Mass Displacement in Ethiopia
While Ethiopia is no stranger to large-scale displacement, the numbers and breadth of the crisis today are at such a scale that they now threaten the country's social, political, and economic fabric. From Tigray to Oromia, from Gambella to the Somali region, the number of Ethiopian internally displaced persons (IDPs) now numbers a staggering 4.3 million people. The triggers for internal displacement in Ethiopia are numerous and often overlapping, but the most obvious and telling reason is armed conflict, particularly the insurgencies in Oromia and Amhara and the devastating Tigray War.
While the number of displaced persons has fallen from 5.38 million in 2021 during the height of the Tigray War, many of those presently displaced have been so for several years. In Oromia, in particular, 5 years of armed conflict between the insurgent Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the government has left over 1.5 million displaced– mainly in the region's western zones. The actions of the Amhara nationalist Fano movement, which has repeatedly targeted Oromo villages and settlements, killing dozens of civilians in large-scale massacres, have compounded the situation. Areas that border the Amhara region in Oromia have become epicentres of regional displacement - 700,000 people remain displaced in just four zones in Western Oromia. While government authorities have sought, in a controversial fashion, to return some of those who have been forcibly displaced, many IDPs are reluctant to do so and have either refused to return or fled due to fears of Fano violence. The ethnocentric and atavistic brand of nationalism that Fano trades upon is making the prospect of resolution and communal co-habitation even harder. A further humanitarian concern is the dire conditions facing those in Oromia IDP camps, where malaria and cholera are rife. And with the coming onset of the country's rainy season, the problems of inadequate shelter and drinking water will only worsen.
The situation is arguably even worse in Tigray, where over 18 months after the signing of the Pretoria agreement, the progress of returning 1.1 million Tigrayans to their homes has remained at a glacial pace. In some ways, the slow pace is understandable, given the devastation that was inflicted on the region. During the war, which displaced millions, widespread ethnic cleansing was carried out by Amhara militias, among others, in Southern and Western Tigray. At the same time, there was an almost total evisceration of food production and industry facilities, while large swathes of the region were occupied, and continue to be so, by Eritrean forces.
However, the recent dismantling of putative Amhara administrations in Southern Tigray offers a glimmer of hope that some of the displaced may soon be in a position to return. In an address on Sunday to IDPs frustrated by their situation, Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) President Getachew Reda proclaimed, "this will be your last rally," and promised that IDPs would soon be able to return to their homes. He contended that the situation in Western Tigray was also stabilising, which is critical for Tigray's food security and known for its fertile land and sesame-farming tradition. Getachew Reda's comments come after a senior Tigrayan military official and TIA member, Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede, recently criticised the federal government's passivity and insisted that "we will not allow another winter to pass without progress and refuse to be complicit in this inaction." Nevertheless, despite these developments, it is still doubtful that the federal government and the regional authorities will be in a position to fully return the Tigrayan IDPs by the agreed date of the first week of July.
A notable period of suffering for displaced Tigrayans occurred after the World Food Programme and USAID suspension of humanitarian aid in April 2023. The controversial months-long suspension of aid led to hundreds of starvation deaths. While at the time, attention was focused on incidents of theft of food aid in Tigray to assist Tigray Defence Force soldiers, the more remarkable if neglected story was the industrial-scale organised theft of wheat aid by senior federal officials who subsequently sold it for export. In Tigray and elsewhere, the much-reduced delivery of humanitarian assistance resulted in many IDPs starving.
In addition to the man-made causes of displacement in Ethiopia, the country is also particularly vulnerable to the growing number of climate disasters plaguing the Horn of Africa. For instance, the ongoing El Nino weather phenomenon that drives wetter conditions has triggered flooding in nearly every region of Ethiopia. Meanwhile, the Somali region's economy has still not recovered from the years-long drought that devastated traditional pastoralist communities in particular. While Tigray hosts the highest number of conflict-affected IDPs, the Somali region hosts the largest number of people displaced due to drought, according to the UN's International Organisation for Migration.
In addition to dealing with a massive number of internally displaced people, Ethiopia is also the country in Africa with the second-largest refugee population -- hosting refugees from South Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, and, increasingly, Sudan. Ethiopia's open-door refugee policy should certainly be a source of pride and celebration, but it should be acknowledged that the refugee camps face similar problems to those of the IDP camps, including gender-based violence, host-refugee conflicts, and addressing humanitarian needs. For instance, the refugee camps in the Amhara region that mainly house Sudanese nationals fleeing the war have become overcrowded and dangerous, with refugees coming under sustained violent harassment by Fano militias. Instances of murder, abductions and theft have all been reported by refugees, one emblematic example being the recent case of the Sudanese woman who was killed by the Fano militia while she was collecting water near the Awlala camp. In response to this dire situation, in recent months, thousands of Sudanese have fled camps in Amhara, and Northern Gondar in particular.
The level of mass displacement Ethiopia is experiencing is having a hugely corrosive effect. Forced to scrape a living, IDPs and refugees are becoming subject to criminality, exploitation, and intimidation by armed groups like the Fano militias. A caseload of 4 million economically inactive and largely destitute people is also a serious challenge to an economy that is already under pressure. Ethiopia's economic woes are unlikely to end any time soon either, even if it manages to secure assistance from international financial institutions. The situation for IDPs is compounded by the hardline, military-centred approach taken by the federal government to address political challenges in the country. Without negotiated political settlements and a return to at least the semblance of peace and security, Oromo, Tigrayan, and Amhara civilians, among others, will never consider returning to their homes, and Ethiopia, as a consequence, will continue to slide into greater instability.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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