Issue No. 237

Published 04 Jun 2024

Another ENDF Offensive in the Amhara Region

Published on 04 Jun 2024 16:32 min

Another ENDF Offensive in the Amhara Region

Intense fighting has resumed between the disparate Fano factions and the Ethiopian federal government in the Amhara region. Since 19 May, anticipating the government's deployment of thousands of Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) troops for another large-scale offensive ahead of the rainy season, several Fano factions have sought to secure strategic positions. In particular, the Gojjam, Wollo, and Gondar factions have engaged in heavy clashes with ENDF units in the past two weeks. These Fano militias have continued to target the security and political apparatus of the federal and regional governments, carrying out ambushes on prisons and ENDF convoys, as well as bombings targeting Prosperity Party offices.

On 1 June, the state of emergency (SoE) within the Amhara region was scheduled to end, having been extended for four months by the federal parliament in early February 2024. Yet 10 months after the SoE's initial designation in August 2023, the Fano movement is still far from being defeated. Indeed, the government's militarised response to the Amhara nationalist insurgency has so far proven unable to comprehensively weaken the largely decentralised forces. The federal government's latest offensive aims to undermine the Fano movement's military capacity and subsequently force them into negotiations from a weakened position.

Yet despite months of near-continuous military operations, few Fano commanders have been killed since August 2023. Significant nationalist figures remain at large, including the former journalist and politician Eskinder Nega, who has pledged his armed militia to the Fano cause-- renaming his Amhara Popular Front to the Amhara People's Fano Front in 2023. Though a significant degree of consolidation within and between the Fano factions is still ongoing, a schism between Fano factions in North Shewa, where Nega is reportedly hiding out, and the powerful Gojjam Fano faction, led by Zemene Kasse, is also widening. This split has only deepened, following the call by US Ambassador Ervin Massinga for a nationwide ceasefire and political negotiations.  Nega's faction is believed to support participation in talks after the formation of a more unified Fano faction to represent the Amhara has taken place, while Zemene, whose forces hold the military advantage, remains firmly opposed to any negotiations.

The two men also symbolise different elements of the Fano movement, with Nega retaining robust ties to the Amhara diaspora while Zemane Kasse is viewed as the 'true leader' of the Fano movement by the militarily dominant Gondar, Wollo, and Gojjam factions. With this schism widening despite Amhara diaspora efforts to mediate between the two groups, there is a chance of armed conflict erupting between these rival factions, particularly between the Gojjam Fano led by Kasse and another Gojjam Fano militia force led by Masresha Sete.

The militarised response to the Amhara insurgency by federal forces shows little sign of abating—with the rounding up of Amhara civilians continuing amidst the launching of yet another wide-scale offensive. Reports continue to surface of summary executions of young men in the Amhara region and large-scale detentions of ethnic Amhara, particularly in the regional capital. There have been repeated accusations of indiscriminate government drone use and airstrikes in the targeting of Fano militants. Groups of young men have been struck by munitions— leading to incidents in February 2024, in which several dozen civilians were reportedly killed in a single strike, and on 12 May, when two separate strikes in North Shewa resulted in several civilian deaths alongside the deaths of Fano militants.

In turn, pro-Fano Amhara diaspora voices have continued to weaponise the ENDF's heavy-handed approach to frame it as an Oromo vehicle of oppression. Videos with often dubious authenticity are being widely circulated to depict the surrender of 'Oromo ENDF' alongside assertions that the army has been fighting alongside 'Oromo terrorists'—the insurgent Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). With many former Amhara Special Forces having defected to Fano in the past 12 months and the Tigrayan contingent of the ENDF having been purged since November 2020, Addis has relied heavily on recruitment from Oromia. Of the nearly 30,000 new troops recently deployed to West Gojjam, Dessie town, and Debre Berhan, many are former Oromia Special Force members who have been incorporated into the ENDF. The OLA and the Ethiopian army, however, remain at loggerheads in the Oromia region, with few signs of a third round of peace talks on the horizon.

As clashes continue to escalate across much of the region, the ENDF is facing an uphill struggle in its bid to strike a knockout blow on Fano. Many of the government troops are exhausted, having been deployed to the Amhara region for months on end, and are facing experienced former Amhara special forces who defected to Fano. Perhaps most critically, by essentially forcing a binary choice on Amhara communities between the ENDF and the Fano militias—many will likely side with the latter, particularly considering their social-familial ties to the Amhara nationalist forces. While Fano factions differ significantly in terms of personnel, weaponry, leadership structure and even ideological outlook, nearly all are rooted within their own communities.

The coming weeks may prove decisive in terms of the trajectory of any future peace talks. If Addis is unable to subdue the Gojjam, Wollo, and Gondar Fano factions, it may be forced to deal with the Fano movement on terms similar to those of the OLA and the Tigrayan forces. Whether the schism within the Fano fully ruptures will also inform whether the decentralised nationalist movement continues its insurgent campaign or splinters into two broader factions that pursue different paths. All the while, weary civilians in the Amhara region will bear the brunt of the escalating violence in the coming weeks.

