Holy Synod Under Seige: Rifts in the EOTC
No institution has been left untouched by the turbulence consuming Ethiopia today– including the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC). Followers of the ancient Church number in the tens of millions, but its leaders and believers are riven by sustained political pressure from the federal government, legacies of subjugation and the weaponisation of religion, and recent armed conflicts. Critically, divides within the EOTC, and with its various Orthodox splinter groups, are largely unrelated to religious dogma and almost wholly political in nature. Rifts were particularly apparent in late May at the latest meeting of the EOTC Holy Synod in Addis, when a number of senior Archbishops were absent– due to their detention or their barring from Ethiopia.
While religion and ethnicity are often understood or referred to separately in Ethiopia, the EOTC is closely tied to the country's legacy of imperial and nationalist projects; it is far from an apolitical, conciliatory body. For many Oromo, the EOTC is an institutional reminder of their harsh subjugation by Orthodox Christian highlanders, particularly under Menelik II in the 19th century. Many Oromo were forcibly converted to the EOTC, the Afaan Oromo language was banned, and the region was politically and economically subsumed into an expanding empire. Oromo intellectuals and historians, including Asafa Jalata, have described Menelik's conquest as a form of internal African colonisation.
EOTC leadership remains generally Amhara today, particularly since the government-led reconciliation in 2018 between the Addis Synod and the breakaway diaspora Synod led by Patriarch Abune Merkorios. The rival Patriarch had led a splinter faction of the EOTC between 1991 and 2018, having left Ethiopia at the fall of the Marxist Derg regime. Like many Ethiopian nationalists, Merkorios apportioned significant fault to the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) for establishing ethnic federalism. He subsequently supported the federal government in galvanising Orthodox believers against Tigray during the war. While Patriarch Abune Mathias is Tigrayan and urged peace, much of the EOTC, particularly the extreme Mahibere Kidusan wing, openly agitated for the devastating conflict. The deep rifts between Tigrayans and the rest of the EOTC are still far from healed, with the Tigrayan Orthodox Tewahedo Church (TOTC) independent from the EOTC since May 2021, when it separated in response to the Synod's alignment with the federal government.
The historic Amhara-Oromo divisions within the EOTC were particularly noticeable in early 2023 when three archbishops unilaterally established a synod in Oromia, accusing EOTC leaders of Amhara domination and discrimination against the Oromo. While a deal was negotiated with the support of Pentecostal Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, his comments that both sides held 'truths' angered many in the EOTC who asserted he had placed the Church and a pretender on equal footing. The split had garnered immense support from Oromo believers, who took to the streets in favour of the dissenting archbishops. On 23 January 2024, having accused the Holy Synod of failing to address Oromo grievances or to ensure greater representation in line with the 2023 agreement, several senior Oromo EOTC leaders established the breakaway Oromia Orthodox Tewahedo Church.
Since the eruption of wide-scale armed conflict in the Amhara region in August 2023, the federal government has increasingly accused individuals in the EOTC of supporting the militant group Fano. It is true that both Amhara nationalists and Fano insurgents see the Orthodox Church playing a central role in the Ethiopian state; both often utilise religious imagery and rhetoric in their messaging. In turn, the federal government has increasingly sought to steer appointments of pro-government, often Oromo, individuals into senior Church positions, most recently Abune Rufael as Secretary of the Holy Synod. EOTC leaders have pushed back, preferring a vacant position to Rufael assuming this role. The latest move by the government to exert control over Ethiopia's religious institutions is draft legislation entitled the 'Religious Affairs Proclamation.' This bill would necessitate the submission of financial records to the Ministry of Peace for regular scrutiny, though this currently excludes the declaration of foreign income and donations.
In this strained context, the EOTC Holy Synod convened its annual meeting in Addis Ababa on 29 May, albeit missing several key figures. In February 2024, the government suddenly prevented Holy Synod Secretary Archbishop Abune Petros from returning to Ethiopia from New York, where he was to oversee the ordination of several deacons. Petros subsequently accused the government of sowing divisions in the EOTC. Other senior EOTC leaders were also targeted by the federal government ahead of the annual meeting, presumably to prevent their attendance. In late May, arrest warrants were issued in Addis for two US-based Archbishops, Abune Theophilos and Abune Yacob, essentially preventing their return. And particularly notable was the sentencing of the Archbishop of Eastern Australia and New Zealand, Abune Lukas, to 6-years in prison in absentia on charges of inciting rebellion against the ruling Prosperity Party. Theopolis and Yacob were charged with conspiring with Lukas against the federal government.
Further splits in the EOTC are highly likely. While it has now formed a delegation to improve relations and dialogue with the federal government, to be led by the Patriarch Abune Mathias, the likelihood of the Amhara diaspora forming an independent Synod continues to grow. And if the Synod defies the federal government, there could well be a serious crackdown on the religious institution. Nevertheless, and despite schisms in the Synod, the EOTC remains politically and culturally influential in Ethiopia. It is yet another site in which the country's future is being fought.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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