat from advancing RSF, to the dismay of Tigrayan authorities.
 
While of critical economic importance to SAF, control over Gedaref State and Al-Fashaga is now threatened by recent territorial gains by RSF. On 29 June, RSF announced it had captured the city of Sinja, the capital of Sennar State, adding to growing fears that it could advance towards the strategic city of Al-Gedaref. Should SAF be forced to send additional reinforcements there, these will likely be drawn from forces deployed near the Ethiopian border. Further withdrawals by SAF from Al-Fashaga could open the door to further Amhara militia raids.
 
On 6 July, in Ethiopia's House of Representatives, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed broke his silence on Al-Fashaga, asserting both that "we will not get involved" and that it would only take a "few hours to retake all our land." Then, this morning, Abiy landed in Port Sudan, the first foreign head of government to do so since war broke out in 2023, to meet with SAF Commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The meeting between Abiy, the closest ally of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the Horn, and al-Burhan, Saudi Arabia's ally in the war, should not be overlooked.
 
It is hard to know precisely what might be covered in today's meeting, but several topics are likely to surface. It is all but certain that Abiy would not be travelling to Port Sudan without the Emiratis' blessing, so we might presume that Abu Dhabi is passing on a number of messages to al-Burhan. Considering that the UAE is a principal patron of both Ethiopia's Prosperity Party government and the RSF, al-Burhan is likely to raise the threat of a new supply route if the paramilitaries can reach Ethiopia. Abiy may also seek to convince al-Burhan to halt Eritrean support for Fano through Sudan. Further details are likely to surface in the coming days.
 
Al-Fashaga, too, is likely to appear on the agenda, with neither Abiy nor al-Burhan needing a distraction in volatile eastern Sudan and north-western Amhara. While it may be out of Addis' hands whether Amhara militias attack Al-Fashaga, any de-escalation there should be welcomed. Further conflict in the tinderbox that is Al-Fashaga is the last thing anyone needs. 

By the Ethiopian Cable team