Another ENDF Offensive in the Amhara Region
Intense fighting has resumed between the disparate Fano factions and the Ethiopian federal government in the Amhara region. Since 19 May, anticipating the government's deployment of thousands of Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) troops for another large-scale offensive ahead of the rainy season, several Fano factions have sought to secure strategic positions. In particular, the Gojjam, Wollo, and Gondar factions have engaged in heavy clashes with ENDF units in the past two weeks. These Fano militias have continued to target the security and political apparatus of the federal and regional governments, carrying out ambushes on prisons and ENDF convoys, as well as bombings targeting Prosperity Party offices.
On 1 June, the state of emergency (SoE) within the Amhara region was scheduled to end, having been extended for four months by the federal parliament in early February 2024. Yet 10 months after the SoE's initial designation in August 2023, the Fano movement is still far from being defeated. Indeed, the government's militarised response to the Amhara nationalist insurgency has so far proven unable to comprehensively weaken the largely decentralised forces. The federal government's latest offensive aims to undermine the Fano movement's military capacity and subsequently force them into negotiations from a weakened position.
Yet despite months of near-continuous military operations, few Fano commanders have been killed since August 2023. Significant nationalist figures remain at large, including the former journalist and politician Eskinder Nega, who has pledged his armed militia to the Fano cause-- renaming his Amhara Popular Front to the Amhara People's Fano Front in 2023. Though a significant degree of consolidation within and between the Fano factions is still ongoing, a schism between Fano factions in North Shewa, where Nega is reportedly hiding out, and the powerful Gojjam Fano faction, led by Zemene Kasse, is also widening. This split has only deepened, following the call by US Ambassador Ervin Massinga for a nationwide ceasefire and political negotiations. Nega's faction is believed to support participation in talks after the formation of a more unified Fano faction to represent the Amhara has taken place, while Zemene, whose forces hold the military advantage, remains firmly opposed to any negotiations.
The two men also symbolise different elements of the Fano movement, with Nega retaining robust ties to the Amhara diaspora while Zemane Kasse is viewed as the 'true leader' of the Fano movement by the militarily dominant Gondar, Wollo, and Gojjam factions. With this schism widening despite Amhara diaspora efforts to mediate between the two groups, there is a chance of armed conflict erupting between these rival factions, particularly between the Gojjam Fano led by Kasse and another Gojjam Fano militia force led by Masresha Sete.
The militarised response to the Amhara insurgency by federal forces shows little sign of abating—with the rounding up of Amhara civilians continuing amidst the launching of yet another wide-scale offensive. Reports continue to surface of summary executions of young men in the Amhara region and large-scale detentions of ethnic Amhara, particularly in the regional capital. There have been repeated accusations of indiscriminate government drone use and airstrikes in the targeting of Fano militants. Groups of young men have been struck by munitions— leading to incidents in February 2024, in which several dozen civilians were reportedly killed in a single strike, and on 12 May, when two separate strikes in North Shewa resulted in several civilian deaths alongside the deaths of Fano militants.
In turn, pro-Fano Amhara diaspora voices have continued to weaponise the ENDF's heavy-handed approach to frame it as an Oromo vehicle of oppression. Videos with often dubious authenticity are being widely circulated to depict the surrender of 'Oromo ENDF' alongside assertions that the army has been fighting alongside 'Oromo terrorists'—the insurgent Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). With many former Amhara Special Forces having defected to Fano in the past 12 months and the Tigrayan contingent of the ENDF having been purged since November 2020, Addis has relied heavily on recruitment from Oromia. Of the nearly 30,000 new troops recently deployed to West Gojjam, Dessie town, and Debre Berhan, many are former Oromia Special Force members who have been incorporated into the ENDF. The OLA and the Ethiopian army, however, remain at loggerheads in the Oromia region, with few signs of a third round of peace talks on the horizon.
As clashes continue to escalate across much of the region, the ENDF is facing an uphill struggle in its bid to strike a knockout blow on Fano. Many of the government troops are exhausted, having been deployed to the Amhara region for months on end, and are facing experienced former Amhara special forces who defected to Fano. Perhaps most critically, by essentially forcing a binary choice on Amhara communities between the ENDF and the Fano militias—many will likely side with the latter, particularly considering their social-familial ties to the Amhara nationalist forces. While Fano factions differ significantly in terms of personnel, weaponry, leadership structure and even ideological outlook, nearly all are rooted within their own communities.
The coming weeks may prove decisive in terms of the trajectory of any future peace talks. If Addis is unable to subdue the Gojjam, Wollo, and Gondar Fano factions, it may be forced to deal with the Fano movement on terms similar to those of the OLA and the Tigrayan forces. Whether the schism within the Fano fully ruptures will also inform whether the decentralised nationalist movement continues its insurgent campaign or splinters into two broader factions that pursue different paths. All the while, weary civilians in the Amhara region will bear the brunt of the escalating violence in the coming weeks.
By the Ethiopian Cable team
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