By the Ethiopian Cable team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 123
Another Election and Djibouti's Succession Problem
The Horn Edition

Apathy pervades the Djiboutian population. A week tomorrow, on April 10, the country will head to the polls, with President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh seeking a 6th— essentially uncontested — term in office. With his coronation inevitable, his family's dynastic rule over this rentier city-state will be extended once more. But in a region wracked by armed conflict and geopolitical contestation, the ageing Guelleh's capacity to manage the familial, ethnic, and regional fractures within and without grows ever more complicated. And Djibouti's apparent stability is no product of institutional strength, but rather an increasingly fractious balance of external rents and coercive control-- underpinned by geopolitical relevance.


23:43 min read 02 Apr
Issue No.944
Türkiye's Deepwater Reach in Somalia
The Somali Wire

In the 17th century, the Ottoman polymath Kâtip Çelebi penned 'The Gift to the Great on Naval Campaigns', a great tome that analysed the history of Ottoman naval warfare at a moment when Constantinople sought to reclaim maritime supremacy over European powers.


21:14 min read 01 Apr
Issue No. 325
Dammed If They Do
The Ethiopian Cable

Why have one mega-dam when you can have three more? Details are scarce, but Ethiopia has unveiled plans to build three more dams on the Blue Nile, just a few months after the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was completed.


14:12 min read 31 Mar
Issue No. 943
Baidoa Falls and Federal Power Prevails
The Somali Wire

Villa Somalia has prevailed in Baidoa. After weeks of ratcheting tensions, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen proved a paper tiger this morning, unable to resist the massed forces backed by Mogadishu. After several hours of fighting, Somali National Army (SNA) forces and allied Rahanweyne militias now control most of Baidoa and, thus, the future of South West. In turn, Laftagareen is believed to have retreated to the protection of the Ethiopian military at Baidoa's airport, with the bilateral forces having avoided the conflict today.


18 min read 30 Mar
Issue No. 942
A Son Sent to Die in Jihad
The Somali Wire

Last October, Al-Shabaab Inqimasin (suicide assault infantry) overran a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) base in Mogadishu, freeing several high-ranking jihadist detainees and destroying substantial quantities of intel. A highly choreographed attack, the Inqimasin had disguised their vehicle in official NISA daub, weaving easily through the heavily guarded checkpoints dotting the capital to reach the Godka Jilicow compound before blowing open the gates with a suicide car bomb. In the months since, Al-Shabaab's prodigious media arm-- Al-Kataib Media Foundation-- has drip-fed images and videos drawn from the Godka Jilicow attack, revelling in their infiltration of Mogadishu as well as the dark history of the prison itself. And in a chilling propaganda video broadcast at Eid al-Fitr last week, it was revealed that among the Inqimasin's number was none other than the son of Al-Shabaab's spokesperson Ali Mohamed Rage, better known as Ali Dheere.


22:20 min read 27 Mar
Issue No. 122
A brief history of Sudan's child soldiers
The Horn Edition

In early 1987, the commander of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), John Garang, is reported to have issued a radio order, instructing his field officers to gather children to be dispatched to Ethiopia for military training. Garang's command conveyed the rebels' institutionalisation of a well-established practice of child soldiering; a dynamic that has been reproduced by virtually every major armed actor in Sudan-- and later South Sudan-- since independence. Today, as war has continued to ravage and metastasise across Sudan, few communities and children have been left untouched by the ruinous violence.


30:05 min read 26 Mar
Issue No. 941
Echoes of the RRA: Identity and Power in South West State
The Somali Wire

The Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA) did not emerge from a shir (conference) in October 1995 to defend a government, nor to overthrow it. Rather, the militia —whose name was even explicit in its defence of a unified Digil-Mirifle identity —arose from the ruin of Bay and Bakool in the years prior, and decades of structural inequalities.


21 min read 25 Mar
Issue No. 324
A War Deferred or Avoided?
The Ethiopian Cable

War has been averted in Tigray-- for now. In early February, tens of thousands of Ethiopian federal soldiers and heavy artillery streamed northwards, readying themselves on the edges of the northernmost region for seemingly imminent conflict.


23:53 min read 24 Mar
Issue No. 940
Baidoa or Bust for Hassan Sheikh
The Somali Wire

The battle for South West—and Somalia's political future—continues apace. With the brittle alliance between South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud having broken down spectacularly, the federal government is pouring in arms and forces to oust the Digil-Mirifle leader. Staring down the barrel of the formal opposition holding three Federal Member States and, with it, greater territory, population, and clan, Villa Somalia is looking to exploit intra-Digil-Mirifle grievances—and convince Addis—to keep its monopolistic electoral agenda alive. But this morning, Laftagareen announced a 9-member electoral committee to hastily steer his re-election, bringing the formal bifurcation of the Somali state ever closer.


20:23 min read 23 Mar
Scroll