Issue No. 226

Published 19 Mar 2024

ENDF fails to subdue Fano

Published on 19 Mar 2024 14:35 min

ENDF fails to subdue Fano 

A renewed offensive launched by the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) on 24 February against the Fano insurgency in the Amhara region has been met with strong resistance. Forty-five thousand government troops were mobilised for the operations that targeted Fano positions across Amhara, particularly in the North Shewa, North Wollo, and the East, West and North Gojjam zones. Mechanised units and heavy artillery were further deployed along with increased drone strikes as the federal government has sought to secure several critical highways, including a stretch that links Addis Ababa to Dessie and others that connect to the regional capital of Bahir Dar.
 
While military officials were quick to claim a speedy victory, several Fano coalitions mounted heavy resistance, resulting in days of intense fighting. Others, though, including the North Shewa Fano and Wollo Fano factions, reportedly opted to retreat to the nearby mountainous and forested areas instead of engaging the ENDF forces. Still, ambushes and raid attacks targeting ENDF convoys and military camps across the region have barely let up in recent weeks. After a brief lull in fighting after the initial offensive in early March, Fano factions soon resumed targeting government forces in several parts of Amhara– particularly in the Gojjam zones.
 
Gojjam remains the centre of the Fano insurgency, both politically and militarily. Gojjam Fano, including Zemane Kassie's Amhara Popular Force, began taking on greater influence as the Tigray Defence Forces advanced into Amhara during the Tigray War in 2021. In turn, the Amhara Popular Force, as they became to be later known, sought to recruit heavily from communities in the East and West Gojjam zones, being less affected by the TDF advance. Following the intensification of violence in early August 2023 that precipitated the current state of emergency in Amhara, these Fano factions played a central role in the brief capture of Bahir Dar. 
 
This time around, in Bahir Dar, the Fano Gojjam faction collaborated with the South Gonder faction to place the city under a state of partial siege. On the night of 29 February, Fano fighters entered from three separate directions and successfully infiltrated deep into the city. The militia targeted the regional headquarters of the Prosperity Party as well as mounted attacks on the regional riot police headquarters, prisons, and government-backed militia camps located on Bahir Dar's outskirts. A riot police commander was killed, and several police stations were broken into in another well-coordinated guerrilla attack. Subsequent ENDF operations triggered days of urban warfare in largely residential areas until Fano fighters withdrew from Bahir Dar. An ENDF statement subsequently claimed that its soldiers had driven out "infiltrators" from the outskirts of Bahir Dar and that the regional capital's environs were now entirely cleared from "extremists."
 
This declaration may also been premature, as the Gojjam Fano has continued to target ENDF convoys and positions in the subsequent weeks. In apparent recognition of the insurgent forces' continued threat, new Republican Guard regiments have now been deployed to Bahir Dar and surrounding areas. The ENDF Deputy Commander General Abebaw Tadesse also appears to have been assigned direct responsibility for the government forces in Bahir Dar-- another signal of how seriously Addis is taking the insurgency-- despite public statements to the contrary.
 
Accompanying the government's offensive against Fano in recent weeks has followed reports of the ENDF conducting severe human rights violations. Following the withdrawal of Fano from Bahir Dar in early March, government soldiers were accused of going house-to-house, accusing residents of being Fano supporters or members before summarily executing or arresting them. Most concerning was the massacre in the town of Merawi by Ethiopian troops on 29 January, which left at least 45 civilians dead. While most victims were young men, others, including a pregnant woman, were also shot dead in some of the worst documented violence in Amhara since August 2023.
 
With the humanitarian situation continuing to deteriorate and public services still so limited in the region, Fano factions have further sought to capitalise on ill will towards the government. Still, the longer the armed conflict drags on, the more there is a chance that Fano's current popularity may begin to dwindle. Its decentralised nature means there is a variation in how these factions interact with the public, with some targeting individuals accused of collaborating with the ENDF. Nevertheless, the lack of a clearly defined agenda by the dozens of militias has also meant that the ethnic nationalist forces are 'many things for many people.'
 
While some pro-Amhara commentators have claimed that Addis Ababa will soon fall to Fano, the disparate militias do not possess the capacity to seize and hold major urban areas. For the most influential Fano units in Gojjam and elsewhere, their tactics appear to be less about seizing territory and more about degrading ENDF capacity. And while it has had some successes in doing so, and vice versa, it is clear that neither side has been able to land a decisive military blow. The insurgency appears set to continue for the forseeable future, with no suggestion of peace negotiations on the horizon.

By the Ethiopian Cable team 

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